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ABSTRACT 
 
Complex Feedback Loops of  
Technoscience, Literature, and Culture: 
Dynamics of the Complexity Paradigm in Scientific Fiction. (August 2010) 
Ho Rim Song, B.A., Pukyong National University; 
M.A., Pusan National University; 
M.A., Kansas State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sally Robinson 
 
 This dissertation explores the emergence of the complexity paradigm in our 
technoscience culture and proposes ―scientific fiction‖ as a genre of cultural studies 
based on that paradigm.  Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms and concepts of 
complexity theory developed by new science, which revises the reductionism and 
linearity of classic science.  The complexity paradigm signifies a system of all 
knowledge that conceives the productivity and creativity of the complexity created by 
interconnective and interactive dynamics among and within systems.  As a literary 
response to the complexity paradigm, scientific fiction emphasizes the productivity and 
creativity of the complexity, offering the possibility of the human‘s co-evolution with 
technoscience.  These characteristics of scientific fiction help articulate new ontological, 
ethical, and aesthetic visions for the posthuman.  This dissertation ultimately highlights 
 iv 
the strong feedback loops of technoscience, literature, and culture, which promote the 
complexity paradigm.   
By comparing Pat Cadigan‘s Synners as a scientific fiction novel and William 
Gibson‘s Neuromancer as a representative postmodern science fiction novel, Chapter II 
presents the defining characteristics of scientific fiction, reconfiguring humanity in 
relation to the technoscience environment.  Furthermore, analyzing Greg Bear‘s Blood 
Music, the chapter claims that the human subject is an adaptive, self-organizing, 
interconnective system.  Grounded in such understandings of humanity and subjectivity, 
the next chapter examines Marge Piercy‘s He, She and It to offer a new ethical 
perspective, or the complexity ethics, which establishes the interconnective and 
interactive relationship between the human and the technological as an evolutionary 
partner.  The complexity ethics describes human behaviors and thoughts in our 
technoscience culture rather than prescribing a moral guideline.  Next, in investigating 
Shelley Jackson‘s Patchwork Girl, a hypertext novel that rewrites Mary Shelley‘s 
Frankenstein, Chapter IV explores a new aesthetics appreciating the creativity of the 
complexity produced by interconnective and interactive dynamics.  Finally, through the 
analyses of the scientific fiction novels, this dissertation suggests that scientific fiction is 
a transdisciplinary field that can offer new cultural visions.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGING COMPLEXITY PARADIGM, 
COMPLEXITY THEORY, AND SCIENTIFIC FICTION 
 
1. The Emerging Network Culture and the Complexity Paradigm 
The transformation of social structure from industrial society to post-industrial 
society and the epistemological transition from modernity to post-modernity during the 
twentieth century cause the human to go through a time of confusion and uncertainty 
both in the physical and metaphysical sense.  Daniel Bell maintains that this confusion 
and uncertainty are associated with increasing complexity by the altered physical and 
metaphorical environments and that social and cultural problems occur in handling this 
complexity: ―The major intellectual and sociological problems of the postindustrial 
society are those of ‗organized complexity‘—the management of large-scale systems, 
with large numbers of interacting variables, which have to be coordinated to achieve 
specific goals‖ (29).  Bell asserts that what matters for a society is how to organize 
complexity.  In order to understand our society and its culture, which is considered post-
industrial and post-modern, therefore, we have to first understand complexity.  Naming 
the post-industrial society as the ―information society,‖ Bell claims that the  
 
 
________________________ 
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understanding of the creation and exchange of information makes our post-industrial age 
distinctive and that information science and technology, such as information theory, 
cybernetics, and game theory, emerge to solve social and cultural problems caused by 
social complexity (29-30).  This view contributes to solidifying the assumption that 
―[t]he growing outer social complexity is matched by a corresponding inner 
technological complexity‖ (Qvortrup 118).  Indeed, information science and technology, 
which can model the ―organized complexity‖ as shown in the creation of the computer, 
allow us to understand social and cultural complexity by exploring how large numbers of 
interacting variables work to produce complex systems.  
Science and technology in our age, however, not only reflect the complexity of 
our age but also they actively participate in increasing complexity.  Science and 
technology cannot be innocent of cultural values and aspirations in that they are rooted 
in human labor and social relations; science and technology come to be deeply involved 
in metaphorical areas as well as physical areas.  Furthering this idea, Michael Reed and 
David L. Harvey contend that a ―new worldview is emerging in sciences‖ and 
technologies (353).  In the same vein, Donna Haraway suggests the term 
―technoscience‖ as an epistemic word for the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
For her, ―technoscience‖ is not just a combined word of technology and science.  Rather, 
Haraway defines the term as the ―hyperspace‖ that exceeds the distinction between 
science and technology: it is ―a specific, finite, material-semiotic universe‖ (Modest 3).  
Through the term, she re-confirms the fact that science and technology become cultural 
conditions of our age.  Technoscience, indeed, is ―culture,‖ performing ―the task of 
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reflecting a world back to us and of articulating its own . .  . version of reality‖ (Graham 
30).  The culture that technoscience reflects and articulates is the network culture that 
works as a complex system, which is ever-changing, nonlinear, and interconnective.  
Reconfiguring the world as a complex system that is dynamically networked, 
technoscience ―treats nature and society as if they were ontologically open and 
historically constituted; . . . non-reductive and indeterminate, yet amenable to rational 
explanation; capable of seeing nature as a ‗self-organizing‘ enterprise without 
succumbing to anthropomorphism or mystifying animism‖ (Reed and Harvey 359).  In 
this way, rejecting traditions of binary thoughts produced by the ideas of discontinuity 
and disconnectivity and instead foregrounding the complexity that emerges from 
crisscrossing connectivity among them, the network culture of technoscience attempts to 
reconfigure such binary relationships as nature and culture, self/subject and other/object, 
and science/technology and humanities/art.  In the process of such reconfiguration, the 
network culture of technoscience evokes feedback loops among culture, theory, and 
science/technology.  The understanding of the feedback loops, which assumes 
interconnective and interactive dynamics between systems, renders the emergence of the 
complexity paradigm.   
The complexity paradigm is an epistemological framework channeling the 
cultural dynamics of the network culture.  ―Paradigm‖ in this dissertation means a 
system of intuitive knowledge that defines the condition for the construction of all 
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knowledge at a particular time.
1
  The complexity paradigm signifies a system of all 
knowledge that conceives complexity, or the dynamics of interconnectivities and 
interactivities among and within systems.  The dissertation deems that the emergence of 
the complexity paradigm becomes noticeable with the development of information 
theories and technologies, and the constitution of its epistemology is spurred with the 
disciplinary convergence of hard science and the humanities.  Complexity theory is 
formed by the new epistemological move.
2
  Complexity theory views the world as a 
large system composed of (sub)systems, in which components of systems and systems 
themselves are interconnected and also adaptively self-organized into more complex 
systems.  This distinctive worldview of complexity theory can grasp and articulate the 
interconnective and interactive dynamics of the network culture.  The dissertation is 
indebted to this viewpoint and the lexicon of complexity theory in arguing the 
emergence of the network culture and its complexity paradigm.  Locating science, 
technology, and literature within the complex network of culture viewed by complexity 
                                                   
1
 In The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Thomas Kuhn defines paradigm as an agreed-upon 
achievement model in scientific practices.  Foucault develops the concept of ―episteme‖ based on Kuhn‘s 
paradigm; ―An episteme is the ‗underground‘ grid of network which allows thought to organize itself‖ 
(Horrocks and Jevtic 65).  The ―paradigm‖ in this dissertation is a negotiated concept of Kuhn‘s paradigm 
and Foucault‘s episteme in that it is a worldview based on scientific ideas.     
2
 Although the discussion of complexity is not new, complexity theory is still new to social sciences and 
humanities. Complexity theory was substantiated when Santa Fe Institute was founded in 1984 to research 
complex adaptive systems, which is essential to understand contemporary social and cultural environment. 
Santa Fe Institute is constituted of groups of scholars from a variety of fields, such as biology, computer 
science, economics, politics, etc. The institute itself is a complexity group of contemporary knowledge. In 
Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (1992), M. Mitchell Waldrop 
introduces the process of the foundation of Santa Fe Institute and the science of complexity in the hope 
that the science of complexity would be able to give insight into today‘s complex social, cultural, and 
economic environments. After the book was published, the term ―complexity theory‖ began to become 
famous. Along with Waldrop‘s book, Roger Lewin‘s Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos and Mark. C. 
Taylor‘s The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture are known as the primary texts of 
complexity theory.  
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theory, the dissertation examines how scientific fiction illuminates and reproduces a 
variety of interactivity both within and among systems.   
In understanding contemporary cultural trends, complexity theory basically 
agrees with some principles of postmodernism, such as the emphasis of difference and 
the rejection of totality.  Yet complexity theory foregrounds more creative and 
positivistic possibilities of the network culture through the amalgam of scientific 
thoughts and philosophical insights.  Viewing the world as a large complex system 
composed of ―complex, self-organizing adaptive systems,‖ complexity theory explains 
that complex systems ―possess a kind of dynamism that makes them qualitatively 
different from static objects, such as computer chips or snowflakes, which are merely 
complicated‖ (Waldrop 11-12).  The dynamism of a complex system gains ―the ability to 
bring order and chaos into a special kind of balance‖ and ―[t]he balance point—often 
called the edge of chaos—is where the components of a system never quite lock in place, 
and yet never quite dissolve into turbulence, either‖ (Waldrop 12, italics in orginal).  The 
dynamism that complexity theory conceptualizes is what the dissertation tries to point 
out in analyzing scientific fiction novels so as to claim that the viewpoint of complexity 
theory is more positive than any other recent cultural and social view.  Considering the 
dynamism of complexity theory, the dissertation attempts to answer the following 
questions: how can we define human beings in the complex system of our culture?; how 
can the relationship between the self and the other be conceptualized within the frame of 
complexity theory?; based on the answers to the previous two questions, how are we 
expected to behave and what would be the ethical criteria in the moment of decision 
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making ?; in the new concepts of ourselves and the world, then, how do we sense and 
create aesthetics?  Through answering those questions, the dissertation will show how 
differently the concept of complexity theory can suggest human subjectivity and the 
cognition of reality.  Nonetheless, it is not the construction of a new world, but a new 
understanding of the world.  Fundamentally, through the dissertation, I propose that we 
are not in ―schizophrenic structures‖3 but are ―connected‖ to ―complex, self-organizing, 
adaptive systems,‖ and that the reality that we perceive in this ontological condition is 
not disappearing into simulacra
4
 any more but reappearing as the inseparably interactive 
compound of the actual and the virtual.   
Introducing terms and concepts used in this dissertation and mapping theoretical 
territory to which the dissertation belongs, this chapter investigates how ―complexity‖ is 
brought to the attention of scientists and cultural theorists and thus how their concerns 
towards complexity produce complexity theory.  Then by surveying the understandings 
of the relationship between science/technology and humanities, particularly literature, 
this chapter examines how science/technology studies and literary studies interface, 
forming the feedback loops among technoscience, literature, and culture.  All these 
investigations are designed to suggest scientific fiction as a genre, which can make 
visible the feedback loops among technoscience, literature, and culture.  In fact, the 
feedback loops among technoscience, literature, and culture, this dissertation argues, are 
                                                   
3
 The discussions of ―schizophrenic structure‖ are often found in postmodern theories.  See Fredric 
Jameson‘s Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism and Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari‘s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  
4
 To see further discussion of reality and simulacra, refer to Jean Baudrillard‘s Simulacra and Simulation. 
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a manifestation of the emergence of the complexity paradigm in our technoscience 
culture.   
 
2. Complexity Theory: A Complex Marriage of Science and Cultural Studies 
Classic science pursues universal laws of nature through the reductive process of 
simplification, and complexity presents a constant stumbling block to this process.  But 
with the emergence of the new science where priority is given to the creativity of 
disorder or chaos, complexity becomes a major subject of science.  Indeed, the scientific 
paradigm shifts from simplification to complexity, forming the science of chaos and the 
science of complexity.
5
  For the new science, ―chaos does not refer to inherently random 
or wholly disorderly phenomena that lie beyond our rational grasp‖ (Reed and Harvey 
359).  Instead, chaos is an incredibly complex and unpredictable system, which can 
produce multiple variables through nonlinear, self-organizing dynamics among 
components of a system.  Therefore, chaos is not the opposite of order but the prior 
phase to order.  In this sense, chaos, which has infinite potential, can be understood as a 
type of complexity.  Based on this understanding of chaos and complexity, the new 
                                                   
5
 Both the science of chaos and the science of complexity are the products of the new science that modifies 
the reductionism and linearity of classic science. Chaos theory, which claims that there is order in 
disorder, has brought about a new breadth to scientific, social, and cultural knowledge and perception. 
Following chaos theory, complexity theory emerged, emphasizing the complexity of the chaotic world. 
Complexity theory is both related to and different from chaos theory. Although they share similar concerns 
about chaotic systems, their way to accesses chaos is a little different: while chaos theory is concerned 
with the order hidden in the chaotic system, complexity theory is concerned with the order that arises out 
of chaotic system. In other words, complexity theory focuses on interconnectivity and interactivity 
between systems in order to see how to organize systems rather than what constitutes systems. As Stuart 
Sim claims, ―complexity takes chaos further, to argue that systems further a high degree of self-
organization‖ (90). Chaos theory and postmodernism cooperate with each other based on their common 
worldview in seeing reality as disorderly order. However, complexity theory tends to extend its reach 
outside science without cooperating with other cultural theories.   
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science becomes concerned with the immediate experience of a chaotic-looking world 
and of the complex structures that constitute it.  As Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers 
claim, the scientific worldview also helps us ―find ourselves in a world in which 
reversibility and determinism apply only to limiting, simple cases, while irreversibility 
and randomness are the rules‖ (8).  Such a sociological view presented by scientists 
affirms the emergence of the interface between hard science and social science, which is 
a characteristic of cultural studies for the techcnoscience culture.   
The science of chaos and complexity is based on the assumption that collective 
behavior and complex phenomena have patterns of activity, which form ―a common 
theoretical framework for complexity that would illuminate nature and humankind alike‖ 
(Waldrop 12).  Chaos theory and complexity theory study the patterns in 
chaotic/complex systems.  Particularly, paying attention to interconnective and 
interactive dynamics between subsystems, complexity theory holds that complex 
systems created and sustained by the dynamics are spontaneous, nonlinear, self-
organizing, and adaptive.  Complexity theory sees the world as a large complex system, 
believing that this worldview allows us to ―understand the spontaneous, self-organizing 
dynamics of the world in a way that no one ever has before‖ (Waldrop 13).  In an 
attempt to establish complexity theory as a fitting theoretical framework for cultural 
studies, Mark C. Taylor recounts the characteristics of complex systems as the 
following: 
1. Complex systems are comprised of many different parts, which are 
connected in multiple ways. 
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2. Divers components can interact both serially and in parallel to 
generate sequential as well as simultaneous effects and events.  
3. Complex systems display spontaneous self-organization, which 
complicates interiority and exteriority in such a way that the line that 
is supposed to separate them becomes undecidable.  
4. The structures resulting from spontaneous self-organization emerge 
from but are not necessarily reducible to the interactivity of the 
components or elements in the system.  
5. Though generated by local interaction, emergent properties tend to be 
global. 
6. Inasmuch as self-organizing structures emerge spontaneously, 
complex systems are neither fixed nor static but develop or evolve. 
Such evolution presupposes that complex systems are both open and 
adaptive. 
7. Emergence occurs in a narrow possibility space lying between 
conditions that are too ordered and too disordered. This boundary or 
margin is ―the edge of chaos,‖ which is always far from equilibrium. 
(Moment 142-43)  
Taylor here integrates terms and concepts of complexity scattered among science studies 
and social sciences.  In fact, because it first emerged in science studies, complexity 
theory is still new for cultural studies.  But through his work of integrating the terms and 
concepts of complexity, Taylor assures critics, writers, and artists that complexity theory 
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is an adequate theory to model our technoscience culture.  Critics, writers, and artists are 
those who represent the complexity of our time and even participate in increasing the 
complexity through their works: in other words, they work under the complexity 
paradigm.  To the extent that the world is conceived of as a complex system, every 
discursive and creative moment is the moment of complexity, which is the very moment 
that this dissertation pursues to engage in, too.  The moment is neither a completely 
abstract, immaterial, and nonhuman moment, nor completely a substantial, material, and 
human one; rather, it is a material-nonmaterial, human-nonhuman, physical-
metaphysical moment.  The dissertation attempts to establish complexity theory as an 
adequate framework to view the interfacial cultural context of our age and to configure 
the cultural epistemology of the complexity paradigm.  
The science of chaos and complexity are often called ―postmodern science‖ in 
that they deny reductionism of classic science and value difference and multiplicity in 
systems: postmodernism rejects reductionism, which has formed hierarchical 
relationships among components of a system and also made metanarratives possible.  
However, complexity theorists, including Bob Price and Taylor, claim that to call the 
science of chaos and complexity ―postmodern science‖ is a mistake (Price 3).  In ―The 
Myth of Postmodern Science,‖ Price argues that while postmodernists reject the entire 
concept of science as flawed and incorrigible, scientists and theorists of chaos and 
complexity see that ―‗science‘ is not the problem, but [the] classical science is‖ (7); they 
want to ―reconstruct‖ science while postmodernists want to ―deconstruct‖ it (14).  In 
sum, scientists and theorists of chaos and complexity reject reductionism employed by 
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classic science, but they do not deny rationalism and positivism of science.  For them, 
the situation of post-industrial or technoscience society is ―not hopeless‖ since ―science 
is not incorrigible‖ (Price 8).  In this sense, they cannot agree with the postmodern 
relativisitic position that ―reality per se is subjective and contingent‖ (Price 9).  Despite 
such efforts of science theorists to differentiate the science of chaos and complexity from 
postmodern science studies, however, cultural articulations emerging from the 
postmodern context still tend to subjugate complexity theory to the theoretical 
framework of postmodernism in order to account for the complexity of technoscience 
milieu.    
Emphasizing affinities between the new science of chaos and complexity and 
articulations pertinent to the postmodern context, N. Katherine Hayles characterizes the 
postmodern context as ―an emergent awareness of the constructive roles that disorder, 
nonlinearity, and noise play in complex system‖ (Hayles, ―Complex Dynamics‖ 5).  She 
maintains that this awareness is accompanied with the realization of coercive structures 
of order and stability, which have established hierarchical social and cultural systems.  In 
this way, she appropriates the new science to ―denature‖ our cultural context, promoting 
the realization that ―what has always been thought of as the essential, unvarying 
components of human experience are not natural facts of life but social construction‖: 
Hayles calls the realization ―cultural postmodernism‖ (Chaos 265).  Grounded in the 
concept of chaos and complexity provided by the new science, she claims that cultural 
postmodernism re-visions the world as dynamic, nonlinear, and thus unpredictable: in 
that world, parts come together and mutually reinforce each other, producing 
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complexity.  This claim is what complexity theory offers as the nature of the world or of 
the technoscience culture.  However, Hayles‘s accounts of cultural postmodernism do 
not fully explore why the worldview of complexity theory must be located within the 
theoretical framework of postmodernism.
6
   
In order to account for the complexity of the postmodern context, Paul Cilliers 
tries to rearticulate postmodern issues in terms of complexity theory.  Cilliers argues that 
a multiplicity of postmodern discourses reflect ―an acknowledgement of complexity‖ 
(116).  There is, however, a major difference between postmodernism and complexity 
theory—that is, their understandings of the whole.  Both postmodernism and complexity 
theory reject totality.  Yet, regarding this anti-totality, whereas postmodernism denies 
the concept of the whole, complexity theory champions the idea of a complex system 
working as a whole: complexity theory offers the possibility of non-totalizing whole, 
which postmodernism does not.  Yet Cilliers tries to blur this difference between the two 
theories by offering Jean-Francois Lyotard‘s notion of ―paralogy‖ as evidence to show 
how postmodern discourses produce networks with other discourses.  Lyotard proposes 
                                                   
6
 Relatively early, Hayles became concerned with the science of chaos and complexity and attempted to 
apply it to literary and cultural studies in terms of postmodernism, as shown in her works published in the 
early 1990s: Chaos Bound (1990) and ―Complex dynamics in Literature and Science‖ in her edited book, 
Chaos and Order (1991). In Chaos Bound, she asserts that ―poststructuralists appropriated [chaos] to 
subvert order‖ whereas ―scientists see chaos as the source of order‖ and attempts to open an intellectual 
path that crisscrosses the two ways of appreciating chao—and complexity— through her accounts of 
―cultural postmodernism‖ in order to articulate the complexity of our technoscience culture (176). 
However, she does not concretely suggest the intellectual path until she begins to distinguish her 
understanding of complexity from postmodernism in the late 1990s. In offering a new understanding of the 
―posthuman‖ in How We Became Posthuman (1999), she criticizes a postmodern tendency to downplay 
materiality and claims the interconnective relationship between the discursive and the material. Through 
the new understanding of the posthuman, she seems to recognize the need for a new way to articulate our 
technoscience culture—rather than the expansion of postmodernism. Considering Hayles‘s recent works, 
such as ―Commentary: The Search for the Human‖ (2005) and Electronic Literature (2008), which use the 
terms and concepts of complexity theory, her idea of the intellectual path to crisscross science and 
humanities meets complexity theory. My critique of Hayles‘s cultural postmodernism here is based on her 
early works that directly deal with the concept of complexity.  
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―paralogy,‖ the search for imaginative new insights into existing theories by noting 
anomalies and paradoxes, as an essential element of the postmodern condition, arguing 
―incredulity toward metanarratives‖ (xxiv).  Cilliers contends that this function of 
paralogy has similarity with that of ―self-organized criticality,‖ ―the mechanism by 
which networks diversify their internal structure maximally,‖ in a complex system (117).  
However, although both the paralogy of postmodernism and the self-organization of 
complexity theory are dynamics which bring about multiplicity and decentralization of 
systems, this paralleling seems overdone in a fundamental sense.  While self-
organization in complexity theory is a means to sustain a whole, Cilliers‘s postmodern 
understanding of self-organization, as paralogy, functions to collapse the concept of the 
whole, or metanarrative.  Considering this difference in the position of complexity 
theory, Taylor asserts ―the well-known postmodern critique of meta-narrative is wrong‖ 
(Rickert and Blakesley 816).  Moreover, as David Byrne points out in the review of 
Cilliers‘s book Complexity and Postmodernism, Cilliers‘s postmodern comprehension of 
complexity has an ultimate difference from complexity theory in the understanding of 
science.  Lyotard‘s paralogy is based on the postmodernist programme as a general 
deconstruction of science and knowledge.  Likewise, Cilliers also perceives science in 
the sense of ―constructed general theory,‖ unlike complexity theory emerging from real 
science (par. 5).  Cilliers‘s insight into the complexity of our cultural context is 
compelling, but his attempt to use the postmodern theoretical framework in articulating 
the complexity seems far-reaching.   
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As shown in the cases of Hayles and Cilliers, however, postmodern science 
studies and complexity theory are both related to and different from each other.  This 
dissertation deems that complexity theory is not anti-postmodernism, but rather it is 
post-postmodernism, a modification of previous science and cultural theories, including 
chaos theory and postmodernism.  In Complexity and the Social Sciences, David Byrne 
formulates the position of complexity theory in the map of cultural studies: ―the linear 
and reductionist as a thesis, postmodernism as an antithesis and complexity as a 
synthesis‖ (45).  This dialectical formulation is not a historical account of the 
development of scientific knowledge and of the knowledge of social actions, but rather it 
is an outline to show the formation process of complexity theory.  Complexity theory, in 
fact, is in interconnective relations to previous paradigmatic theories.  Accordingly, it is 
probably not proper to emphasize the difference of complexity theory as a cultural 
theory from others, but, at the same time, it is necessary to do so in order to appraise its 
value as a theoretical framework to envision a new paradigm emerging in the 
technoscience culture—the complexity paradigm.  The dissertation suggests that the 
human is facing the new paradigm and we need new terms and concepts to articulate it, 
arguing that postmodern science studies cannot adequately cope with the dynamics and 
complexity of the new paradigm.   
 In order to claim a paradigm shift in our technoscience culture and further 
explore the emerging complexity paradigm in terms of complexity theory, this 
dissertation purposely limits the theoretical reach of postmodernism although Hayles and 
Cilliers try to offer the possibilities—which feel contrived— that postmodern science 
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studies may be extensively used to articulate the complexity of the current cultural 
context by borrowing terms and concepts from complexity theory.  This dissertation sees 
that postmodern epistemology, rejecting the integration and totality of modernism, is 
pertinent to such concepts as fragmentation, rupture, and discontinuity, and that 
complexity theory is a new insight into the dynamism of interconnection and interaction, 
reflecting and observing the epistemological framework of the complexity paradigm.  
Postmodern science studies contend that meaning is created by dismantling the existing 
orders/hierarchical systems and emphasizing the differences of the deconstructed 
components of the systems, but complexity theory sees that meaning is created by 
interconnections and interactions between subsystems and between subsystems and the 
whole.  By calling into question science‘s reductionism and linearity—rationalism per 
se—, postmodern science studies challenge the traditional concept of knowledge and 
claim the social construction of science/scientific knowledge.  For this postmodern 
position, all knowledge is necessarily ideological and reality per se is subjective.  Such 
characteristics of postmodern science studies reinforce relativistic—as a result, 
nihilistic—views in cultural understandings.  However, complexity theory, modifying 
the belief of classic science in reductionism and linearity, claims that ―there is reality 
‗out there‘ although it recognizes that complex interactions can obscure that reality‖ 
(Price 8).  For that stance of complexity theory, the rationalism of science is a necessary 
method to discern a reality and to infuse empirical and (thus) positive views into cultural 
understandings, in which a metaphysical nihilism is pervaded.  The dissertation focuses 
the empirical and optimistic view found in scientific fiction, critiquing the relativistic 
 16 
and nihilistic view of postmodernism.  The next section explores how technoscience 
studies and literary studies have tried to make or perceive feedback loops, on which 
scientific fiction is founded.    
 
3. Feedback Loops between Science/Technology, Literature, and Culture 
Around fifty years ago, C. P. Snow deplored, as a major hindrance to solving the 
world‘s problems, the breakdown of communication and thus ―a gulf of mutual 
incomprehension‖ between science and the humanities—in particular, literature— 
expressing their relation in terms of a dichotomy: ―Literary intellectuals at one pole—at 
the other pole scientists, and as the most representative, the physical scientists‖ (4).  As 
Snow noted, there was still a traditional master-slave relationship between science and 
literature in that dichotomy: that is based on the Western intellectual tradition of 
privileging reason over imagination and the assumption that literature is a cultural 
consumption of truth revealed by science.  But the terms of the dichotomy have evolved 
in the years since to build a bridge between science and literature and, as a result, 
science and literature are now viewed —especially by the postmoderns— as similarly 
constituted practices embedded in culturally and historically contingent formations.  
Since the dissertation ultimately maintains that the way to understand the relationship 
between science/technology and literature is related to the epistemological framework of 
contemporary culture, I will here outline recent studies that influence the reconfiguration 
of the relationship between science, literature/humanities, and, further, culture, to grasp 
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how the epistemological framework of the complexity paradigm has evolved around that 
relationship.  
The emergence of the sociology of scientific knowledge in the 1970s brought 
about a big change in science studies.  While traditional sociology of knowledge focuses 
on how, and to what extent, science influenced society and history, the sociology of 
scientific knowledge claims science‘s social, historical contingency.  The sociology of 
scientific knowledge contends that the focus of the philosophy of science shifts from 
knowledge to practice, denying science as ―a single unitary entity‖ and claiming ―the 
multiplicity, patchiness, and heterogeneity of the space in which scientists work‖ 
(Pickering 8).  For the sociology of scientific knowledge, therefore, scientific knowledge 
is the product of a particular culture, and scientists inescapably bring the assumptions of 
the paradigm constructed by their scientific and cultural community to bear on the 
questions they ask and the phenomena they perceive.  Based on this perception about the 
sociality of scientific knowledge, feminism criticizes normativities supported or 
constructed by gendered scientific knowledge, and reads ―science as a text in order to 
reveal the social meaning—the hidden symbolic and structural agendas—of purportedly 
value-neutral claims and practice‖ (Harding 18).  The sociology of scientific knowledge 
and feminism‘s culturalizing of scientific knowledge make science close to literature by 
revealing that scientific texts are as amenable to critical analysis as any work of 
imaginative literature.   
Donna Haraway furthers this feminist view about science by dismantling the 
traditional distinction between fact and fiction.  In Primate Visions, Haraway claims that 
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―the history of science appears as a narrative about the history of technical and social 
means to produce the facts. The facts themselves are types of stories‖ (4).  In this way, 
Haraway connects science as narrative to science fiction, emphasizing that both of them 
are in ―a territory of contested cultural reproduction‖ (5).  However, Haraway remains 
wary of claims of nature being reducible to narrative, or science to signs; it is important 
to Haraway not to operate such a reduction, but to hybridize different categories.  
Haraway suggests the image of a cyborg as a hybrid of heterogeneous categories, such as 
science and narrative, or the material and the semantic: for her, a cyborg is a material-
semantic being that illustrates the connection between scientific, literal, and cultural 
issues without annexing reality to discourse.  The concept of the hybrid is acclaimed as 
an inclusive approach to the networks of current technoscientific culture.  But some 
critics emphasize interactivities between science and narrative/literature rather than their 
hybridization, expressing an apprehension that valuing hybridization can give rise to 
―unpleasantly self-conscious form of scientific art or artistic science‖ (Wilson 211).  
In Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, Edward O. Wilson points to complexity 
as the common characteristic of science and literature, stating ―[t]he love of complexity 
without reductionism makes art; the love of complexity with reductionism makes 
science‖ (54).  He suggests that there is a complementary relationship between science 
and art/literature, which allows them to keep their separate strength, rather than 
hybridizing them: ―Science needs the intuition and metaphorical power of the arts, and 
the arts need the fresh blood of science‖ (211).  Wilson proposes interpretation as ―the 
logical channel of consilient explanation between science and the arts,‖ which have 
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different goals and methods, in that interpretation expresses both ―the factual expertise 
of the critic‖ and ―his character and aesthetic judgment‖ (211).  Likewise, J.L. Howarth 
regards science and literature as different forms of interpreting ―reality‖: science 
interprets ―reality‖ by thinking about and narrating ―a model of the part of the universe 
of experience with which we are dealing,‖ and literature does so by narrating images of 
the universe of our experience (181).  In this way, Howarth, like Wilson, outlines the 
disciplinary differences.  For Wilson and Howarth, the differences serve to produce 
mutual enrichment, but neither critic expands the discussion of consilience between 
science and literature into the scope of cultural discourses.  
Current postmodern literary criticism tends to use science to restore the place of 
literature, denying the literature of exhaustion.
7
  William R. Paulson tries to reestablish 
the place of literature in culture by connecting information theory and cognitive 
processing to the criticism of literature.  He claims literature is ―the noise of culture‖ in 
that it functions as ―a perturbation or source of variety in the circulation and production 
of discourses and ideas‖ (Noise ix).  By so doing, he shifts the role of literature from ―the 
leading edge of the trash phenomenon‖ to ―communication crafted to maximize the 
positive role of noise‖ (Hayles, ―Complex‖ 20).8  Paulson expects that the new role of 
literature supported by science can give rise to ―new forms of explanation, new 
articulations between levels of phenomena in a world of emergent complexity‖ 
(―Literature‖ 49).  However, the expectation is achieved by placing literature as the noise 
                                                   
7
  1960s‘ postmodern critics and writers, such as John Barth and Philip Roth, retreated literature into 
―narrower and more sterile byways of linguistic, stylistic, and formalistic experimentation,‖ which Barth 
called ―literature of exhaustion‖ (Porush, ―Fictions‖ 77).   
8
  The passage, ―the leading edge of the trash phenomenon,‖ is from Donald Barthelme‘s Snow White 
(103). It is often used to indicate the understanding of postmodern literature in the 1960s.   
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of culture in ―the margin‖ (Paulson, Noise 180).  In other words, the ―hierarchical gap‖ 
between science and literature still remains in Paulson‘s vision (Paulson, ―Literature‖ 
50). 
David Porush refuses the idea that literature is marginal.  Rather, Porush 
contends that literary works come to ―be understood as a superior form of describing 
what we know‖ thanks to the science of complexity—particularly, its concept of 
dissipative structure: he claims that literature, like the dissipative system, ―acts as a self-
organizing system, growing willy nilly through bifurcation points towards higher orders 
of systematic organization‖ (―Fictions‖ 76-77).  In his view, literature is no longer in 
competition with science in describing reality, but rather it has a complementary 
relationship with science.  Further, this view shows that the concept of complexity helps 
challenge the usual idea of the flow of influence from science to literature, and that the 
connection between science and literature is no longer metaphoric to the extent that the 
boundaries between them get blurred in their complementary relationship.   
Hayles holds that the complementarity of science and literature is essential in the 
technoscience age: ―[t]he literary texts often reveal, as scientific works cannot, the 
complex cultural, social, and representational issues tied up with conceptual shifts and 
technological innovations‖ while ―[t]he scientific texts often reveal, as literature cannot, 
the foundational assumptions that gave theoretical scope and artifactual efficacy to a 
particular approach‖ (Posthuman 24).  Therefore, the study of literature and science 
together should be taken as ―an area of specialization‖ rather than ―a subset of cultural 
studies or a minor activity‖ to understand ourselves who are ―embodied creatures living 
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within and through embodied worlds and embodied words‖ (Posthuman 24).  The 
dissertation offers scientific fiction as the ―area of specialization‖ of cultural studies.  
Scientific fiction straightforwardly shows the complementary relationship of literature 
and science and the complexity paradigm based on the comprehensive understanding of 
that relationship.   
 
4. Scientific Fiction: Novel Perspectives of the New Paradigm 
I suggest scientific fiction neither as a subgenre of science fiction nor as a way to 
re-read science fiction or literary works dealing with science and technology.  Rather, I 
categorize as ―scientific fiction‖ literary works that understand the interconnective and 
interactive dynamics of the technoscience culture and value the complexity produced by 
the dynamics: they function as as observers and participants of the complexity paradigm.  
Based on this definition of scientific fiction, various science fictions and works from 
other genres are within the scope of scientific fiction: from Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein 
to recent cyberfictions and cognitive fictions and to hypertexts.  Scientific fiction as a 
transdisciplinary practice creatively uses the interconnective dynamics of the complexity 
paradigm and it creates the context that energizes the dynamics.      
The dissertation differentiates scientific fiction from postmodern understandings 
of science fiction in order to emphasize the critical characteristics of scientific fiction.  
Postmodern science fiction—particularly, cyberpunk, a subgenre of science fiction 
appropriating information science and technology— interestingly imagines how far the 
boundaries of the human subject can be expanded by technologies and questions how the 
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redefined subject will live in a world where the boundaries between human and 
nonhuman beings blur.  Due to its collaboration with postmodernism, science fiction, or 
narrowly cyberpunk, is regarded as an agent of postmodernism seeking discontinuity or 
disconnectivity.
9
  In the same vein, Rosi Braidotti claims that science fiction is ―all about 
displacement, ruptures and discontinuities‖ (Metamorphoses 182).  Postmodern science 
fiction conceives of science and technology as deepening the 
discontinuity/disconnectivity only to produce ―high-tech paranoia‖ (Jameson 38).  
Indeed, postmodern writers, such as William Burroughs and Thomas Pynchon, ―confront 
in their fiction the incompleteness and narrowness of science both thematically and in 
their deployment of literary style‖—for instance, discontinuity, ambiguity, and collage 
(Porush, ―Hacking‖ 109).  Such distrust of science and technology is rooted in the anti-
rationalism and relativism of the postmoderns.  The postmodern relativistic and anti-
rational viewpoint results in a schizophrenic understanding of our cultural condition in 
which the fragmentation of the human subject, rather than the coherence of the subject, 
is more persuasively discussed and in which universal ethics is no longer valid.
10
  Under 
the influence of the postmodern epistemology, science fiction thematizes and stylizes in 
its texts the fragmentation of the subject and the absence of ethical codes, reflecting 
postmodern nihilism. 
                                                   
9
  In Constructing Postmodernism, Brian McHale insists on ―[t]he cycling of materials between cyberpunk 
SF and postmodernist mainstream fiction,‖ using the phrases, ―postmodernism recycled as cyberpunk‖ and 
―cyberpunk recycled as postmodernism‖ (229-36). 
10
   See Fredric Jameson‘s Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism for the fragmentality 
of the subject and the discussion of the schizophrenic; for postmodern ethics, see Zygmunt Bauman‘s 
Postmodern Ethics. 
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However, despite similarities to postmodern science fiction such as descriptions 
of the cybernetic technology-sutured life, scientific fictions, including Pat Cadigan‘s 
Synners, Greg Bear‘s Blood Music, Marge Piercy‘s He, She and It, and Shelley 
Jackson‘s Patchwork Girl present more optimistic views.  Scientific fiction perceives 
and reinforces the impulse of (inter)connectivity inherent in the network culture of our 
technoscience age, describing the world as a dynamic system composed of ―complex, 
self-organizing, adaptive systems‖ rather than the collection of fragmented units 
(Waldrop 11).  In this understanding of the dynamics of the complexity paradigm, 
science and technology are no longer used as a metaphor for 
disconnectivity/discontinuity, but rather they are media that connect the subjects to other 
systems.  In this vein, scientific fiction accepts the changed relationship between the 
human and science/technology from a subject-object to ―a subject-subject relationship, 
in which not only does the human being form the technological agent, but the 
technological agent also forms the human being‖ (Qvortrup 90).  The favorable stance 
about science and technology also reflects the importance of science and technology as 
essential epistemological elements in the complexity paradigm.  However, the favorable 
stance of scientific fiction toward science and technology does not necessarily mean that 
scientific fiction is technophilic: scientific fiction is neither utopian nor dystopian for the 
future of the technoscience culture.  Its focus is on how the (post)human co-evolves with 
technoscience rather than how technoscience improves (post)humans and our 
environments or how we should keep our humanity from technoscience.   
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Based on such distinctive views of scientific fiction, I examine how scientific 
fiction novels articulate humanity, human subjectivity, ethics, and aesthetics, and how 
the articulations can show the emergence of the network culture and the complexity 
paradigm.  Chapter II analyzes Synners and Blood Music to delineate how science and 
technology both materially and discursively affect the construction of the subject.  In 
doing so, I redefine the human subject as an informational-material being, and reclaim 
the possibility of agency in accounting for the dynamics underlying the human subject.  
Furthering the discussion of the subject by representing the physiologically and 
psychologically obscure demarcation between human beings and technological monsters 
(cyborgs), Chapter III traces how Piercy‘s He, She and It explores an ethical dilemma 
generated by the technoscience culture: how would the subject live as/with a human-
machine conscience or a technological monster?  Through the analysis of human beings‘ 
ethical relationship with technological monsters (cyborgs) in the novel, I attempt to 
configure a new ethics for technoscience culture. I link this text with Mary Shelley‘s 
Frankenstein: or, the Modern Prometheus to examine their intertextual complexity made 
possible by the new ethics.  In Chapter IV, to suggest hypertext as a practical reaction of 
literature toward the new paradigm, I examine Jackson‘s hypertext Patchwork Girl, 
which rewrites Shelley‘s Frankenstein in the technoscientific narrative environment.  By 
examining the ―hypertextuality‖ that the electronic novel explores and also by focusing 
on the creative dynamics of the hypertextuality, the chapter discusses new aesthetic ideas 
provided by the complexity paradigm.  The analyzing focus of all chapters is on how 
each scientific fiction novel perceives and appropriates interconnective and interactive 
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dynamics between systems—whether between humans, between human and 
machine/technology, between individuals and social systems, or between different 
textual elements— and the complexity produced by the dynamics.  The dynamics and 
complexity read in the novels will be appreciated to claim the existence of the strong 
feedback loops between technoscience, literature, and culture and the emergence of the 
network culture and the complexity paradigm.   
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CHAPTER II 
THE POSTHUMAN CONDITION AND SELF-ORGANIZING SUBJECTIVITY 
IN THE COMPLEXITY PARADIGM 
 
It is an undeniable fact that tools and machines—or, technology—are ―part of the 
process of natural selection, giving humans an advantage in their evolutionary struggle‖ 
(Mazlish 216).  The familiar theme of ―man tool maker,‖ reflecting human beings‘ 
biological uniqueness and intellectual superiority, has long dominated human 
understanding of the relationship between humans and the rest of the world as well as 
technology.  Examining epistemological changes of human beings in evolutionary terms, 
Bruce Mazlish affirms that humans come to realize that we are not in a privileged 
position, but in intimate connections with machines.  He argues that that is the fourth 
discontinuity that the human race is recently breaking up: the discontinuity between 
human and machine.
11
  There have been considerable physical and metaphysical 
symptoms of the inseparable relationship between humans and machines.  Particularly, 
information theory and technologies, affecting dramatic changes in human life, have 
brought about a new context for humans, and now humans need to reconfigure 
themselves in that new context.  Mazlish expects that once humans break the 
discontinuity between ourselves and machines, humans can ―move closer to reality and 
away from disabling fantasy‖ (4).  Then, how will the reality in which the discontinuity 
                                                   
11
 Mazlish addresses that there have been breakdowns of discontinuities that have constituted human pride. 
Citing Sigmund Freud and Jerome Bruner, he states that through ―three smashings of the ego, humans are 
placed on a continuous spectrum in relation to the universe, to the rest of the animal kingdom, and to 
themselves‖: Greek philosophers and Copernicus‘s heliocentricism, Darwin‘s evolution theory, and 
Freud‘s theory of continuous ego and unconsciousness (4-5).  According to him, recently humans have 
begun breaking a fourth and major discontinuity: human and machine.   
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between humans and machines vanishes be like, and how can we articulate what it is to 
be the human and its subjectivity in that reality?  This chapter attempts to answer these 
questions by examining scientific fiction modeling novel conditions of the human in the 
new context, looking over posthuman discourses to get away from the arrogant fantasy 
that human beings have about our position in Nature—distinctive and privileged reason. 
Martin Heidegger was a leading philosopher who speculated on the relationship 
between human and technology in terms of human ontology.  He denied the instrumental 
understanding of technology and insisted on technological enframing (Gestell) of being 
in ―The Question Concerning Technology,‖ emphasizing his claim that the essence of 
technology was not technological.  Heidegger argued that technology should be 
understood as ―a way of revealing the totality of beings‖ (Krell 309).  According to him, 
the human is a being thrown into the world, which comes to be a dwelling in its infinite 
totality.  Modern technology and science become located deeply and fundamentally in 
what it means to be human and to engage in the world.  Therefore, to understand science 
and technology is a way to reveal the totality of beings.  Considering its caution about 
the possibility that the human can be enframed by technology, it can be said that this 
view embeds a technophobic stance that resists technology/science‘s power to 
dehumanize and objectify.  However, Heidegger‘s contribution to science/technology 
discourses is not his caution against potential dangers of technology, but rather his notice 
of the innate power of technology as an integral element in constituting the human 
subject.  In addition to such philosophical consideration for technology as constitutive, 
recent science and technologies make human beings physically and metaphysically 
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experience transition and metamorphosis.  Such discursive and material changes in 
understanding the relationship between human and science/technology call into question 
old issues about humanity: what is human nature and how is it scientifically described 
and symbolically reproduced?  These questions, however, imply a similar yet more 
essential question, ―what does it mean to be human?‖ 
Ironically, the question of ―what it means to be human‖ coemerges with 
discourses of ―the end of man.‖  Human‘s epistemological and ontological changes are 
too radical to keep the old concept of humanity, and thus a new definition of humanity is 
required.  Michel Foucault claims that ―Man is an invention of recent date. And one 
perhaps nearing its end‖ (Order 387).  He sees ―man‖ as a product of épistème—or, 
paradigm in Thomas Kuhn‘s term—of a period, and, in this sense, the end of man 
implies the change of the paradigm.  Foucault means that our contemporary paradigm no 
longer accommodates the agential subject formed in Western culture since the eighteenth 
century (the Modern age)—that is, the conscious and coherent self that produces 
meaning and actions.  Foucault‘s provocative remark of ―the end of man‖ represents 
postmodern deconstruction of liberal humanism.  Interrogating, or promoting, collapses 
of metanarratives including liberal humanism, postmodern critics have suggested new 
insights into the relationship between humans and the rest of the world.  They replace 
the traditional idea of the human subject, the agential self, with such consequential 
concepts of their deconstructive remapping of cognition as ―multiplicity, heterogeneity, 
difference, and ceaseless becoming‖ (Schrag 8).  In this postmodern understanding of 
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the human subject, humans cannot claim any more the ontological purity of human 
beings since human nature itself is ―an evolving identity‖ (Mazlish 7).  
The deconstruction of the subject comes to flourish with the advent of 
technological reconceptioning of humankind.  Such neologisms as cyborg, metamen,
12
 
and homo datum
13
 are attempts at the technological reconception of the human.  By 
modeling the human beyond homo-sapiens, these terms manifest that humans face a new 
stage of evolution and need new articulation for the new humanity.  Ihab Hassan names 
this emergent view of humanity as ―post-human‖ coming after the end of ―the five 
hundred years of humanism‖ (843).  This word is authorized, as a constellation of 
discourses of ―the end of man,‖ by self-proclaimed posthumanists, such as N. Katherine 
Hayles, who notice interactions between postmodernism and science/technology 
changes: science studies also question the universality of knowledge, and weigh in on 
knowledge‘s locality and situatedness.14  Such postmodern influences on science studies 
promoted discourses about posthumanism to be constructed in more scientific and 
technological concepts and terms.  More specifically, the question of ―what it means to 
be (post)human‖ becomes how to understand humans as a constitutive of the 
technoscience milieu.  
Technology modifies the concept of the human, making ‗natural‘ aspects of 
human beings obsolete: technologies concerning the human body, such as cybernetics, 
                                                   
12
 Gregory Stock uses this neologism, which represents human nature evolving with the milieu, in his book 
Metaman. 
13
 Cadigan‘s term to express the human as a being in informational networks. 
14
 This scholarly tendency was led by the sociology of science knowledge (SSK).  SSK insists on science‘s 
sociological aspects through empirical and naturalistic accounts of hard science. See Science as Practice 
and Culture (Andrew Pickering ed.).   
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biomedical technologies, and genetic engineering, come to implicate normative and 
exemplary humanity.  For this human condition, posthumanism suggests ―a human-
technology symbiosis‖ as a human existential mode of the technoscience age (Haney 2).  
Donna Haraway‘s statement, ―The machine is in us, our process, an aspect of our 
embodiment,‖ is no longer science-fictional imagination in the technoscience age 
(Simians 180).  Biotechnology, the convergence of technology and biology, literally 
begets the convergence of human and technology.  Such convergences make the cyborg 
real.  Haraway defines the cyborg as ―a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and 
organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction‖ (Simians 149).  The 
concept of the cyborg, understanding humans as conglomerations of separate parts, 
dissolves traditional boundaries by denaturing the human.  Indeed, the cyborg becomes 
the emblematic existential mode of humans in the posthuman age.  
Andy Clark claims that ―human beings . . . are natural-born cyborgs,‖ deepening 
the idea of the cyborg in the cognitive level: cyborgs, or ―being human-technology 
symbionts,‖ are ―thinking and reasoning systems whose minds and selves are spread 
across biological brain and nonbiological circuitry‖ (3).  Genetics promotes the 
posthuman viewpoint by using such cyborgian metaphor in describing human biological 
nature.  In The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness beyond the Brain, Robert Pepperell 
maintains that ―there is no distinction between the mechanical and the organic when it 
comes to considering DNA‖ (10).  Such blurring of the boundary between the 
mechanical and the organic is based on an assumption that human identity is essentially 
an informational pattern.  In information theory, what is important is not the content of 
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information, but its constitution and flow.  In this view, the ontological essence of the 
human as an information pattern, if any, cannot be natural and singular, but contingent 
and non-essential: the ontological attribute of the posthuman is contingency and fluidity.  
Hayles argues that due to this contingency and fluidity, it is difficult to define 
what it means to be posthuman.  Instead, presuming that humans already became 
posthuman, Hayles presents four points of view about the posthuman: 
1) the posthuman view privileges informational pattern over 
material instantiation. 
2) the posthuman view considers consciousness . . . as an 
epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that 
it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor 
sideshow.  
3) the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original 
prosthesis we all learn to manipulate. 
4) the posthuman view configures human being so that it can be 
seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. (Posthuman 2-
3) 
As shown in these four points of view of the posthuman, understanding the human as an 
information pattern increases the human identity‘s disembodiment, and, consequently, 
the disembodiment of the subject helps radical posthumanists, such as Hans Moravec, 
believe that human consciousness can be downloaded into a computer in the near future.  
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Although this radical anticipation of the posthuman is not yet realized, it reflects how 
persuasively the concept of posthuman as an information pattern is conceived.   
The idea of downloading human consciousness into a computer is prevalent in 
cyberpunk fiction in which ―the ontological hygiene between non-human nature, 
humans, and machines is tested to its limits‖ (Graham 127).  Cyberpunk writers, such as 
William Gibson, Pat Cadigan Rudy Rucker, and Lewis Shiner, illustrate in their texts the 
human as an informational pattern theorized in posthuman discourses.  In the world of 
cyberpunk novels, the human body is seamlessly conflated with machines, human 
consciousnesses can be easily uploaded into cyberspace, and artificial intelligence can 
perpetuate human consciousness: there is no distinguishable boundary between human 
and non-human, organism and machine.  Indeed, through representation of such 
posthuman conditions, cyberpunk novels show that the universal and fixed subject of 
liberal humanism is unavailable as postmodern discourses of the subject claim: in this 
sense, cyberpunk is often considered to be the literary form of the postmodern.   
Although they provide challenging models against traditional humanism through 
the denaturing of human ontology and experience, postmodern cyberpunk novels also 
reiterate features of liberal humanism by foregrounding the tendency to emphasize the 
consciousness or mind rather than the material body.  In this way, postmodern 
cyberpunk fictions—whether intentionally or not—disclose the paradoxical attitude of 
the posthuman toward liberal humanism.  Considering the fact that the posthuman 
fundamentally intends to be beyond the traditional humanism, the paradox is not 
desirable for the posthuman.  The posthuman wants to suggest a post-humanism, one 
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that goes ―beyond the exclusions of the false universality of the humanist self and 
beyond the moral vacuity of the excessive individualisms of the liberal self‖ (Vint 13).  
To redress the paradox of the posthuman, Hayles tries to redefine posthumanism: she 
argues that posthumanism is not anti-humanism, but rather a new humanism inheriting 
some properties from liberal humanism.  Nonetheless, not to repeat mistakes of liberal 
humanism, such as hierarchical binarism between mind and body, she argues for the 
importance of the material embodiment.  The embodied posthumanism emphasizes the 
materiality of the human subject, addressing that complexity produced by such a 
material embodiment makes humans different from intelligent machines (Hayles, 
Posthuman 283-84).   
Whereas it is a fascinating project for technocrats, disembodiment is a fear for 
those who imagine a horrible future in which mankind is exterminated or dominated by 
the non-human through the unethical direction of science/technology development.  
Embodied posthumanism is in a compromising position between the two stances.  As 
Elaine Graham points out,  
The ‗end of the human‘ need not necessarily entail a choice between 
‗impersonal deterministic technologized posthumanism‘ and ‗organic 
unmediated autonomous ―natural‖ subjectivity,‘ but may involve modes 
of post/humanity in which tools and environments are vehicles of, rather 
than impediments to, the formation of embodied identity. (199)   
Scientific fiction, seeking complexity, embraces such a modified vision of the 
posthuman—embodied posthumanism.  In other words, scientific fiction highlights the 
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interactive dynamics between ―impersonal deterministic technologized posthumanism 
and organic unmediated autonomous ‗natural‘ subjectivity‖ rather than dramatize 
conflicts over ―a choice‖ between them.  For scientific fiction, new technologies do not 
just involve ―the making and remaking of bodies, but the making and remaking of 
world‖ (Featherstone and Burrows 2); human evolution is accompanied by social and 
cultural changes.  Hence, it can be said that humans and the rest of the world are 
necessarily interconnected and, furthermore, interactive.  Such understanding of the 
relationship between humans and the rest of the world reflects the complexity paradigm, 
which understands the relationship as complex adaptive systems. 
The complexity paradigm is an epistemological tendency to see the world as a 
large system consisting of sub-systems that constantly interconnect with each other and 
with the whole.  As systems, the human and cultural and social structures change and 
reorganize their components to adapt themselves to the problems and changes posed by 
their surroundings.  In this understanding, it is possible to conceive beings beyond the 
discussion of embodiment and disembodiment.  Besides advocating embodied 
posthumanism, scientific fiction makes models of new species of humans by 
recomposing complex structures of humans and non-humans.  Because they sense the 
dynamics of interconnectivity and interactivity between and among systems, scientific 
fiction writers do not restrict their imaginative experiments with human evolution within 
existing ontology.  In addition, such experiments of scientific fictions about human 
ontology can be a good base to support a ―becoming subjectivity.‖  In short, the new 
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models of human species not only suggest future humanity but also describe a desirable 
subjectivity more concretely and plausibly than any theoretical accounts can.   
In order to examine the dynamics of interconnectivity and interactivity and to 
figure out the human subject imagined in the complexity paradigm, the first half of this 
chapter will analyze Cadigan‘s Synners along with William Gibson‘s Neuromancer.  But 
Neuromancer, as a representative work of postmodern cyberpunk, will be used to 
emphasize the difference of paradigm on which Synners is based.  I do not argue that 
Synners is not a cyberpunk novel. Rather, it is not a postmodern cyberpunk novel whose 
foundational dynamics is disintegration and discontinuity, but a cyberpunk novel of 
complexity paradigm—a subcategory of scientific fiction.  The process of this work will 
help illustrate epistemology and ontology of the complexity paradigm.  Synners, as a 
scientific fiction novel, can function as an advanced theory book of the posthuman, 
reinventing the human subject through the insight into complexity.   
The last part of this chapter will examine Greg Bear‘s Blood Music to further the 
discussion of the human subject in the complexity paradigm.  Portraying a post-human 
world where human beings are transformed into an intelligent superorganism 
constructed by interconnectivities and interactivities between human and non-human, 
Blood Music focuses on how the individual subject can be articulated in relationship 
with social networks.  In depicting the posthuman condition, the novel takes advantages 
of the vision of nanotechnology suggesting the possibility of disassembling and 
reassembling molecules of things, and thus constructing new entities.  For 
nanotechnology, the human is also an information pattern that can always transit to, 
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transform, and incorporate into other organic and non-organic systems.  Through the 
instability of the human subject that Blood Music depicts in the nanotechnological 
viewpoint, I will reinterpret the becoming subjectivity for the complexity paradigm.  
Such a reframing work of the human subject will reinforce the aim of this chapter—that 
is, to show how the technoscience culture reconfigures humanity and subjectivity in light 
of the complexity paradigm.  
   
1. The Complexity of the Posthuman Condition in Synners: Postmodern Cyberpunk 
Vs. Complex Scientific Fiction 
Cyberpunk novels explore on a full scale how ―technology mediates our 
relationship with our own or other bodies‖ and how it ―shapes our perceptions and 
cognitive process‖ (de Lauretis 167).  Indeed, cyberpunk is a literary embodiment of the 
interactions between theory and practice—especially, postmodern theories and 
cybernetic technologies.  Using cybernetic imagination, cyberpunk novels dramatize the 
human condition in contemporary technoscience culture, where human beings become 
machines and machines become humanized.  In so doing, cyberpunk calls into question 
the traditional concept of humanity: Bruce Sterling, a well-known spokesman of 
cyberpunk literature, addresses cyberpunk as ―a reaction to ‗standard humanist 
liberalism‘‖ (qtd. in Hollinger 31).  Such a critical aspect of cyberpunk has been 
supported by postmodern deconstruction of the subject, which challenges the 
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universality and fixity of the subject/self.
15
  Providing critical insights into the 
posthuman condition over technoscience culture, Cadigan‘s Synners and Gibson‘s 
Neuromancer have been taken as resources of postmodern discourses about humanity 
and subjectivity.
16
  However, in this chapter, I compare the novels to explore the 
different epistemological and ontological dynamics underlying the novels and thus to 
argue the emergence of the complexity paradigm.
17
   
While many cyberpunk novels, including Neuromancer, present a postmodern 
paradigm based on disconnectivity and fragmentation, Synners demonstrates an 
emerging paradigm, complexity paradigm, which conceives phenomena in terms of the 
dynamics of interconnectivity and interactivity.  Postmodern critics use Neuromancer to 
show how the universality of the subject in the traditional concept of the subject can be 
deconstructed and then rearticulated in terms of differences.  Not furthering how the 
differences are working together within certain systems, postmodern cyberpunk as well 
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 As in the cyberpunk issue of the Mississippi Review (47/48:8, 1988) where cyberpunk was characterized 
as ―The apotheosis of the postmodern,‖ many postmodern critics have seen cyberpunk as a literary 
embodiment of postmodernism (qtd. in Fitting 295). Brian McHale, Istvan Csicsery-Rona, Jr., Veronica 
Hollinger, Scott Bukatman, and John Chrisite also read cyberpunk as postmodern in some fashion. 
Postmodern critics interpret cyberpunk novels to exemplify ―how technology and capitalism influence 
human ontology by generating a world of images that have no original referent‖ (Fair 92): the denial of the 
original referent leads to the denial of the universal and concrete self in postmodern discourses of 
subjectivity. 
16
 Their works deploy similar imageries of cybernetic culture, such as a blurring of the boundaries between 
physical and virtual reality, the human desire to transcend bodily limitation, and technological mediation 
of the relationship between the human body and consciousness. For these characteristics, critics frequently 
cite both novelists to conceptualize human conditions in technoscience culture.   
17
 Neuromancer and Synners are often compared by feminist critics to expose gender ideology embedded 
in contemporary technoscience. Anne Balsamo argues that ―contemporary discourses of technology rely 
on the logic of binary gender identity as an underlying organizational framework to structure the 
possibilities of technological engagement‖ (―Forms‖ 234). Cyberpunk, which is dominated by male 
writers and male ideology, fully embodies the logic. On the other hand, Synners, as a work of the female 
writer, seems to avoid adapting the traditional gender ideology in describing technology: in this sense, the 
novel is regarded as a good resource for feminist critics to envision a post-gender world. But in comparing 
Neuromancer and Synners in this chapter, I try to articulate the difference between the novels in different 
terms and perspective from feminist ones in order to highlight the difference of paradigm, beyond gender 
ideology, on which the novels are founded.  
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as postmodern criticism tends to depict technoscience milieu nihilistically.  In 
structuring the relationship between human and technology, however, despite similar 
concerns with postmodern cyberpunk, Synners describes the human condition in 
technoscience culture less nihilistically—if not positively—than other cyberpunk novels.  
The novel redistributes differences, observing the web of relationships between the 
differences.  As a result, the processes of the redistribution produce complexity within 
the text and leads to the expansion of systems that the text constitutes thematically and 
structurally.  That aspect categorizes Synners as scientific fiction, which realizes and 
reflects the complexity paradigm, distinguishing it from postmodern cyberpunk novels.   
The dynamics underlying Synners is interconnectivity and interactivity while 
disconnectivity and fragmentation underlie Neuromancer.  In Neuromancer, characters 
and events do not develop into complex relationships although they co-work for a 
project.  Rather, they reconfirm fragmented relationships without any further change.  
On the other hand, in Synners, the human and the artificial cooperate to overcome a 
cybernetic crisis (an informational virus), and their co-working not only saves the net, a 
world subsuming cyberspace and the physical world, but also intensifies their 
relationship, creating a new entity (Markt).  In this way, Synners perceives technoscience 
as a sytem that can interconnect and thus co-evolve with the human, and, further, it 
offers technoscience, or technology in a narrow sense, as the constitutive element of the 
human subject.  Therefore, to examine a possible model of the posthuman subject that 
the complexity paradigm envisions, it is necessary to see first how the novel depicts 
technology as the constitutive element in articulating the (post)human condition.  
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a. Technology 
In postmodern literature, technology is often considered an instigator of 
schizophrenic disjunction.  In particular, media technologies, including computer and 
televisions, are criticized as one that ―articulates nothing but rather implodes, carrying its 
flattened image surface within itself‖ (Jameson 37); technology furthers depthless 
fragmentation of the human subject.  In this view, the relation between humans and 
technology is to be set as polar oppositions along a paranoid-schizoid axis, and thus their 
relationship is understood in terms of control.  However, ironically, media technologies, 
particularly computer technology, are also expected to model complex relationships 
between humans and technology, furthering the interconnectivity and interactivity 
between them (Cilliers 24).  While postmodern cyberpunk that follows the postmodern 
impulse of disconnectivity or disjunction tends to take the former position, scientific 
fiction that reflects the interconnectivity impulse of the complexity paradigm is 
concerned with the complexity produced by the human-technology combination.  
Although in both Synners and Neuromancer technology is part of human life, the 
attitude of each novel toward technology is different.  Cyberpunk novels, including 
Neuromancer, tend to fear the advancement of technology as David Porush explains: 
―cyberpunk reveals to what end technology seeks to control us at the same time that it 
dramatizes the cyberpunk apocalypse: we have met the enemy and he is us: we are the 
technology‖ (―Frothing‖ 257).  Porush‘s statement implies an anxiety about technology 
exercising dominion over human beings: the more technology becomes inseparable from 
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humans, the more it is threatening to humanity.  This skeptical opinion is partially 
relevant to the origin of cybernetic technology developed in the process of developing 
antiaircraft predictors during World War II.   
The technology called ―antiaircraft‖ mechanizes patterns of pilots‘ behaviors to 
predict the movements of enemy aircraft; by converting the human into patterns of 
information, it shows that humans can be under technological control.  Nobert Wiener 
expanded the war technology into ―a new science of control mechanisms in which the 
exchange of information would play a central role‖ (Galison 232).  Conjoining with 
mathematics and computer science, the technology was established as cybernetics by 
Wiener.  The essential end of cybernetics is the control and prediction of information.  
Cybernetic technology, including computer and information technologies, gives rise to 
both promise and fear for the human future: the promise comes from the expectation that 
technology could enhance human beings‘ physical condition, and the fear from a 
science-fictional imagination that technology could master humans.  Neuromancer 
foregrounds the fear of technology advancement by alluding to the possibility of 
technology to take control.  In the novel, the controller and predictor of information is 
not humans but an AI (Wintermute), and the human characters hired by the AI are means 
for it to gain ―autonomy.‖  The main plot of the novel itself is an AI‘s quest for 
independence from human control.  
The world of Neuromancer is full of the tension between humans and AIs.  AIs 
keep making themselves smarter, and humans struggle to restrain them: 
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See, those things [AIs], they can work real hard, buy themselves time to 
write cookbooks or whatever, but the minute, I [Flatline] mean the 
nanosecond, that one starts figuring out ways to make itself smarter, 
Turing‘ll wipe it. Nobody trusts those fuckers, you know that. Every AI 
ever built has an electromagnetic shotgun wired to its forehead. (159) 
Flatline exposes humans‘ distrust of AIs, which have the potential to reverse the 
hierarchical relationship between humans and technology.  Wintermute and its 
management of the project to combine with another AI, Neuromancer, represent the 
threatening power of technology, and the Turing police, which monitors all AIs to keep 
them within the reins of human control, signifies that there are tensions between humans 
and technology.  In this way, the relationship between the human and technology is 
defined in terms of control in Neuromancer.  Flatline‘s statement ultimately betrays fear 
of a possible future in which technology dominates and controls humans.
18
  This 
cyberpunk imagination of humans‘ loss of control over technology assumes a lopsided 
perspective on technoscience culture: the perspective misses a point that the relationship 
between human and technology is not necessarily formed in terms of control or 
domination, and also that the relationship is too complex to explain with those terms.  
 Paul Cilliers poses two perspectives for modeling the complex structure of 
technoscience culture: scientific and philosophical perspective.  The scientific 
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 The theme of reversing the master-servant relationship of human-technology/science has been a kind of 
tradition of science fiction since the first science fiction novel, Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein. In that novel, 
when the monster asks Dr. Frankenstein for its bride, the horror at the creature is maximized. George 
Slusser calls the situation the ―Frankenstein barrier,‖ which means ―[t]he creature of the future is now 
present as object of horror in the eyes of a humanity that cannot accept its futurity‖ (48). The human‘s 
horror is that the future creature could move beyond human control.   
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perspective models the structure to predict and control its complexity.  However, the 
whole notion of prediction and control become suspect since they do not fully explain 
the complexity of technoscience culture.  Neuromancer adopts the scientific perspective, 
laying disproportionate emphasis on the control of technology and prediction of a 
possible future as the result of the control.  In order to model the complexity of the 
technoscience culture, as Cilliers speculates, the approach to the complexity should go 
through ―the shift from control and prediction to understanding‖ (13).  The shift is 
toward the philosophical perspective from which ―we can say that we wish to model 
complex systems because we want to understand them better‖ rather than to control and 
predict (13, italics in original).  However, the request of the perspective shift does not 
mean abandoning the scientific perspective.  The scientific perspective is needed to 
provide surface details that the philosophical perspective, emphasizing boundaries of an 
intellectual continent, tends to miss.
19
  In this aspect, Cilliers suggests the co-operation 
of the two perspectives for a sophisticated modeling.  By harmonizing the two 
perspectives, Synners successfully models complexity systems: the novel, disposing 
scientific details in every nook and corner of the text, focuses on how we can understand 
complexity of technoscience culture rather than how we should control and predict it.  
 Synners is a story about music video creators (Visual Mark, Gabe, Gina, the 
Beater), hackers (Sam, Fez, and Keely), an AI (Art), and their cooperative fight against 
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 Cilliers does not fully develop the two perspectives in his book. To justify his claim of the incorporation 
of the two perspectives in modeling complex systems, he states, ―science without philosophy is blind, and 
philosophy without science is paralysed‖ (13). The idea of co-operation between the philosophical and the 
scientific is relevant to recent efforts of science studies to deconstruct the dichotomy of the rational and 
the social, or science and sociology.  Bruno Latour‘s We Have Never Been Modern and Helen E. 
Longino‘s The Fate of Knowledge examine this scholarly trend.   
 43 
an informational virus.  All these characters and events are engaged with a newly 
developed socket technology, which is made from living tissue and enables the brain to 
share information with other socketers and the Net.  Music video creators and consumers 
implant sockets into their brain to enjoy fuller experiences:  
When the sockets are engaged, stimuli will induce these things directly, 
for the duration of the experience. The consumer plugs into the feature 
presentation—music video, movie release, commercial, standard TV 
fare—and undergoes a three-dimensional experience. . . .  [S]ockets 
feeding into the temporal lobes will enhance whatever data come in. 
Interactivity again—the consumer can cooperate in the forming of the 
images. Useful for the games of any level of sophistication. . . . (66) 
People need not wear any devices like hotsuits to enter the virtual reality since the virtual 
reality is directly enacted within their brain: sockets make it possible to interconnect 
between organism and machine and the real and the virtual.  Besides, the socket 
technology improves the communication between creators and consumers. The 
technology does not just help exchange the content without leaking, but can make the 
original more sophisticated by varying images through the interactivities between 
creators and consumers—in other words, the technology represents how complexity is 
produced through interactivities between systems.  Moreover, the socket implant can 
improve socketers‘ concentration and memory.  Along with these benefits, the 
technology entails dangers.  Because the technology directly impacts the neural system 
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of the human brain, it could cause problems on the human consciousness and the body 
(132).  But problems, the novel recognizes, are not just physical:  
I still say you‘re gonna have to go some fucking distance to turn public 
opinion on what looks like a faster, easier way of mind control and 
brainwashing, all that shit. There‘s still plenty of people around who 
believe that manic-depressives and the schizos and the migrainers and the 
epileptics and the narcoleptics and all those leptics are morally wrong to 
have little buttons in their heads to keep them even. Hell, there‘s still 
plenty that think test-tube babies are a fucking atrocity. (69) 
Through the socket technology, this novel helps us contemplate moral effects as well as 
physical ones that the interface with technology can bring on.  By mentioning test-tube 
babies, the novel tries to expand the matter into technology in general: interface 
technology is not just a future reality or fantasy, but it already exists in present 
technoscience culture as in the technology for producing a test-tube baby, bringing forth 
both benefits and dangers.  Synners neither exaggeratedly celebrates the benefits nor 
dramatically counts the dangers as apocalyptic.  The novel does not judge technology, 
but rather it seems to be interested in how humans should live within a given 
technological reality with both technological benefits and problems. 
 Unlike Neuromancer, which portrays technology with outlawed images of an 
underworld and counter culture, Synners is situated in a relatively common reality where 
people are concerned about the morality and legality of technology.  The scene wherein 
the socket technology is examined for legalization is important to show the novel‘s 
 45 
attitude toward technoscience.  In that scene, possible benefits and dangers, including 
moral aspects, are discussed.  An elder senator insists on the need to control technology: 
You‘ve done it, and something like this can‘t be undone. Like the start of 
the nuclear age, way back when. You can‘t stuff it back into the box and 
tell Pandora you‘ll get back to her when you‘re more . . . more moral, to 
use the quaint terminology. So if we can‘t undo it, we‘d better have as 
much control over it as possible. (136, italics in original) 
Stating the need to have ―control‖ over technology, the senator expresses traditional 
ethics of the relationship between humans and technology.  He, however, immediately 
admits that the old ethics is no longer applicable: ―However, it was one of the tenets of 
the church I grew up in, waiting to use something until you‘re moral enough‖ (136).  
Synners claims that the morality of technology no longer depends on the issue of the 
control of technology because, as the creator of socket implants Dr. Joslin addresses, 
―[technology] is out of control‖ by now (69).  Rather the novel questions that if we 
cannot undo recent technological conditions and also cannot claim humans‘ total control 
over technology, how we should prepare for social, moral, and ontological changes by 
technology.  
In answer to this question, Synners asks us to admit the changes at first.  Only by 
doing so, can we reconfigure humanity adapting to the complexity of technoscience.  For 
the new humanity, the traditional viewpoint of morality also confronts its end.   
―Knowledge is power. But power corrupts. Which means the Age of Fast 
Information is an extremely corrupt age in which to live.‘‖  
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―Aren‘t they all?‖ Sam asked him [Fez]. He smiled his dreamy little smile 
at her.  
―Ah, but I think we‘re approaching a kind of corruption unlike anything 
we‘ve ever known before, Sam-I-Am. Sometimes I think we may be on 
the verge of an original sin.‖ (53) 
Fez hints at the change of paradigm.  Human beings are not in a privileged position 
under the law of God any more.  But, rather, we are in the on-going process of ―change 
for the machines,‖ not of changing the machines: in identifying humanity, the 
relationship with technology is constitutive.
 20
  In this understanding, the relationship 
between the human and technology is not necessarily contesting.  When Gabe mentions 
―appropriate technology‖ as the way that people should live, Gina retorts: ―‗All 
appropriate technology hurt somebody. . . . Every technology has its original sin.‘ She 
laughed. ‗Makes us original synners. And we still got to live with what we made‘‖ (435).  
Gina‘s thought represents the attitude of the whole novel toward humanity and 
technology: humans are not ―sinners‖ of God, but ―sinners‖ of technology.  The term 
―synner‖ is a coined word to emphasize a (post)human characteristic of synthesizing 
(with) technology.  The Beater from the old generation of the music video industry also 
manifests the emergence of such a new humanity: ―And now I’m over. This is not my 
synthesizer anymore. You are. You and Gina and the rest of them, you synthesize the 
sound and the pictures into what they want to see and hear. You’re real synthesizers. . . . 
I may be a sinner, but I ain’t no synthesizer. Synner, then. With a y‖ (83, italics in 
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 The phrase, ―change for the machines,‖ is reiterated throughout the novel.   
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original).  ―Synners‖ indicates, in a narrow sense, people who implant sockets in the 
brain, but broadly it means all human beings in contemporary technoscience.  In this 
form of the human subject, the polar oppositions set by a paranoid-schizoid axis between 
humans and technology that postmodern critics assert to exist is no longer valid.  But, 
instead, the subject can be explained as a continuum always added to in relation to new 
forms of technological mediation.  
Cadigan stresses the phrase ―incurably informed‖ as a characteristic of synners 
(33, 388, 397, and 432).  Synners basically cannot disconnect from information: 
―[synners are] not in our natural habitat anymore. [They have] become denizens of the 
net. Homo datum‖ (Cadigan 386).  In this sense, the term ―synners,‖ exploring the 
potential impact of the human-machine interface, can be a representative word to signify 
the posthuman subject, seeing humans as a process of information.  To synthesize 
something else, synners always keep interconnective relationships with other 
components within the system they belong to or with other systems.  Therefore, a synner 
as ―homo datum‖ can be understood as a network that constantly evolves by interacting 
with others.  In this sense, synners, as Taylor claims for the posthuman, are 
―incarnations of worldwide webs and global network whose complexity is fraught with 
danger as well as opportunity‖ (Moment 17, italics in original).  The concept of ―synner‖ 
supports an ontological perspective that complexity theory proposes: ―to be is to be 
connected‖ (Rickert and Blakesley, ―interview‖ 818).  Thomas Rickert and David 
Blakesley argue that this recognition makes it possible ―to understand the interrelation of 
the multiple systems and structures constituting life at the beginning of the twenty first 
 48 
century‖ (―Interview‖ 818).  In short, the term ―synner‖ comprehensively expresses the 
human subject which, Cadigan suggests, lives in technoscience culture.   
  
b. Synner and Complexity 
 The synner, as a new existential mode of human being, is a system that is 
ontologically open and historically constituted.  Once such a system meets a threshold 
that connects with another system, it expands its system.  As a result of expanding, three 
modes of the human emerge under the category of synner: ―synthesizing human‖ 
(embodied human beings), ―synthesized human‖ (AIs), and ―the bastard offspring of 
both‖ (the combined entity of a human character (Visual Mark) and an AI (Art) (386).  
These three species are not competitive enough to dominate the others, but rather they 
are in interactive and coevolving relations: they recognize that they are interconnective 
components in a bigger network.  Therefore, when the entire network has a problem (the 
hit of informational virus), they fight together against the problem.  At the crisis, a leader 
of hackers, Fez, confirms the existences of the three human species and their 
interconnections: ―Fez blinked. ‗Make that three species. And like all good life forms, 
we have a natural enemy that can prey on all of us.‘ He sighed. ‗This would have been 
fascinating if it could have lasted. But we have slightly over an hour now before we all 
revert to homo sapiens. Temporarily but, alas, indefinitely‘‖ (386, my italics).  As Fez‘s 
consideration shows, what the three human species fear is neither the possibility of 
losing biological human identity nor a species‘ control over the others, but the reduction 
to the traditional humanity—Homo sapiens.  In the complexity paradigm, the reversal to 
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Homo sapiens does not mean simply the retrogression of human being, but its indefinite 
fatality.  Although, according to complexity theory, evolution toward increased 
complexity does not necessarily imply ―progress,‖ reduction of dynamic systems to a 
certain point makes the systems stagnated.  Therefore, a ―synner,‖ who regards reduction 
as an ontological apocalypse and thus constantly attempts to connect to others, can be a 
proper model of the human subject for the complexity paradigm: synners are a product 
of complex structures and a producer of complexity.   
The human category called synner composes dynamic structures not only within 
each species but also among species: the incorporation of the synthesizing (biological 
human beings) and the synthesized human (AIs) gives birth to the third species of 
human.  Before discussing the third species, however, the synthesizing and the 
synthesized human require scrutiny in order to examine the internal and external 
dynamics of the two, which finally makes the third species possible.  Incorporating AIs 
into the human category, Synners no longer sets human and machine/technology in the 
relation of self and other as in a traditional view of the relationship between human and 
technology.  Rather, the novel understands that the human identity is a matter of 
interactive process with others.  Haraway claims, ―what counts as human and non-
human is not given by definition, but only by relation, by engagement in situated 
worldly encounters, where boundaries take shape and categories sediment‖ (―Game‖ 
64).  Like Haraway‘s claim, Synners concentrates on interconnective relations between 
the human body and consciousness, between humans and non-humans, and between 
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physical reality and virtual reality.  By reconfiguring the relations, Synners explores 
complexity in the human subject.   
In contrast, in postmodern cyberpunk, humans and AIs (or non-human entities in 
general) are still in the relation of self and other, or in the categories of sameness and 
difference, although human‘s mechanization and artificial entity‘s humanization by 
technology blur the boundaries between humans and machines.  The concept of the 
human being, in postmodern cyberpunk, is pondered through definition rather than 
relations.  Neuromancer is also preoccupied with the definition of human.  For instance, 
Dixie Flatline, who deserted the human body and became a cybernetic construction, tries 
to explain his identity and AI‘s by mentioning how different they are from humans: 
―‗Well, it feels like I am, kid, but I‘m really just a bunch of ROM.‘ . . . ‗But I ain‘t likely 
to write you no poem, if you follow me. Your AI, it just might. But it ain‘t no way 
human‖ (159).  Flatline‘s definition of non-human subjects shows that the human, in this 
novel, is still centralized in identifying other entities.  In this identity formation, the 
relationship between human and machine/technology is still put in the relation of 
sameness and difference.  In other words, despite surface conflations of the two by 
technology, the boundary between humans and technology is fundamentally solid.  On 
the one hand, deploying the posthuman subject of human-machine symbiosis and the 
possible reduction of human consciousness into a cybernetic construction, postmodern 
cyberpunk novels, including Neuromancer, recognize human‘s affinity with non-human 
subjects.  But, on the other hand, the realization makes the cyberpunk novels ―articulate 
more forcefully the boundary between human and non-human in an attempt to disavow 
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this affinity‖ (Vint 190).  This inconsistent standpoint on the affinity between human and 
non-human/technology is related to human‘s ambivalent attitude toward technology.  In 
cyberpunk, the ambivalent attitude is depicted through human desire and anxiety about 
disembodiment: the desire for disembodiment to overcome bodily limitation and the 
anxiety about the loss of humanity due to far-reaching technology.   
Cybernetic technologies, in cyberpunk, allow humans to realize an old dream for 
transcending physical limitation: human bodies are prosthesized with machine and 
consciousnesses are digitalized.  Humans come to know that we cannot claim the purity 
of humanity any more because we are already the symbiont of human and machine—
posthuman.  The assumption that the human is ―a set of information processes‖ supports 
the idea of human-machine symbiosis by exploring the community of the human and the 
machine (Hayles 4).  In cyberpunk, the human as an informational entity can be freely 
uploaded and erased; human bodies, as ―meat,‖ are taken as a historical accident that can 
be transcended.  Losing its materiality, the body is considered discursive, universal, and 
volatile.  This cyberpunk imagination of disembodiment marks a postmodern 
understanding of the subject as a discursive construction, which is contingent and 
unfixed.  However, although they welcome the contingency and unfixity of the 
postmodern subject, corporeal feminists, including Elizabeth Grosz, Hayles, and Anne 
Balsamo, contend that the postmodern subject lakcs for locality and specificity 
considering multiple differences, such as race, history, and gender.  They point out that 
the problem of the postmodern subject is caused by the abstraction of the material body, 
and that the abstracted body is a universal and male body.  The universal, male body 
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tends to easily disappear, and the subject normalized by male ideology is disembodied.  
In this sense, it can be said that discourses of the postmodern subject are still under the 
shadow of mind-body binaries.  Paralleling the disembodiment of the postmodern 
subject with the loss of materiality of information in cybernetics, Hayles states that the 
posthuman that supports disembodiment can reiterate the same problems that the 
postmodern subject is criticized for.  In this way, exploring images of the posthuman, 
postmodern cyberpunk illustrates possibilities and problems of disembodiment.   
For the human subject as ―a set of information processes,‖ the body is degraded 
as a shell delivering information.  The extreme imagination of cyberpunk about the 
disintegration of mind-body becomes a rich resource of gender discourses in 
technoscience culture.  As Balsamo argues, cyberpunk, whose narrative is predominantly 
masculine, evidences ―the obsessive reinscription of dualistic gender identity‖ produced 
by that disintegration (Technologies 162).  Neuromancer portrays problems of the 
dualistic gender identity: the male protagonist‘s (Case‘s) consciousness/mind invades 
and controls the female protagonist‘s (Molly‘s) body.21  This relationship between 
Case‘s mind and Molly‘s body reinforces the traditional coupling of mind with maleness 
and the body with femaleness, implying the knowing male subject and the knowable 
female subject that feminists problematize (Grosz 4).  According to Michelle Kendrick, 
this iteration of an old gender problem is derived from male critics‘ understanding of 
cyberspace as ―an idealized vision of electronically mediated experience,‖ and 
disembodied subjectivity is ―a characteristic response to the advent of new media, which 
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  Throughout the novel, Case‘s consciousness and Molly‘s body are highlighted.  As a representative 
example, Case‘s consciousness joins Molly‘s body through simstim technology. 
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we persist in trying to fit into traditional paradigms of knowledge, such as mind-body 
dualism‖ (154).22  Reminiscent of ―the corporeal body in front of the computer,‖ 
Kendrick claims that ―[n]otions of subjectivity . . . are always and inescapably 
embodied‖ and that only embodied subjectivity can adequately convey the complexity of 
the relationship between human and machine (152).  Similarly, Hayles criticizes the 
tendency for disembodiment as the trace of liberal humanism: the emphasis on cognition 
leads only to ―fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied immortality,‖ and entails a 
loss of social, cultural, and sexual specificity (Posthuman 5).  Synners is aware of the 
problems of disembodiment, and weighs in on embodied posthumanism to keep the 
balance between the desire for and the anxiety of disembodiment.   
Synners envisages the interaction between material bodies and technological 
devices more positively than postmodern cyberpunk novels.  The novel makes the 
interaction integral to the embodied subject, unlike Neuromancer, in which the 
interaction contributes to producing exclusionary categories.  Hence (post)human 
characters of the novel are not associated with ―body loathing,‖ which Mark Dery 
signifies as a characteristic of cyber culture.
23
  Synners also shares typical themes and 
tendencies of postmodern cyberpunk, such as themes of mind and body invasion and 
traditional binary associations of mind-male and body-female: male characters (Visual 
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  Kendrick maintains that male critics of cyberspace, such as Michael Heim and Steve Shaviro, depend 
on Gottfried Leibniz‘s monadology in theorizing cyberspace and cybernetic technologies. Monads are an 
ultimate element of the universe, the only substance which material phenomena eventually reduce to. 
According to Kendrick, the male critics understand that monads, which are ―cohesive but bodiless 
entities,‖ represent the experience of cyberspace, which projects expressions of pure desire.  Such monadic 
understanding reduces complexity (151). 
23
 In Escape Velocity : Cyberculture at the End of the Century, Dery argues that ―the body loathing‖ is 
derived from  ―a combination of mistrust and contempt for the cumbersome flesh that acts as a drag 
coefficient in technological environments‖ (235).   
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Mark and Gabe) incline for disembodiment and female characters (Gina and Sam) for 
embodiment.
 24
  However, the novel does not want to ingrain any binary polarization and 
association.  Instead, emphasizing the interactivity between embodiment and 
disembodiment—rather than downplaying either of them, Synners tries to reshape 
current discourses of mind-body in cyberculture.    
One of the male characters, Gabe, is addicted to a virtual game world (House of 
the Headhunters) that he created, neglecting his life in the real world: he spends more 
time with his virtual characters than with his family.  As a result, his daughter (Sam) has 
left home for years and his wife asks him for divorce.  While he is losing bodily 
relations, he feels more and more alive in the virtual world.  The socket implantation and 
drug intoxication make virtual experiences more realistic for Gabe.  However, he does 
not seek to reduce to a cyber construction like another male character, Visual Mark, or 
characters of other cyberpunk novels.  Rather, he feels pleased when he comes to regain 
his sense of realness in the physical world: when Gina hits him with fist, he becomes 
satisfied with the sense of pain and follows her around to keep the sense.  Gina, a music 
video creator, has sockets in her brain, but she is described as a vindicator of bodily 
experiences unlike other socket-people.  Gina has struggled to hold Visual Mark in the 
physical world for decades, and help Gabe regain the sense of realness through physical 
feeling.  Gina is a promise for Gabe and Visual Mark to find meaning in living in the 
material world, and, for the entire novel, she is a marker of embodied posthumanism.  
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 Bruce Sterling‘s ―Preface from Mirrorshades‖ in Storming the Reality Studio (346). Sterling claims the 
themes of mind and body invasion as central themes of cyberpunk novels.  
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Gina understands that since ―the body possesses incredible new possibilities for 
inventive acts,‖ the body is not what humans can easily give up (Bay 232).  As Jennifer 
L. Bay puts it, ―Since the outer is no longer merely an expression of the inner, the body 
is no longer ‗a sign that can be deciphered by those who know the code‘‖ (232). 25  
Synners embodies this viewpoint through differences of the characters‘ perception of 
―pain.‖  While Gabe recognizes pain that Gina gives as the evidence of his realness, 
Visual Mark regards it as information that the brain conveys:  
 ―Because the brain feels no pain.‖ . . . 
 ―Pain is curable,‖ Mark whispered to her. ―It‘s the most curable thing of 
all, really, and it‘s the thing we all walk around feeling all the time when 
we don‘t have to. There doesn‘t have to be pain. Just us. No pain. Just us . 
. . us . . .‖ 
―. . . . Pain, your pain, my pain, it was all noise, and I‘ve cleared it away 
for us.‖ (410) 
Visual Mark sees human beings as pure information.  For him, therefore, pain is just an 
electronic mark and an unnecessary human condition.  But for Gina, pain is more than 
informational codes.  She sees it as a physical experience through which she can feel her 
realness like Gabe.  So she rejects Visual Mark‘s suggestion to stay with him at the 
electronic system where there is no pain.  She chooses the embodied life in the physical 
world. 
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 This inner quotation is from Taylor‘s Hiding (15).  
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 Synners, however, does not reiterate the logic of either/or in handling the theme 
of mind-body.  Characters‘ choices of the body do not mean disconnection with the 
disembodied virtual world.  Rather, the emphasis on the material body is a significant 
element to construct the interconnectivity between the real and the virtual.  When Gabe 
and Gina enter the system to cure the virus, Gina hits Gabe again to make him feel 
―sober‖ through ―pain‖ (407-08).  Gabe‘s pain is marked as bruises on the skin of his 
real body: ―The marks on his skin were fresh and deep, his swelling cheek looked 
painful, and the expression on his face said the best dream of his life had just gotten even 
better‖ (408).  The bruises on his body signify the interactions between interiority and 
exteriority, mind and body, the virtual and the real.  Those different realms are 
interconnected like the Mobius strip.  The Mobius strip shows that ―while there are 
disparate ‗things‘ being related, they have the capacity to twist one into the other‖ 
(Grosz 209-10).  Grosz explains the relationship between mind and body with this 
Mobius strip model: through the model, she argues for the embodied subject.  According 
to her, the body also has two aspects (material and discursive) that are always 
interacting, yet not reducible to the same thing like a Mobius strip.  For the embodied 
posthuman subjects, virtual and real experiences are equally important elements in 
constructing their subjects because the two systems (the virtual and the real) are so 
interconnected and interactive that they are not reducible to either of them.   
The interconnectivity and interactivity between the virtual and the real are 
indispensable conditions of the posthuman.  Synners contends that the symbiosis of 
human and technology should be understood not just metaphorically but practically in 
 57 
posthuman culture because it is inevitably true that humans and technology are within 
communal feedback loops.  When the virus hits the net system of the Los Angeles area, 
socket–people who connect with the system are also directly influenced—they die of the 
informational stroke: the extraordinary electronic input into the brain by the virus causes 
the brain‘s overdrive and shutdown.  The novel designates humans‘ insufficient 
recognition of their affinity with machines as the cause of this disaster:  
Feedback loops—outputs turn around and go back in as inputs. Neurons 
start firing in patterns over and over, and if they‘re bad patterns, that‘s 
well, too bad. You people got no shields. You put in sockets, but you 
forgot about the watchdogs and the alarm systems and the antivirals and 
the vaccines. You people put those on every neural net except your own. 
(358) 
This comment is made by Art (AI).  Art points out humans‘ underlying recognition of 
privilege as a maker of machine: although the socket implantation could be achieved due 
to humans‘ recognition of the feedback-loop relationship between humans and 
machine/technology, humans still overlook the fact that we are part of the feedback 
loops.  Art maintains that the privileged viewpoint of humans is rooted in the traditional 
way of conceiving the self: ―I suppose I shouldn‘t expect you to understand. For you 
[Sam] the nets are an object. You have self and nonself, and those are both constants. 
For me [Art] it‘s something else. The L.A. system wasn‘t a where; it was a configuration 
of me‖ (358, italics in original).  Remarking on the difference between a human‘s and a 
machine‘s way of thinking, Art implies that the crisis of the net cannot be resolved if it is 
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conceived in the binary thinking system of self and nonself; to understand the net and to 
resolve the problem, human beings need to refashion our way of thinking: if human 
beings are defined as the symbiont of human-technology, we should consider how to 
incorporate our thinking system and machine‘s configuration for the new context of the 
posthuman.   
The crisis, affecting both the net and the real world, becomes a good opportunity 
for all embodied and disembodied characters—the synthesizing and the synthesized—to 
reconsider their relationships.  When every access to the net is shut down due to the 
virus, Sam‘s chip-player connected to the former insulin pump was the only workable 
electronic device.  With the help of the remaining part of Art, the device can access the 
net.  Then Gabe, the characters of his virtual game (Caritha and Marly), and Gina enter 
the net to restore the system.  This whole process of the restoration is powered by the 
material body: the chip-player uses Sam‘s bio-energy.  As such, the efforts to resolve the 
problem illustrate how systems are interconnected and how their interactivities create 
complex structures.  In this sense, the restoration does not only mean a cleansing of each 
system, but also recovering all interconnectivities and interactivities between systems—
between embodied and disembodied subjects, between the real and the virtual, and 
between human and non-human.
26
  Synners supposes that the interconnectivities and 
interactivities make systems coevolve.   
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 This assumption is supported by a character‘s (Adrian) comment: ―We‘ll have clean lines we can‘t use. 
That‘s as bad as being infected‖ (390). What people ultimately want is not just to recover the net and to 
restore damages of the real world, but to reconnect with the net.  
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Neuromancer, in contrast, assumes that systems are fundamentally not 
interactive: in particular, the real and the virtual are not interactively structured.  Even 
though people jack into cyberspace and AIs can get involved in businesses in the real 
world, the two systems do not coevolve and the denizens of each system do not develop 
their relationships into more interactive and organizational ones.  Flatline as a cybernetic 
construction with human consciousness, realizes that he cannot belong to any category 
of entities: he is no longer a human being, and he is not a free subject in cyberspace as 
he wished.  His transformation reduces his entity into an isolated and closed system.  
Because Flatline cannot endure his unaffiliated position, he wants to be erased.  In terms 
of complexity, since he is disconnected from other systems, he does not evolve into a 
more complex being and is entropically degraded.  Flatline‘s existence shows that the 
real and the virtual in Neuromancer are closed systems that are not interactive with other 
systems, and thus that the closed systems, due to their disconnectivity, may not expect to 
evolve into more complex systems, or produce any other systems.   
The world of Neuromancer where humans and non-humans are vividly mixed is 
a complicated society, but the complication of existential modes does not necessarily 
yield complexity.  In Neuromancer, characters of various existential modes are gathered 
by Wintermute to perform a project.  After the project successfully finishes, Wintermute 
and Neuromancer are fused.  However, the relationships among characters are broken up 
and they go back to their own worlds: Case and Molly leave each other, Armitage is 
dead, Flatline is going to be erased, and the AIs are dispersed into a matrix.  Their 
gathering just reinforces disconnectivities among characters and systems; the world of 
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Neuromancer, consisting of disconnective systems, is complicated, yet fragmented.  The 
novel struggles to deconstruct traditionally integral concepts and highlights differences 
produced by technoscience—different types of existence, space, time, and reality.  But 
the differences in the novel are fragmented without hope of significant change or 
evolution: neither human being nor non-material forms of will and intelligence, neither 
the human world nor the virtual world, does change after all.  Neuromancer, as a 
complicated system, does not possess dynamics enough to change or expand its 
structure.   
In order to highlight the creativity of complexity, complexity theory makes 
strenuous efforts to distinguish complicated systems and complex systems.  Whereas a 
complicated system is a collection of independent units, a complex system is one 
―‗consisting of interconnected or interwoven parts; composite; compound; involved or 
intricate, as in structure‘‖ (Taylor, Moment 138): for instance, static objects, such as 
computer chips and snowflakes, are complicated, and the human brain and the flocking 
behavior of a large group of birds are complex.  While a complicated system is 
reducible, linear, and predictable, a complex system is irreducible, nonlinear, adaptive, 
and self-organizing.  Such a dynamics of the complex system makes elements of the 
system intricate and creates more complexity in the system.   
In complex systems, the level of order or behavior is not the sum of the 
individual elements or actions due to the nonlinear, adaptive, and self-organizing 
characteristics of complex systems.  Whereas complicated systems can be deconstructed 
into constituent parts and thus allow for explanation and analysis, complex systems 
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cannot be simplified and thus they are unpredictable; complex systems are unstable and 
seemingly chaotic.  As Fez mentions, however, ―chaos is just another kind of order‖ 
(Cadigan, Synners 175).  For complex systems, the order comes from patterns of the 
dynamics expanding a system—called ―deterministic chaos,‖ not from a simplified core 
element of the system.  Fez explains a pattern that works for the expansion of the net in 
the concept of deterministic chaos:  
The way we all kept adding to the nets did exactly that, passed a 
threshold. It got to the point where the net should have collapsed in chaos, 
but it didn‘t. Or rather, it did, but the collapse was not a collapse in the 
conventional sense. . . .  When it reached the point where it was burdened 
to the limit, it had two choices—crash, or accommodate. It did both. . . .  
Going over the brink of catastrophe was the first stage. The second was 
recovery—since it was programmed to accommodate, it did. But the only 
way it could accommodate was to exceed the limit. Institute a new limit, 
and when that was reached, go over the brink of catastrophe again, 
recover and institute a new limit beyond that. And so forth. (174-75)  
Fez‘s speculation over a pattern of changing the net reflects the dynamics of evolution 
that complexity theory claims: the word ―deterministic chaos‖ is also from complexity 
theory‘s account of evolutionary pattern for complex systems.  In fact, Fez‘s comment 
re-presents early complex theorists‘ concept of ―dissipative systems,‖ ―the most general 
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expressions of deterministic chaos found in nature,‖ including ―mechanical and chemical 
systems‖ and ―biological and social configuration‖ (Harvey and Reed 377).27   
The concept of ―dissipative systems‖ is a fundamental concept to understand 
complex systems in that it expounds the pattern of evolutionary behaviours of systems.  
Harvey and Reed schematize the evolutionary behaviours as ―oscillation‖ between a 
stable state of a dissipative system following ―a normal linear trajectory‖ and a 
perturbation destabilizing the system (385).  According to them, ―the oscillation 
continues until it abandons its original path and takes one or more of the alternative 
points as its path of development‖ (385).  This dynamics affects both the existence of 
dissipative systems and their evolutionary capability.  Hence, adding complexity to its 
structure through the dynamics, the dissipative system is far from equilibrium.  Such 
conceptions of dissipative systems are the basic operating logic of complex systems.  As 
Fez points out, by instituting new limits in a crisis of collapse, complex systems expand 
their structures.  In terms of dissipative systems, the virus in Synners is a perturbation to 
the stable state of the entire system, and the perturbation functions not just as a crisis but 
as an opportunity for expanding the system in that it contributes to increasing 
complexity.   
 The oscillating dynamics of dissipative systems between stability and 
perturbation corresponds to ―the edge of order and chaos‖ at which complexity emerges 
(Waldrop 12).
28
  Complex systems have ―the ability to bring order and chaos into a 
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 The term ―dissipative system‖ is coined by chemist Ilya Prigogine, who won the Nobel Prize.   
28
 M. Mitchell Waldrop subtitles his book Complexity ―the edge of order and chaos.‖  This phrase is also 
frequently used to account for the emergence of complexity.   
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special kind of balance,‖ which is called ―the edge of order and chaos.‖  The edge of 
order and chaos is ―the constantly shifting battle zone between stagnation and anarchy, 
the one place where a complex system can be spontaneous, adaptive, and alive‖ 
(Waldrop 12).  In the zone, complex systems, or dissipative systems, can be growing by 
―[passing] a threshold‖ (Cadigan, Synners 174): the moment of passing a threshold—or 
that of bifurcation—in complex systems is ―when physical processes unpredictably 
change state or achieve new levels of self-organization‖ and ―when an aggregate of 
previously disconnected elements suddenly begins to ‗cooperate to form a higher level 
entity, with new, unpredictable properties‘‖ (Johnston, ―Computer‖ 445).  The main plot 
of Synners embodies the moment of bifurcation producing a new human model; indeed, 
the new model of the human is a product of adaptive, self-organizing dynamics, adding 
complexity to the entire system.  The emerging product of complexity is ―Markt,‖ a type 
of posthuman constructed by fusing a human (Visual Mark) and an AI (Art).  Markt is an 
entity of higher level complexity than synthesizing humans and synthesized humans.  
This entity opens up a new context for human beings, and, at the same time, it is the 
outgrowth of human beings‘ recognition of a new context for technoscience culture. 
 
c. Synner, the “Bastard Offspring” of Machinic Phylum 
Markt is born at the edge of order and chaos where an interconnective dynamics 
dominates.  In other words, Markt‘s ontological basis and behavioral pattern depend on 
interconnectivities and interactivities with other systems.  The existence of Markt in 
Synners reflects how the novel understands the mechanism that operates the 
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interconnectivity and interactivity between systems—between human and nonhuman, 
the organic and the inorganic, the real and the virtual: the new entity shows how 
creatively technoscience can redistribute and reassemble differences in various physical 
and sociological systems within a larger system, and how the new assemblage extends 
and redefines forms of intelligence and consequently what it means to be human in 
technoscience culture.  In this sense, it can be said that the existence of Markt is not only 
an imaginative figure of complexity paradigm, but a possible future existential mode of 
humans.    
The existence of Markt becomes possible because both human and technology 
change for each other.  Repeating the phrase, ―change for the machines,‖ throughout the 
text, Synners emphasizes how human beings have been changing for the machines: the 
socket technology can be a primary example of the ―change for the machines.‖  Through 
the technology, humans transform themselves to have better communication with 
machines.  But in the face of Visual Mark‘s transfer to the net, Gina realizes that 
machine/technology is also changing for humans: ―Change for the machines? Nah, the 
machines had finally changed for him, and he was just doing what he‘d always done‖ 
(226).  As an evidence of Gina‘s claim, the AI Art has been transforming itself from a 
virus vaccine program (Dr. Art Fish) to an intelligent entity.  In fact, mutual changes 
between human and machine/technology, or organic and nonorganic, have proceeded to 
―a common phylogenetic line‖ called ―machinic phylum,‖ which is ―a realm of forces 
and material flows that cuts across the strongly coded oppositions between the organic 
and the inorganic, the human and the inhuman, order and chaos‖ (Johnston, ―Computer‖ 
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443).  This concept of the machinic phylum pays attention to the ―flow‖ between 
systems in explaining the mechanism constructing the human subject.  The characteristic 
concern with dynamism of the human subject can open up a new phase for human 
evolution by disturbing boundaries used to identify human beings and verifying 
interconnective forces between codes traditionally assigned in oppositional poles, such 
as organic and inorganic, human and nonhuman.  In this way, the concept of the 
machinic phylum provides a philosophical context that can give birth to synners. 
In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari coin the term ―machinic phylum.‖  In the book, describing the 
development of weapons, such as the saber and the sword, Deleuze and Guattari study 
how metallurgy follows variations in materials and their qualities (space-time 
haecceities) and transforms them into features (traits of expression).  Through the study, 
explaining how the material appears to be active and exhibits an invisible life, they argue 
for a technological lineage comprehending differences of variation—that is, ―machinic 
phylum.‖  They define the machinic phylum as ―materiality, natural or artificial, and 
both simultaneously; it is matter in movement, in flux, in variation, matter as a conveyor 
of singularities and traits of expression‖ (409).  Singularity is certain critical points 
where material processes are traversed by a few abstract mechanisms that can be said to 
constitute a machinic phylum (Johnston, ―Computer‖ 444).  In short, the machinic 
phylum is a matter-flow of linked singularities, which is beyond biological lineages, 
pertaining to non-living creatures; the machinic phylum is ―like the unity of human 
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beings and Nature,‖ or the unity of differences of variation (Deleuze and Guattari 406).29  
The concept, in sum, indicates a broad group of abstract machines that drive processes of 
becoming; that is also the act of evolution and the act of emergence in terms of 
complexity theory.   
Explaining the emergence of a new paradigm, which ―‗see[s]‘ matter as capable 
of self-organization,‖ in scientific researches, Manuel DeLanda reconceptualizes 
Deleuze and Guattari‘s ―machinic phylum‖ in terms of nonlinear systems of complexity 
theory (―Nonorganic‖ 134): he redefines the machinic phylum as a self-organizing 
process that nonlinearly works by bifurcations (singularity).  Occurring at the onset of 
self-organization, bifurcations can change the destiny of systems.  In this sense, the 
bifurcations can be said to be sources of creativity and variability for systems (DeLanda, 
―Nonorganic‖ 138-39).  Yet, the machinic phylum has remained invisible until the 
advent of digital computers made possible visualizing the nonlinear complex models of 
bifurcation/singularity; by modeling the machinic phylum, computers have contributed 
to forming ―machinic vision‖ to understand the complexity of the organic and the 
nonorganic.
30
  However, more importantly, the computer itself is an extension of the 
machinic phylum.   
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 For Deleuze and Guattari, ―the machinic‖ is distinguished from the mechanical, or the technical machine, 
a collection of discrete yet homogeneous elements, and also from the organic based on a hierarchical 
organization of biological organs.  Rather, the machine, encompassing the technical machine and the 
organic, is ―the social or collective machine, the machine assemblage that determines what is a technical 
element at a given moment, what is its usage, extension, comprehension‖ (Deleuze and Guattari 398). 
30
 The ―machinic vision‖ here follows Johnston‘s definition of the term: ―Machinic vision . . . presupposes 
not only an environment of interacting machines and human-machine systems but a field of decoded 
perceptions that, whether or not produced by or issuing from these machines, assume their full 
intelligibility only in relation to them‖ (―Machinic Vision‖ 27).  
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In War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, imagining robot historians‘ narrative 
about the history of intelligence, DeLanda assumes that intelligence can be understood 
as a machinic process rather than humans‘ unique property; such a machinic vision about 
intelligence sees ―the emergence of fully autonomous Artificial Intelligence‖ as ―the 
inevitable outcome of this evolutionary process in which humans entered and became 
more and more dependent upon machinic arrangements‖ (Johnston, ―Computer‖ 445).  
Synners shares this machinic vision about artificial intelligence.  As shown in Fez and 
Rosa‘s conversation, it seems no longer a question whether AIs can achieve 
consciousness or not, but the question is whether the conscious AIs are human or not.  
Mentioning Art, Rosa points out disequilibrium as a common trait of AIs and humans: 
―‗Part catastrophe and part chaos,‘ said Rosa. ‗Sounds pretty human to me‘‖ (176).  This 
view reflects the machinic vision about the interface of human and machine systems.  
Both humans and AIs are artisans who ―follow a flow of matter, a machinic phylum‖ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 409).  In the flow of matter, the artisans constitute a continuum by 
―two-way traffic between data and flesh‖ and Markt is a derivation of the continuum 
(Johnston, ―Computer‖ 449).   
In Synners, the virus that hits the System seemingly brings the net and human 
beings to a crisis: it disconnects the System from the whole net and kills socket-people.  
Nonetheless, the novel does not portray the virus as a totally negative entity, but rather 
as a clue of expansion of the entire system; in terms of complexity theory—and also in 
the view of machinic phylum—, it functions as ―a strange attractor (deterministic 
chaos),‖ which can ―define the future of . . . systems‖ (DeLanda, ―Nonorganic‖ 139): 
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Meanwhile the thing [virus] was moving through the system, lashing out, 
absorbing, growing. . . . It was a virus, but with a most important 
difference: this one knew where it was, and what it was, and that it was. 
This one was alive.  
So the problem was to keep from getting sick. Or rather, sicker. It 
still amazed him [disembodied Visual Mark] how sick he was—how sick 
the system was—and yet everything could continue to operate. He 
remembered his old existence as meat. Weren‘t there certain kinds of 
infections—bacteria, rather—that were useful, even vital?   (Cadigan, 
Synners 330, italics in original) 
Visual Mark claims that the informational virus is ―alive,‖ and notices the matter-flow 
between the physical and the virtual by relating the informational virus to the organic 
virus.  In other words, he recognizes that the informational virus and the organic virus 
are related to a common phylogetic line, the machinic phylum.  As DeLanda puts it, 
―[w]hen a system‘s dynamics are caught in a strange attractor, that system is ‗bound to 
be creative‘‖ to explore all the possibilities of the systems (139).  In this sense, the virus, 
as a strange attractor in the world of the novel, creatively explores a new configuration 
of the relationship between the real and the virtual, human and nonhuman, creating the 
entity of Markt.  The dynamics of the virus excites the onset of a self-organizing process 
for change.  In this process of machinic phylum, the entire system of the novel is 
expanding.   
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  The moment of fusing Visual Mark and Art is that of bifurcation/singularity.  
―[A] bifurcation point,‖ as Porush puts it, is ―a system-shattering moment when the 
previous, simpler organization can no longer support the intensity or frequency of its 
own fluctuations, and either disintegrates or jumps to a new level of order and 
integration‖ (―Fictions‖ 68, italics in original).  The direction of change is unpredictable, 
and thus Visual Mark feels misgiving about his transformation at the bifurcation point.  
Visual Mark imagines the moment of his transformation (a bifurcation point) as 
following: 
To escape being devoured by it, he would have to spread further, possibly 
amputating a great deal of himself, confined in some other location, 
losing his enlarged awareness. Or perhaps enlarging himself that much 
would dissipate him, fragment him into many little aspects of the same 
program, each one self-contained and out of contact with the other. 
Perhaps then he would lose his memory and forget that he had been 
human once. (325-26) 
Since he is aware of the nonlinearity of change, Visual Mark cannot predict how his 
consciousness will remain: it could be reduced or enlarged.  Yet, what Mark is afraid of 
is the disintegration of his consciousness.  He seems to recognize that the disintegration 
will bring about the loss of his originality or his humanity.  If he disintegrated into 
fragments disconnecting from other systems, he would become a closed system, which 
might not add complexity to its structure, although making the structure complicate.  
Fortunately, however, the union of Visual Mark and Art turns out to be the ―[jump] to a 
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new level of order and integration‖ (Porush, ―Fictions‖ 68).  The two consciousnesses do 
not reduce to either of them, but rather gain ―complete rapport‖: 
Art had much salient memory to share on the matter, in spite of the fact 
that It had never been flesh. It was the only thing he could think to call 
Art, and he still bridled somewhat against the old associations of the 
word, even though It in this new existence was a far more encompassing 
term than mere he or she. He supposed it was a matter of getting used to it 
. . . and getting used to It. He remained he in his own thoughts, though 
that too would change over time. Change for the machines. That could be 
a good thing.  
He and Art were in complete rapport from the moment of his 
unlocking. (381, italics in original). 
The fusion of Visual Mark and Art is not so much mechanical prosthesis as dynamic 
communication—the machinic phylum: the mutual flow of matter and energy between 
the two consciousnesses.  Consequently, their conjunction is more than a simple sum of 
the two different systems, increasing complexity not only in the net but in the human 
subject.  In this way, Synners illustrates interconnective dynamism of nonlinear complex 
systems through the concept of bifurcation in chaos/complexity theory, expecting 
positive influences of the dynamism on systems.  
 Markt is a human subject of an open and self-organizing system promoted by 
interconnective dynamics—the machinic phylum, and that is the desirable mode of the 
posthuman envisioned by the complexity paradigm.  Markt keeps self-organizing by 
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incorporating other artificial intelligences, including Gabe‘s virtual characters, Marly 
and Caritha.  Such impulse of connectivity reinforces the dynamism of the new subject.  
Besides, Markt indicates the interconnectivity, or ―synthesis,‖ as the dynamics 
constituting all complex phenomena: ―The magic is, there is no magic. Sound and vision, 
yes, but no magic. Pain and pleasure, yes, but no magic. Catastrophe and chaos, yes, but 
no magic. Synthesis. But no magic. Synners . . . but no magic. None whatsoever. 
Ludovic, this isn’t bad news‖ (420, italics in original).  This statement reflects the 
epistemological and ontological philosophy of Synners.  A phenomenon can look 
magical, or mysterious, due to its complex, chaotic surface. Complexity theorists, 
however, would contend that the phenomenon is constituted by ―underlying mechanisms 
that lead systems toward self-generated organization,‖ and thus it is not a result of magic 
but of the mechanism (Strehle 217).  The novel manifests that this way of understanding 
is not ―bad news.‖  
As recent physics, chemistry, genetics, biology, and philosophy prove, systems—
whether physical, organic, social, or cultural—are maintained and expanded by 
interconnectivity and interactivity between systems and also between components of 
systems, increasing complexity.
31
  The novel, illustrating this complexity paradigm, 
explores the interconnectivity and interactivity between humans and technology—or the 
machinic phylum— as ―optimistic‖ (393).32  Hayles claims this optimism is possible  
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 Complexity theorists, including David Byrne, Manuel DeLanda, and Mark C. Taylor, comprehensively 
overview the trend of scientific and social theories that are concerned with the complexity paradigm.  
32
 Fez evaluates Markt as an ―optimistic‖ phenomenon: according to him, the addition of Visual Mark to 
the System makes Art, which is ―viral at heart,‖ more social (393).  In addition, Markt is expected to help 
cure organic beings: ―Mark‘s new existence is still pretty much a secret, but it opens up all new 
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when ―emergence replaces teleology; reflexive epistemology replaces objectivism; 
distributed cognition replaces autonomous will; embodiment replaces a body seen as a 
support system for the mind; and a dynamic partnership between humans and intelligent 
machines replaces the liberal humanist subject‘s manifest destiny to dominate and 
control nature‖ (288).  Indeed, ―synners‖ suggested as a new posthuman subject in the 
novel embody such replacements, and accordingly synners can be a model of humanism 
that can avoid reinscribing and repeating some of the mistakes of the past (Hayles, 
Posthuman 288).  As Markt comments, ―This is certainly an unexpected and historic 
pleasure‖ (418).   
   Technologies of body modification and science studies proving commonalities 
between human and nonhuman are rapidly making the concept of the natural human 
obsolete.  Such scientific and technological situations promote the idea that human 
beings could disappear by the end of the twenty-first century or near future (Broderick 
15).  More radically, human beings, as Hayles claims, have already entered the state of 
the posthuman, and we now ponder identities and values of what comes after the human; 
the posthuman discourses should provide models to account for ―what (and who) [can] 
define authoritative notions of normative, exemplary, desirable humanity into the 
twenty-first century‖ (Graham 11): that is a necessary work to understand ourselves 
confronting a new context that technoscience culture provides.  In this sense, the 
―synners‖ as a model of the posthuman has a significant meaning in the discourse of 
subjectivity.  The concept of the synners suggests that a being in a constant process of 
                                                                                                                                                      
possibilities for healing brain damage, disorders, all that stuff‖ (434). In this way, Markt, a product of the 
machinic phylum, optimistically functions for the physical world and the net.  
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becoming by synthesizing (interconnecting) with others becomes a ―normative, 
exemplary, desirable humanity.‖  This vision is the product of the emergence of the 
complexity paradigm.  Such scientific novels as Synners, which notice and reflect the 
emergence of the complexity paradigm, understand the relationship between humans and 
the rest of the world in terms of community and integration.  The posthuman subject of 
the complexity paradigm represents humans as irreducible, nonlinear, self-organizing 
systems.  In this sense, the emphasis of interconnectivity and interactivity between 
systems in articulating the subject is necessary as the novel Synners foregrounds the term 
―synner‖—humans as synthesizers.  Through the concept of synners, the novel also 
emphasizes the performativity of subjectivity—fluidity of consciousness and identity.  
The entity of Markt is the very product of such performative subjectivity.  
  Considering that Markt is the offspring of the traditional human subject 
(synthesizing human) and its object (synthesized human), the existential mode of Markt 
can be a good example for the posthuman that sees the ―self‖ as ―something that emerges 
from community rather than as something threatened in its autonomy by others‖ (Vint 
13).  As Hayles points out in How We Became Posthuman, some versions of the 
posthuman are still under influences of liberal humanist ideas about the human subject as 
the unified and coherent organization.  Vint claims that such tendency is related to a 
profound individualism embedded in the Western tradition (13).  But Markt seems 
beyond the individualism.  At the process of conjunction with Art, Visual Mark 
experiences losing the sense of individual, becoming more-than-self: ―The old concepts 
of private property and individual were fast losing their importance to him as he and Art 
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came closer to being two aspects of one consciousness rather than two separate 
intelligences‖ (384, italics in original).  Markt‘s assembled consciousness maintains a 
dynamic state, keeping the balance between the two different aspects: consequently, 
there comes the absence of a core self of individual.  The new subject is a disequilibrium 
system.  Therefore, the essence of the subject, if any, is the dynamics to keep the state of 
disequilibrium.  This aspect can help the new subject move ―beyond the exclusions of 
the false universality of the humanist self and the moral vacuity of the excessive 
individualism of the liberal self‖ (Vint 13).  Cadigan does not further the discussion of 
such a new subjectivity in Synners, by not depicting much the world of synners after the 
emergence of Markt.  Hence, the next section of this chapter tries to articulate 
subjectivity based on the new humanity that Synners portrays for the complexity 
paradigm.  
The new paradigm no longer centers on the individual self, and thus the 
traditional image of the self-determining individual becomes invalid for the posthuman 
condition.  ―But if we give up [the] image of personhood and individuality,‖ as 
Raymond Barglow questions, ―what will replace it?‖  The second section of Chapter II 
attempts to answer the question by analyzing Bear‘s nanofiction, Blood Music.  As a 
nanofiction, which understands biological conditions of humans in the level of 
information technology, Blood Music describes the subjectivity of the complexity 
paradigm more vividly and illustratively by radically developing the concept of the 
machinic phylum. 
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2. The Distributed Subject and Nanovision: The Assembled Individual Subject in 
the Superorganism 
Considering the human condition newly provided by technoscience culture, Ray 
Kurzweil asserts that ―the Singularity is near‖ (21).  The Singularity signifies ―a point 
where our old models must be discarded and a new reality rules, a point that will loom 
vaster and vaster over human affairs until the notion becomes a commonplace‖ (Vinge 
89).  Kurzweil supposes that the Singularity enables the human to ―transcend the human 
brain‘s limitations of a mere hundred trillion extremely slow connections‖ (20).  In the 
same vein, Vernor Vinge argues that the Singularity essentially involves ―the creation of 
superhuman intellect‖ (89).  Through the Singularity, the superhuman is expected not 
only to overcome the limitations of biological evolution but to achieve superintelligence 
beyond the human intelligence.  
 As Vinge claims, it is science fiction—especially scientific fiction— writers that 
acknowledge human beings‘ experiences of the Singularity, and they picture 
superhumanity as the essence of the Singularity (90).  Cadigan‘s ―synner‖ is an example 
of that claim.  Expanding the ontological range of the human species, Cadigan 
introduces a model of the superhuman—synners— to cope with a new context full of 
new material and semiotic affairs.  However, the ideas of the Singularity and 
superhumanity are not just for a science-fictional imagination.  Rather, those ideas 
pervade contemporary technoscience culture.  Biophysicist Gregory Stock, for example, 
offers the term ―Metaman,‖ signifying ―beyond, and transcending humans,‖ to 
understand the evolutionary direction of the posthuman.  He argues that the world, 
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materially and sociologically, has become an immense living organism called Metaman, 
a global ―‗superorganism‘—a community of organisms so fully tied together that it is a 
single living being‖ (20).33  Anticipating that the concept of Metaman will flourish more 
with the human‘s increasing reliance on new technologies, especially communication 
technology, Stock claims that Metaman is more than metaphor; it is an actual living 
entity ―feeding, moving, growing, and rapidly evolving‖ (21).  Relocating genes between 
different species, merging organisms, and breaching the boundaries between separate 
life forms, Metaman ―changes by unprogrammed adaptation that is decidedly 
evolutionary in character‖ (227): it evolves directionlessly and moves toward ever-
increasing complexity, which is a characteristic of adaptive, self-organizing systems.  
Stock presents Metaman as a symptom of a new ontology constructed by the new 
paradigm, which is ―replacing much of what has gone before‖ (233).  Indeed, he offers 
Metaman as the future humanity of an emerging paradigm, the complexity paradigm.   
Presenting the superhumanity as a model of the posthuman, both Cadigan and 
Stock try to show that their models of the posthuman do not ignore individuals.  Stock 
claims that within the enormous structure of Metaman, the human individuality is 
protected: ―Living inside Metaman does not enslave or diminish us as individuals; by 
sheltering us from the natural environment, bringing us food and water, technologically 
extending our powers, Metaman lets us express our individuality more fully‖ (28).  
                                                   
33
 Stock stresses that the superorganism (Metaman) is not the same as the concept of Gaia.  He states that 
while Gaia is ―a single living organism‖ that ―simulate[s] thought about the processes regulating our 
biosphere,‖ Metaman is an interactive aggregate of the irrelevant (15). He claims that the Gaia hypothesis 
barely provides insight into the future of humanity due to its single structure. Instead, Stock focuses on 
Metaman‘s self-organizing power to connect irrelevant systems and to develop the momentum toward a 
better future.  
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However, he does not further explain how Metaman helps us express our individuality 
―more fully.‖  Expecting the emergence of faster and smarter intellects like synners, 
Cadigan also believes in the continuance of individuality in spite of technological 
advancement beyond imagination in the future: ―even if the human of one hundred years 
from now is a sentient entity contained within a piece of silicon, s/he‘s going to have a 
personal life.‖34  Stock‘s claim and Cadigan‘s opinion, however, remain as just a hope 
without theoretical or practical supports.  Such awkwardness in presenting the individual 
shows that the subjectivity of the new paradigm, which perceives the human as a 
complex, adaptive, self-organizing system, is not yet fully constructed after the 
deconstruction of traditional selfhood.  
 In the view of the complexity paradigm, the posthuman world after the 
Singularity will keep evolving into a higher complex network sustained by ―machinic 
implementations . . . of distributed bio-social phenomena, of collective thought processes 
and enunciations that cannot be articulated on the level of an isolated individual self‖ 
(Rotman 92).  According to this view, the individual subject in the higher complex 
network is distributed piece by piece, merged, and copied.  As Vinge claims, such 
dynamic processes constituting the individual subject are ―essential features of strong 
superhumanity and the Singularity‖ (95).  In this view, the individual is no longer 
understood as a being independent from the milieu.  The more powerful the superhuman 
network and the more capable it becomes of replacing the traditional notion of the 
human, the less convincing the idea of the self-determining individual.  Not only in 
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 Cadigan states this quotation in the ―Introduction to Chapter 14, Synners‖ published in South Atlantic 
Quarterly (92.4).  
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scientific epistemology but widely in contemporary discourses of subjectivity, the 
discredit about the self-determining individual is pervasive: as a result, the traditional 
image of the individual tends to be thought of as ―the illusion of the whole and coherent 
personal organization, or as the misleading description of the imaginary ground on 
which different subject-positions are colligated‖ (Smith xxxv).  In this way, the human is 
now confronting the crisis of the individual—or, the crisis of the self—in the sense of 
Western traditional individualism.  Bear‘s Blood Music is also concerned with the 
posthuman condition at the crisis of the individual.  The novel sees that the concept of 
the self-determining individual is no longer valid. However, the novel shows that the 
demolition of the traditional image of the individual does not necessarily mean the 
disappearance of the individual.  Rather, Blood Music tries to reconfigure the status of 
the individual in network culture by suggesting the emergence of new forms of the 
individual and community.  Depicting how the individual subject emerges from the 
community or the network where it belongs, Blood Music finds that the structure of the 
individual subject is a fractal of the structure of the larger network: the individual is also 
constituted by subnetworks.   
The idea of conceiving the individual as a network helps Blood Music form a 
new subjectivity distinguished from existing subjectivities.  Western traditional 
individualism is based on the assumption that the self, owning himself/herself, owes 
nothing to community or society: in other words, the traditional notion of individualism 
is premised on the separateness of the individual self from others.  On the other hand, the 
postmodern denies and deconstructs the certainty of the boundary between the self and 
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the other.  Whereas a liberal humanist discourse of the subject would say that an 
individual has a core self inside, the postmodern would argue that there is nothing inside.  
However, Blood Music claims that the inside is not empty, but there is a dynamics to 
constitute the individual subject; accordingly, the individual subject is ―more than an 
illusion‖ (Barglow 83).  In terms of complexity theory, the dynamics is an impulse of 
interconnectivity and interactivity between systems or between components of a system, 
and the subject is an adaptive, self-organizing system constituted by the dynamics.  
Therefore, the subject is not a single entity, but it is ―an assembly of intercommunicating 
parts‖ (Andrew Crumey).35  Looking into an atomic world under the skin through a 
nanotechnological perspective, Blood Music investigates how the individual subject, 
which is deprived of its privilege in the discourses of evolution and is denied its pride as 
the agent, can be rearticulated in enormous intelligent networking systems of 
technoscience culture.     
 
a. Nanovision and the Machinic Process of the Superhuman 
Portraying a moment of the Singularity, Blood Music introduces a world of the 
super intelligence, or the superhuman.  The posthuman world of the novel is drastically 
unfamiliar and looks unreal.  However, the novel claims that the unfamiliarity and 
unrealistic-ness are not simply because the Singularity that the novel pictures is 
impossible or unrealistic, but rather because the human does not yet have the language to 
describe it.  In the novel, a news reporter who looks down on the post-Singularity world 
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 This quotation is originally from Andrew Crumen‘s novel Pfitz, but I cited it from Taylor‘s The Moment 
of Complexity (231).  
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of North America states: ―How can I begin to describe the landscapes beneath us? A new 
vocabulary, a new language, may be necessary. Textures and forms hitherto unknown to 
biologists, to geologists, cover the cities and suburbs, even the wildernesses of North 
America‖ (145).  The news reporter is struggling to find proper rhetoric to explain a new 
reality.  The new landscape that the news reporter mentions means not just the change of 
physical geography—material changes—, but the change of metaphysical geography—
semiotic changes.  The new landscape shows the emergence of a new paradigm to revise 
existing epistemological and ontological perspectives.  Blood Music intends to provide a 
rhetoric to ―describe the landscapes‖ of the new paradigm by producing metaphors 
cutting across micro- and macro-structures, or organic and inorganic structures.    
It is in nanotechnology that Blood Music finds its rhetoric for the new paradigm: 
through the rhetoric of nanotechnology, the novel models the emerging paradigm and 
envisages a human future based on that paradigm.  More exactly, in adopting the vision 
of nanotechnology to create a model of posthuman reality, Blood Music brings in 
―nanovision,‖ which Colin Milburn offers as ―a way of seeing that lyses the membrane 
between the technological present and the nanotechnological future‖ (13).  Expanding 
the adaptive, self-organizing systems of the molecular world  to the macro-world, the 
nanovision focuses on ―the involvement of human perception with technological 
otherness, to replace the static being of transcendent ‗rapture‘ with the participatory 
evolution of ‗becoming‘‖ (Milburn 14-15).  Blood Music furthers this nanovision to 
define the status of the individual subject within the emerging paradigm—the 
complexity paradigm.  Ultimately, the novel structurally and thematically parallels the 
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development of physical and conscious structures of the individual with the evolution of 
the human species.  By showing how the organic structures of the body are becoming, or 
incorporating into a bigger network, the novel claims that the constitution of the 
individual subject is also a becoming process making connections with others/society 
through the machinic processes.   
In Blood Music, nanoscientist Vergil I. Ulram illegally researches ―autonomous 
organic computers‖ that are able to control viral and bacterial genes and to construct new 
complex structures (8): the organic computers are sentient single-celled organisms called 
―noocytes.‖  When his research is disclosed, Vergil injects them into his blood to save 
them.  The noocytes within Vergil‘s blood transform his body atom by atom into a 
different form of organism.  Furthermore, they contaminate other living entities and 
make a big sentient organism—a brown goo of moving intelligence.  The noocytes 
disassemble molecules of matter, including human beings, other animals, and even 
crops, and then reassemble them as part of the brown goo.  At the end, the brown goo 
dominates North America and will soon other continents, too.  It changes the whole 
environment of the Earth, and makes the human enter a new dimension of evolution.   
The brown goo illustrates the ―grey goo problem‖ of nanotechnology, which K. 
Eric Drexler envisions as a hypothetical end-of-the human scenario (172-73).
36
  Drexler 
argues that a new technology called molecular technology, or nanotechnology, which 
―handle[s] individual atoms and molecules with control and precision,‖ ―will change our 
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 While the goo is grey in Drexler‘s writing, it is described as brown in the novel. However, as Drexler 
states, the color does not matter (173).   
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world in more ways than we can imagine‖ (4).37  Furthermore, Drexler expects that the 
engineers of nanotechnology will build ―nanomachines,‖ or ―assemblers,‖ which will 
enable the human to ―remake our world or destroy it‖ (14).  Drexler envisages an 
apocalyptic situation wherein self-replicating assemblers get out of control by accident 
and then consume all matter on Earth, transforming matter into a grey goo.
38
  He 
assumes that the grey goo is a version of the superhuman that is smarter than the human.  
Similarly, in Blood Music, the noocytes (assemblers) are activated by accident and 
remake the world into a superorganism composed of human and nonhuman.
39
  
Observing the transformation, the characters of the novel initially think that ―Perhaps 
humanity was coming to an end‖ (135).  However, the novel ultimately does not depict 
such a sudden change (the Singularity) by technoscience as an apocalypse.  In fact, in the 
novel, human beings are not exactly destroyed, but they are transformed into a new 
existential form: the singularity is a way of evolution, not destruction.  
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 The term nanotechnology is a combined word of nano and technology, and the term ―nano‖ is the prefix 
meaning one thousand times smaller (10
-9
). To measure molecules, a nanometer is used.  
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 Among Drexler‘s writings of nanotechnology, the concept of the grey goo has been given attention due 
to its science-fictional imagination. It was also one of the aspects for which other scientists criticized 
Drexler‘s concept of self-replicating machines (assemblers) for they believed that the concepts of the grey 
goo and assembler have caused groundless fear of nanotechnological future. Richard Smalley is a famous 
nanotechnologist who openly criticizes Drexler‘s vision. To know the visions and problems of 
nanotechnology, read Rudy Buam‘s ―Nanotechnology: Drexler and Smalley Make the Case for and 
against ‗Molecularassemblers.‘‖ Also, Colin Milburn summarizes such skeptics and critics about 
nanotechnology in his book (see page 23-25). Later (2004), however, Drexler revises his claim that the 
grey goo accidentally appears due to out-of-controlled assemblers. He argues that ―[i]n developing and 
using molecular manufacturing, avoiding runaway replication will not be a matter of avoiding accidents or 
mutations, but of avoiding the deliberate construction of something dangerous‖ (Phoenix and Drexler 871). 
In other words, apocalyptic results by nanotechnology will not happen without deliberate moral violation. 
In addition, he maintains that fear of runaway self-replicating machines should not divert attention away 
from other more serious risks of molecular manufacturing.  
39
 As Vergil mentions, the term ―noocytes‖ is ―[f]rom the Greek word for mind, ‗noos‘‖ (63).  Therefore, 
the brown goo produced by the noocytes can be considered a collective mind, or super intelligence.   
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 In the novel, Vergil is the exciter of the Singularity and becomes ―a super-
mother‖ of the noocytes (64).  When the noocytes are activated in his body, Vergil is 
―being rebuilt from the inside out‖ (50).  This inside-out or bottom-up transformation is 
not simply metamorphosis of the body, but also it is accompanied by epistemological 
and ontological changes.  Such phenomena brought about by the noocytes illustrate ―a 
technocultural revolution‖ that nanotechnologists anticipate (Milburn 21).  Under the 
posthuman assumption that the human is ―a set of information processes,‖ the 
technocultural revolution profoundly alters the definitions of life and the individual 
(Hayles, Posthuman 4).40  As a product of the revolution, the noocytes transform the 
human and their milieu by decoding and re-encoding them into new complex structures 
in nanoscale.  The re-formation of things is possible because there is common ontology 
between the human and the milieu: everything, including the human, is the product of 
the transmission of information, or the machinic process, between systems.  The 
transforming process of the noocytes highlights the creativity of the machinic process 
and hints at the evolutionary direction of the posthuman—evolving into a network of the 
organic and the inorganic.  
On the other hand, the machinic process by the noocytes—the noocytes‘ 
transforming process based on the flow of material and mental information among 
things— is conceived, at first, as a frightening disease to destroy the human.  
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 As Drexler mentions concerning the grey goo, the process of the noocytes‘ domination over the 
environment is similar to the apocalyptic future the cyberpunk novels portray in which AI systems 
displace humankind. Indeed, there is a common theme between the grey goo, noocytes, and the AI 
systems: that is, the posthuman point of view that sees the human ―a set of information processes‖ 
(Hayles, Posthuman 4). Hence they can interconnect and interact with other systems and expand their 
existence through such dynamics.  In the same vein, Scott Bukatman regards Blood Music as ―a foundation 
cyberpunk text‖ (216).  
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Considering that the machinic process denies the unbreakable boundary between the 
human and the rest of the world, the evolution through the machinic process will result 
in a frightening future for the humans who have believed in their separateness and 
uniqueness in evolution history.  In the same vein, some critics read destructive images, 
such as apocalypse and holocaust, from the transforming process by the noocytes.
41
  
However, in the perspective of complexity theory, which argues that the machinic 
process occurs everywhere from the inner structures of the human body to the outer 
structures of things and to the inorganic structures of societies, the transforming process 
of the noocytes is not necessarily destructive or apocalyptic; rather, it is a productive and 
creative method of evolution.  In this sense, the noocytes are not outside predators 
destroying the human, but internal organizers managing the flux of information among 
molecules and producing variations of structures: ―They [the noocytes] came from us . . . 
They‘re like our own cells, not like a disease‖ (171).  In this way, the novel stresses that 
the noocytes‘ work is based on the assumption of the human‘s ontological 
communicability with others.  In other words, the transformation of the human into the 
superorganism of the brown goo, as a product of the machinic process, is not only the 
noocytes‘ unilateral compulsion on the human.  Instead, the transformation is produced 
by the nano-structural communication between different structures/systems—physical 
and metaphorical interactions between the human and the other.   
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 In ―‗You Who Never Was There‘: Slavery and the New Historicism-Deconstruction and the Holocaust,‖ 
Walter Benn Michaels associates the situation of the human in Blood Music with ―the vanishing race,‖ 
Holocaust (184); Roger Luckhurst, in ―Catastrophism, American Style: The Fiction of Greg Bear,‖ also 
regards the novel as a ―catastrophe‖ novel, depicting the ―stage of moments of the end‖ (218). 
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In the novel, the human and the noocytes ―learn‖ and ―adapt‖ to each other to 
evolve into the super intelligence without reducing either of them (87).  This aspect 
shows that the transformation of the human is a process of creating complexity, which 
depends on the interactivity between different structures and the irreducibility of the 
structures to a certain structure.  Besides, the novel assumes that the ontological 
communications between the human and the other lead the human ―where we‘ll be for 
some time‖ without ―NO HARM, NO PAIN‖ (87, emphasis in original).42  The novel 
claims that the Singularity is ―not a hallucination‖ even though ―it could not be put into 
words‖ yet and that it will be something ―beautiful‖ and ―more convincing, with all the 
grit and detail of reality‖ (87-88).  In this sense, in conceiving the Singularity, Blood 
Music appreciates the complexity paradigm, which regards the irreducible interactivity 
between systems/structures as a nature of evolution. 
In order to underscore the interactivity and irreducibility of the transformation, 
Blood Music uses characters (Suzy, Olafsen twins, and Vergil‘s mother April) having 
strange genetic codes that the noocytes cannot decode immediately: the noocytes keep 
trying to converse with the people to persuade them to voluntarily participate in the 
transformation.
43
  In particular, it takes a longer time for the noocytes to transform Suzy 
than the other characters due to both the strange patterns of her genetic codes and her 
disapproval of the transformation.  Suzy‘s mother transformed into the new entity tells 
Suzy: ―Please don‘t be afraid. They left you alone because they couldn‘t enter your body 
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 Throughout the text, what the noocytes state is marked in bold font.  
43
 Suzy who has Down Syndrome, twins, who have too similar genetic codes to each other, and April, who 
has similar genetic codes to that of their mother body (Vergil) must be difficult objects for the noocytes to 
decode immediately. Hence, the nooctyes waits in transforming the characters until the noocytes decode 
them and these characters themselves allow the transformation.  
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without killing you. You have an unusual chemistry, darling. So do a few others. That‘s 
not a problem anymore. But it‘s your choice, honey. Just listen to us . . . and to them‖ 
(169).  Through this statement briefing the persuading process, the novel shows how 
differences are handled in constituting the superorganism of the human-noocytes: the 
process is not a threatening invasion but an interactive and cooperative process.  Edward, 
a doctor who examines Vergil, describes the process of the transformation, stressing this 
aspect:  
There was a rhythm in his arms, in his legs. With each pulse of blood, a 
kind of sound welled up within him as if an orchestra were performing 
thousands strong, but not in unison; playing whole seasons of symphonies 
at one. Music in the blood. The sensation became more coordinated; the 
wave-trains finally canceled into silence, then separated into harmonic 
beats. (85)   
Edward points out that although the rhythm of the transformation process is cooperative, 
it is not in unison; rather, it is a beauty of complexity that differences of the subsystems 
create.  Both the macro-scale process of persuading and the micro-scale process of the 
transformation show how differences can be reassembled to create new structures or to 
add complexity.  In fact, the harmony, or the ―blood music,‖ of the transformation is 
derived from the re-assemblage of the differences.  In other words, the differences are 
the basis of the evolving dynamics to the extent that ―[t]he differences in [the] 
environment,‖ as Deleuze and Guattari maintain, ―trigger self-organizing processes‖ 
(Bonta and Protevi 4).  The self-organization is motivated by the interactivity and 
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irreducibility between the differences.  In Blood Music, all individual beings, as well as 
ones with strange genetic codes, are subsystems of the superorganism, and their 
differences promote and make the superorganism more complex.     
The emphasis on the interactivity and irreducibility also reflects the novel‘s 
attempt to show that the superorganism is not a totalitarian system in which individuality 
is sacrificed to the logic of the whole, but a complex system in which the whole is 
sustained by its interactions with individuals as well as interactions among individuals; 
the interactivities are the self-organizing performances of the noocytes inside the body.  
The dynamics of the self-organization promotes the machinic process between the 
human and the technological other (noocytes), and between the individual subject and 
the other.  Using the words ―music‖ and ―orchestra‖ to emphasize the harmonic nature of 
the transforming process shows that the novel acknowledges the machinic process of the 
self-organizing transformation as unthreatening, or, more radically, enjoyable and 
artistic, because the superorganism is not a result of a compulsory force to assimilate 
differences into a certain mode, but that of an interactive process to produce a creative 
outcome—complexity.  In sum, through the transformation of the human into the 
superorganism, Blood Music traces how physical and metaphysical organisms self-
organize their structures to lead to a higher level of complexity.  Such a self-organizing 
process creating complexity resembles the way in which complexity theory understands 
social systems.
44
  In other words, Blood Music shares the perspective of complexity 
theory that human societies are the product of evolution as far as they are part of the 
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 Fritjof Capra claims that the concept of a network produced by ―nonlinear, multidirectional, patterns of 
organization‖ is applicable to human societies as well as biological organisms (34).  
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living world: ―[societies] are made up of individuals, individuals are built from cells, 
cells contain chromosomes, which in turn have genes‖ (Nowotny 17).  In this way, the 
organic and the inorganic systems are networked by the transmission of information 
among organizations only to form a superorganism.   
This perspective mirrors ―the realist social ontology,‖ which explores social 
constructivism in its literal meaning.  In arguing social constructions, the realist social 
ontology investigates objective processes of construction ―in which language plays an 
important but not a constructive role‖ (DeLanda, New Philosophy 3).  The 
superorganism of the human-noocyte in Blood Music illustrates the realist social 
ontology through the insight of nanotechnology into a bottom-up ontological model that 
nano-scale structures are ―the basis of whole new products, industries and forms of 
‗life‘‖ (Urry 1).  Showing how the superorganism emerges from the interactions of its 
component parts or individual human beings, the novel claims that ―the identity of the 
[individual] acquire[s] new layers as the emergent whole reacts back and affects them‖ 
(DeLanda, New Philosophy 33).  In terms of this perspective, individuals exist ―as part 
of populations within which they constantly interact with one another‖ (DeLanda, New 
Philosophy 32).  In this vein, the superorganism of the novel can be read both as the 
whole or a society constructed by interactions between individuals and as the individual 
by interactions between subindividual components.     
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b. The Distributed Subject and Agency of Self-Organization 
Positivistically complementing social constructivist ontology, the realist social 
ontology reflects the perspective of the complexity paradigm on the individual subject.  
The complexity paradigm, claiming the interconnectivity and interactivity between 
systems as the dynamics of evolution, denies the concept of the self-determining 
individual based on its separateness from others.  This aspect of the complexity 
paradigm cripples the implicit methodological individualism embedded in traditional 
discourses of subjectivity.  Methodological individualism, a philosophical method that 
understands broad social developments as the collection of decisions by individuals, sees 
that individual persons are isolated from one another and that a collectivity of 
individuals cannot function as a decision-maker (DeLanda, New Philosophy 4).  For 
methodological individualism, the whole is nothing but the sum of parts.  On the 
contrary, in complexity theory, which argues that the whole is constituted by the 
interactions between parts—not just an aggregation of the parts— and thus that the 
property of the whole cannot be reduced to that of a part, not only is the social reality 
formed by interpersonal networks, but also the individual, as a product of the machinic 
process, is defined in the relations with others.  In this way, under the influence of the 
complexity paradigm, interactivities between individuals are understood as essential 
components performing material and metaphysical roles in constituting the individual 
subject as well as social networks.   
Conceiving the emergence of the complexity paradigm, Barglow comments that 
―[t]he social character of the self has been an axiom‖ of contemporary sociology: 
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―human beings are essentially relational creatures. Their identity consists not simply in 
their separateness from others, but in the myriad affiliations that link them within a 
shared lifeworld‖ (184).  The ―myriad affiliations‖ are not ―the serial, the singular, the 
monolithic, and the linear,‖ but ―the plural, the internally multiple, and the distributed‖ 
(Rotman 83).  This understanding of human identity brings about the deconstruction of 
the self-determining self and the emergence of the distributed subject in the networks of 
person-to-person connectivity.  Complexity theory regards such changes as phenomena 
caused by the machinic process between human and non-human, which pushes ―the 
human far from equilibrium and into a ‗crisis‘ situation‖ (Bonta and Protevi 18).  For 
complexity theory, the ―crisis‖ is an opportunity to increase complexity rather than a 
problem.  Modeling subjectivity in the ―crisis‖ situation, Blood Music shows that 
―subjectivity,‖ as Taylor manifests, ―is not completely passive‖ to the extent that ―there 
is a codetermination as well as coevolution between the individual and the web or 
matrix‖ (Rickert and Blakesley, ―Interview‖ 807).  By emphasizing the codetermination 
and coevolution between the individual and the milieu through the machinic process of 
the noocytes, the novel suggests the possibility of agency.   
While entering the system of the noocytes, Bernard, a scientist who tries to 
understand the machinic process of the noocytes through conversations with them and 
observation on his own transformation, virtually experiences the posthumanist claim that 
the human is a set of information processes, and he comes to realize that the claim 
signifies not only the body but also the mind: the noocytes tell Bernard that they can 
encode human beings‘ ―personality‖ and ―soul‖ as well as their material information 
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(151 and 176).
45
  The noocytes claim that by doing so, they ―complete the [feedback] 
loop‖ between the human and the milieu (151).  In the machinic process of the noocytes, 
characters (Vergil and Bernard) feel at first as if their ―soul[s]‖ were stolen (53 and 151).  
The noocytes‘ transforming process literally shows that the mentality of the individual 
subject can be decoded in terms of information.  In other words, for the noocytes, 
―personality‖ and ―soul‖ are just a result of the flow of information, and, accordingly, 
the individual subject, as a form of information, can be distributed throughout the 
networks.  For them, therefore, the traditional concept of the individual must be 
incomprehensible:  
  —I‘d like to speak to an individual 
  INDIVIDUAL? 
  —Not just the team or research group. One of you, acting alone. 
  We have studied INDIVIDUAL in your conception. We do not fit 
the word.  
  —There are no individuals? 
  Not precisely. Information is shared between cluster of ******* 
  —Not clear. 
Perhaps this is what you mean by INDIVIDUAL. Not the same as a 
single mentality. You are aware that cells cluster for basic 
structuring each cluster is the smallest INDIVIDUAL. These clusters 
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 Bernard provides himself to European scientists to let them research the nooctyes when he realizes his 
infection.  Bernard plays a significant role in making the novel a scientific text rather than simple scientific 
imagination. The conversations between Bernard and the noocytes and Bernard‘s records about the 
processes of his transformation are as if the author Bear lectures readers on recent technoscience culture 
and human subjectivity in it.  
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rarely separate for long into single cells. Information is passed 
between clusters sharing in assigned tasks, including instruction and 
memory. Mentality is thus divided between clusters performing a 
function. Important memory may be *diffused* through all clusters. 
What you think of as INDIVIDUAL may be spread throughout the 
*totality*. (141-42) 
This passage shows that the noocytes demystify the concept of the soul, or the central 
agent, but they do not steal or destroy it.  In traditional discussions of subjectivity, the 
central agent, which is also called self or soul, signifies ―the core person complete with 
essential qualities of inwardness that make each of [the human beings] distinct and 
unique‖ (Barglow 81).  However, along with the development of information 
technologies, the concept of agent is replaced by the ―sophisticated command and 
control apparatus of a ‗human computer‘‖ (Barglow 82).  Such a technological 
understanding of the human diffuses the individuality of the subject by deconstructing 
the divine inwardness of the subject into the units of information, and, as a result, 
problematizes the traditional concept of the individual subject as the whole and coherent 
organization.  
While in traditional discourses of subjectivity, mentality as an essence of the 
individual cannot be shared, in a posthumanist view, mentality as information can be 
distributed and shared, considering the existential essence of information is sharing and 
flowing.  In this sense, the informationalization of the human presupposes the need to 
share and communicate, which leads to the increase of complexity.  The sharing and 
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communication of information enable many individual minds to weave networks 
together, and, consequently, the individual becomes a socialized mind, interdependent 
with others.  In sum, the informationalization of the human subject results in the 
invalidity of the traditional concept of the individual as a separate being from others, 
and, likewise, the concept of the agent as the core personality becomes ineffective.  In 
this way, by opening up the possibility of coevolving with the milieu, the human subject 
can adapt itself to rapidly changing reality by technoscience in physical and 
metaphysical levels.  
Blood Music, nevertheless, does not totally negate the concept of the agent per 
se; instead, it claims that the agent still exists, albeit in a different concept.  While 
undergoing the incorporation into the system of the superorganism, Bernard states, ―I 
belong to nobody. I am not what I once was‖ (163).  Since his singular mentality, or the 
central agent, is ―diffused‖ and ―spread‖ throughout networks, there is no central 
perceiver to whom he belongs, but it is successive perceptions that constitute Bernard 
(142).  The perceptions are decentered agents.  In other words, Bernard is constituted not 
by a single agent to control the being, but a multiplicity of agents.  Bernard also 
recognizes this plurality: ―I cannot really comprehend the size of the population within 
me. They come in many classes: the original noocytes and their derivatives, those 
converted immediately after the invasions . . . At a crude guess, perhaps two trillion fully 
developed, intelligent individuals exist within me‖ (132-33, italics in original).  Bernard, 
however, does not fully understand the relationship between Bernard as a whole and the 
―intelligent individuals exist[ing] within [him].‖  Although he conceives of the 
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existences of his multiple inner beings, he believes he possesses a unity in his identity, as 
revealed by his saying ―I am Bernard‖ (172).  For his claim, the noocytes tell him that 
―There are many BERNARD‖ and that the speaking or conscious Bernard at that 
moment is one of ―[a] million changing versions, never to be reintegrated‖ (172).  
Hence, the claims for a unity in his identity and a representative identity for multiple 
intelligent individuals within him cannot be valid.   
Bernard also comes to realize his changed ontological condition after 
experiencing the operating systems of the noocytes more: ―Each of them [Bernards] can 
have a thousand, ten thousand, a million counterparts, depending on their quality, their 
functions. None needs die, but in time all or nearly all will change. In enough time, most 
of the million me’s will bear no resemblance to the present me, for we are indefinitely 
variable. Our minds work on the infinite variety of life’s foundations‖ (197, italics in 
original).  In this passage, Bernard decenters his selfhood and admits to differences 
between other versions of his beings.  He does not use the first person singular ―I‖ to 
indicate the speaker/writer of the passage, replacing it by the plural pronoun ―we.‖  This 
change of term shows that Bernard recognizes the decentered-ness of his subject and the 
paralleling relationships among them.  In this way, Blood Music shows that decentered 
subjectivity does not necessarily mean ―no agent,‖ but, instead, a multiplicity of agents 
without hierarchical relationships between agents.     
While the centered subjectivity assumes ―the autonomous individual . . . [with] a 
‗command central‘ of a kind, a subject from whom thought and action project outward to 
grasp and master the environment,‖ the decentered subjectivity regards the individual as 
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the effects of the interactivities between systems or distributed agents (Barglow 64): in 
other words, the individual subject is a result of internal processes between 
heterogeneous and multiple agents.  Therefore, the subject should be defined by the 
dynamics among the inner variations, rather than its differences from others outside.
46
  
Blood Music explores this view through the superorganism of the human-noocyte: the 
superorganism illuminates the distributed subject forming and performing itself through 
multiple perceptions.  The superorganism‘s internal variations (individual beings within 
the superorganism) keep becoming something else.  Likewise, the individual subjects, 
such as Bernard and Vergil, within the system of the superorganism realize that they are 
also constituted by the same pattern as the superorganism.  The individual subject is 
internally unstable and always in the process of becoming.  The instability of the subject 
is not because the subject has no agent but because what is constituted by is the 
nonlinear, adaptive, self-organizing dynamics of interactivities between multiple 
agents—in other words, the instability of the subject is due to its dynamic agency. 
Deconstructing the central agent entails the evaporation of agency that is 
traditionally considered to be what the agent possesses and thus frequently considered 
equivalent to the notion of mastery.  The decentered subjectivity that refutes the 
existence of agency, in a postmodern understanding, assumes that the human subject of 
multiplicity and heterogeneity is not only unfixed but also fragmented: the schizophrenic 
subject.  However, paying attention to the machinic process of the superorganism, which 
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 To understand the concept of ―difference in itself‖ further, see Deleuze‘s Difference and Repetition.  In 
that book, he maintains that matter differs from itself: ―difference is not between species . . .  but entirely 
on one side, within the chosen line of descent‖ (60). Blood Music reinterprets this philosophical view on 
differences in scientific terms.  
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interconnects individual things to each other and to the whole, Blood Music re-opens up 
the possibility of agency.  The agency that the novel suggests is the dynamics to 
structure systems/agents through interactions between components of system or between 
subsystems—the dynamics of self-organization: agency is not located in a certain 
system/agent, but it is a self-generating dynamic between systems/agents.  In this 
perspective, therefore, the agency cannot be designated as an attribute of the subject.  
Rather, the agency effects the subject.  In other words, while in the methodological 
subjectivity of the self-determining individual, a subject is the presupposition of agency, 
Blood Music suggests that the subject is a result of the agency. 
 Complexity theory maintains that complexity emerges from interactions of a 
great many independent agents in a great many ways and ―the very richness of these 
interactions allows the systems as a whole to undergo spontaneous self-organization‖ 
(Waldrop 11, italic in original): the self-organization emerges at a high degree of 
complexity.  But nano-biologists set forth a subtlely different view.  They claim that the 
self-organization is not only a result of high complexity, but also it is a necessary 
dynamics to create complexity.
47
  In other words, the dynamics of self-organization 
creates complexity by compounding interactions between components or (sub)systems 
nonlinearly and adaptively.  Blood Music follows the nano-biological view in depicting 
the emergence of agency: agency emerges spontaneously through interconnections 
among elements or interdependent agents, and it becomes the dynamics to form a 
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 To understand the self-organizing capacity of biological systems, see Jean-Marie Lehn‘s ―Toward 
Complex Matter: Supramolecular Chemistry and Self-Organizing.‖ Exploring how matters become 
complex from the elementary particle to the thinking organism, Lehn points out that self-organization is a 
fundamental dynamic to constitute living beings no matter how small they are. In this sense, the dynamics 
of self-organization causes complexity rather than being triggered by complexity.   
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subject.  Vergil witnesses the emergence of the dynamics of self-organization in the 
development of the noocytes:  
More than once, he had the spooky feeling that his work was too easy, 
that he was less a creator and more a servant . . .  Once he started the 
process and switched on the genetic sequences which could compound 
and duplicate the biologic DNA segments, the cells began to function as 
autonomous units. They began to ―think‖ for themselves and develop 
more complex ―brains.‖ (14) 
The process in which the noocytes get sentient illustrates that the self-organizing 
capacity of biological systems, which nano-biologists claim exists, gives birth to 
consciousness.  Although they are born by simpler initiating processes, the noocytes, 
after achieving the dynamics of self-organization, are never reduced to their earlier 
status.  For that early consciousness that ―began to ‗think‘‖ is not the core self of the 
noocytes to control the entire changing processes.  As the noocytes constantly 
incorporate with human and non-human beings, the initiative consciousness is dispersed 
throughout their networks and reorganized with others.  If there is a core-ness of the 
noocytes, it is the very dynamics through which the noocytes nonlinearly and adaptively 
self-organize themselves, making their entire system more complex.  In this sense, it can 
be said that the dynamics of the nonlinear, adaptive, complex self-organization functions 
as agency to activate the system of the noocytes and further the superorganism: the self-
organizing dynamics makes a multiplicity of different entities a whole by integrating 
them within the entire system of the superorganism.  The dynamics exists everywhere 
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interconnectivity and interactivity between the superorganism‘s subsystems or 
components take place.  In terms of subjectivity, the agency is distributed throughout the 
networks of the systems/agents forming the subject.  
Although agency is generally defined as ―the ability of human subjects to effect 
novel and creative changes in the world,‖ Blood Music expands the concept beyond the 
human realm through the noocytes and the superorganism (Bonta and Protevi 5, my 
italics).  By demystifying and reconfiguring the concepts of agent and agency as the 
natural dynamics of evolution, the novel tries to locate the human subject within 
networks of technoscience culture. Within the networks, the human subject cannot be 
fixed and stable, but contingent and provisional.  Indeed, the superorganism, a collective 
organism of the human and the nonhuman, embodies the subjectivity of technoscience 
culture that Hayle depicts: ―agency is distributed rather than singular, cognition is 
dispersed through the mind and body rather than situated solely in the neocortex, and 
consequently that ‗personhood‘ is always already a collective endeavor‖ (Hayles, 
―Commentary‖ 329).  Paying attention to the relationship between the dynamics of 
agency and personhood, Blood Music attempts to form subjectivity to account for the 
individual subject within networking culture of technoscience.  The novel assumes that 
the subject emerges as a result of ―collective endeavor‖ at a certain moment.  This 
assumption is illuminated through how individual characters individuate themselves 
from the superorganism: human subjects, after being incorporated into the 
superorganism, individuate themselves from the superorganism to express their 
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individual personhood.  Their personhood is formed through the individuation.  The 
novel simulates ―becoming‖ subjectivity via the process of individuation.   
In the view of complexity theory, complex systems constituted by nonlinear and 
adaptive dynamics are unstable organisms in the process of ―becoming.‖  In this view, it 
can be said that all beings, as complex systems, are ―becoming‖ entities.  However, 
Gilbert Simondon claims that ―becoming‖ should not be simply taken as ―a framework 
in which the being exists‖; rather, becoming is a dimension of being (301).  A being 
inherently has the dynamics of becoming, and the individual subject is formed by the 
dynamics: the dynamics makes one of the potential versions of the being contingently 
and provisionally individuated from the whole as the subject at a moment.  Therefore, 
the subject cannot completely represent the entire being, and, in turn, the being can be 
just partially embodied as a subject through the individuating process.  In this sense, the 
becoming of living things ―represents a permanent individuation,‖ and the living thing is 
―the theater of individuation‖ (307).  Such thoughts on becoming and individuation 
explain the relationship between the entire system of the superorganism and individuals 
as its subsystems in Blood Music.  The noocytes absorb living things and then 
incorporate them into a superorganism with collective intelligence.  Although the 
individuals constituting the superorganism are informationalized and distributed into the 
entire system, they can reassemble themselves through individuating processes of 
information.  For instance, when Suzy hesitates to incorporate into the system of the 
superorganism, her mother and brothers emerge to persuade her.  Their emergences 
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illustrate the individualization of the subject.  The scientist Bernard describes the 
individuating process in nano-scale:  
Now he waits for data in the form of structured proteins, hormones and 
pheromones, nucleic acid strings, data perhaps even in the form of 
*tailored* cells, viruses or domesticized bacteria. He needs not only basic 
nutrients, easily available from the blood serum, but supplies of the 
enzymes which allow him to absorb and process data, to think. . . . The 
blood is a highway, a symphony of information, instruction. It is a delight 
to process and modify the rich broth. The information has its own variety 
of tastes, and is like a living thing, liable to change in the blood unless it 
is carefully monitored, trimmed of accretions, buffed. Words cannot 
convey what he is doing. His whole being is alive with the chatter of 
interpreting and processing. (165, my italics) 
This passage shows that the individuating is the self-organizing process of information: 
the dynamics of agency.  Bernards, distributed agents, exist before the individuating 
process is triggered, but they are potential rather than substantial within the networks of 
the superorganism where there is no central authority.  A multiplicity of possible 
versions of Bernard ―waits‖ for becoming an emerging version of Bernard.  But the 
emergent version is not the permanent one; Bernard, the subject, is a contingent and 
provisional entity.  Before the individuation, Bernard, or the subject, is a deferred 
presence waiting for the emerging process by agency, the dynamic of self-organization.  
Through ―the chatter of interpreting and processing,‖ the deferred presence of Bernard is 
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becoming a Bernard; Bernard keeps becoming beside itself through constant 
individuating processes.  
Simondon expresses the concept of the deferred presence as the ―preindividual 
being‖ (311).  According to him, the being individuates itself ―through the 
potentialization of the incompatibilities of its preindividual centers‖ (314).  The subject 
contingently emerges through the self-organizing dynamics between preindividual 
centers or agents of the deferred presence.  Suzy‘s brother Kenneth accounts for the self-
organizing dynamics:  
Well, yeah, they argue sometimes, and we argue, too. It‘s not cut and 
dried. But nobody hates anybody because we‘re all duplicated hundreds 
of thousands, maybe millions of times. You know, like being Xeroxed. 
All across the country. So like, if I die here, now, there‘s hundreds of 
others tuned in to me, ready to become me, and I don‘t die at all. I just 
lose this particular me. So I can tune in to anybody else, and I can be 
anywhere else . . . . (171, italics in original) 
His explanation shows that the relationship among agents is incorporative rather than 
exclusive.  The entity of ―I‖ is a product of complex interactions between ―others‖: 
others are always ready to (re)produce ―I.‖  In this view, the ―others‖ are not beings that 
are not ―I,‖ but they exist as the preindividual presence of ―I‖: the ―I‖ is individuated 
from the preindividual presence composed of a variety of distributed agents.  Such 
condition of the ―I‖ explicates Simondon‘s claim that individuation is the becoming of 
the being and the becoming is a dimension of the being: the individual subject is a 
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contingent and provisional emergence of the being in its becoming process.  The 
individuated being, therefore, can be ―neither the whole being nor the primary being‖ 
(Simondon 311).  Kenneth individuates a ―particular [him]‖ from his preindividual 
presence within the system of the superorganism.  Indeed, the particular version of 
Kenneth does not represent the whole of his presence, and it is not its primary subject, 
either.  Rather, the Kenneth talking to Suzy at that moment is a contingently and 
provisionally emergent subject of the being.   
In terms of complexity theory, the ―I‖ that Kenneth indicates as his self during 
the conversation with Suzy is ―a moment of complexity‖ (Taylor, Moment 232).  The 
current ―I‖ of Kenneth is a subject contingently networked within the superorganism: in 
other words, it is an incarnation of the complexity of networks ―operat[ing] in many 
channels and multiple media‖ (Taylor, Moment 232).  Taylor delineates such conditions 
of the networking subject in terms of complexity: ―Webs and networks can no more 
exist without me than can I without them. In the absence of firm walls and fixed 
boundaries, it is impossible to put an end to this inconclusive interplay of networking. 
This is what I am—this is what we have become in the moment of complexity‖ (Moment 
232).  In this view, the subject can be defined as a moment of complexity.  Blood Music 
reinvents, through the insight of nanotechnology, such complexity of the human subject 
as one emerging from the machinic process of biological-social information.  Illustrating 
the interconnective and interactive relationship between micro biological organisms and 
macro social organisms, the constituting process of the superorganism underpins the 
claim of complexity theory that subjectivity is ―an objectively real, emergent property of 
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biological and social life‖ (Price 14).48  In this way, Blood Music speculates on the 
individual subject more vividly and persuasively than any other posthuman criticism and 
scientific observation.  
Based on visions and insights of nanotechnology into molecular reality, Blood 
Music makes itself not simply a fun-seeking fantasy but a scientific hypothesis to 
configure the physical and semiotic conditions of the posthuman and the evolutionary 
direction of the human.  The fictional situations that Blood Music depicts, in fact, are 
hypotheses, rather than fantasy or imagination, about the Singularity that human beings 
are going to encounter.  The novel also offers the superorganism as a hypothetical model 
of how the human subject will survive the coming Singularities.  The views of the novel 
on the Singularity and the superorganism are related to the novel‘s speculation on the 
reality of the universe.  The novel claims that ―the universe really has no underpinnings‖ 
(206), and ―[t]here is nothing . . . but information‖ in the universe (154); ―the universe is 
always changing‖ according to how information is interconnected.  In this vein, it can be 
said that ―there is no ultimate reality of the universe‖ (206).  Therefore, the human can 
just make hypotheses and theories, which ―fit what happens on [the human] level‖ (206-
07), and a good hypothesis and theory do not simply explain a reality but constitute it: 
―Theory fits, universe is shaped‖ (206, italics in original). 49  By showing how a different 
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 Refuting discursive subjectivity prevailing in postmodern epistemology, complexity theorists emphasize 
realness of subjectivity; they argue that the human subject cannot be simply reduced to ―a creation of 
language‖ insofar as the human lives in the material world (Price 14). Therefore, for complexity theory, it 
is important to prove the interconnection and interaction between the bio-organism and the social 
organism in the discussion of subjectivity. 
49
 This view reflects recent science studies arguing sociality of scientific knowledge and practice: science 
is not neutral, but value-loaded and socialized.  This view does not believe in underpinnings or absolute 
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reality can be created through reassembling information, Blood Music self-supports its 
hypotheses on reality and further asserts itself as a good theory.   
While it denies ultimate reality, Blood Music assumes that there is ―the reality 
literally constructed by the desire of life‖ in the universe (Milburn 180).  Based on this 
assumption, the novel focuses on what the desire of life is and how it constructs a reality 
rather than what reality is.  To expound those concerns theoretically, the novel employs 
terms and visions of complexity theory, particularly based on nanobiology.  According 
to nano-biologist Jean-Marie Lehn, the machinic process (material self-organizing 
process) happening at the molecular level of living things is the evidence of ―the desire 
of life‖—an essential dynamics constituting a life.  The novel reinterprets the dynamics 
of the self-organizing process as agency constructing the subject.  The agency generates 
complexity by interconnecting distributed information/agents: the novel considers the 
human subject the complexity momentarily produced by the dynamics.  This view helps 
clarify the human subject in a constantly changing reality without underpinnings: the 
subject of complexity self-organizes itself to adapt to changing milieu.  According to 
Blood Music, as reality can be constituted by a good theory observing how distributed 
information in the universe produces complexity, the human subject also can be 
constituted by a good theory.  The novel, as a good theory, expects that its hypotheses 
help the human be released ―from the prison of supremely lonely selfhood into a fluid 
collectivity that far transcends the limitations of individual consciousness‖ (Hayles, 
―Commentary‖ 331), and that, through the release, the human subject can experience 
                                                                                                                                                      
knowledge or reality. For further understanding, see Science as Practice and Culture (Ed. Andrew 
Pickering. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992). 
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―[some]thing so rich‖ that we ―had never felt/seen/tasted‖ it before (Bear 172).  
Expanding the discussion of the human relationship with technological others, the next 
chapter will examine the new experiences that the human subject encounters, and try to 
suggest a new ethical model of the human subject for the complexity paradigm.   
In Western individualist tradition, the human subject is considered ―a moral 
individual—responsible not only for self-formation but also for establishing and 
maintaining ethical relationships with others‖ (Barglow 64).  However, with the 
technoscience culture blurring boundaries socially formed as well as biologically given, 
the human subject cannot be explained in such a traditional view.  As Synners and Blood 
Music anticipate, technoscience will continue to enact changes on the current condition 
of the human, furthering our connections with others; thusly, the human becomes more 
and more a technological monster.  In order to investigate an ethically responsible mode 
of subjectivity, the next chapter will focus on how the human subject lives as/with 
technological monsters by analyzing two scientific fiction novels that explore ethical 
relationships with others: Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein: Or, the Modern Prometheus and 
Marge Piercy‘s He, She and It.  In so doing, I will argue that the texts form a network 
through textual interconnectivity and examine how the network creates a new ethics and 
new meanings for the complexity paradigm.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL MONSTER AS THE 
HOPEFUL OTHER: ETHICS OF DYNAMIC ONTOLOGY 
 
The advent of posthumanism is accompanied by the expectation of a novel 
ethical perspective that can not only account for posthuman behaviors but advance a new 
understanding of relationships between (post)humans and their environment.  Suggesting 
that the ethical aim of posthumanism is to ―create the conditions for the emergence of 
less hierarchical and less violent social and political relationships,‖ Ann Weinstone 
argues that the ethical aim of posthumanism would not be achieved if questions of ethics 
were not located in human-human relationships (Weinstone 6).  According to her, 
without proper vocabularies articulating human-human relationships, relationships 
between humans would come to be understood in a radical alterity marked with ―both 
unbridgeable difference and dangerous similarity,‖ and, consequently, it would be hard 
for humans to expect less hierarchical and less violent human-human relationships 
(Weinstone 4, italics in original).  In this vein, for Weinstone, the cyborg, as the 
exemplary figure of posthumanism, is not a proper model to discuss ethics since it is not 
a hybrid of human and human, but human and nonhuman (5-6).   
However, such an anthropocentric ethical view can be challenged by non-
anthropocentric understandings about the relationship between human and nonhuman or 
environment and about ontology of human beings.  First, to re-view the relationship 
between human and nonhuman, some critics, such as Silvia Benso and Don Ihde, offer 
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―the ethics of things,‖ a non-anthropocentric perspective to understand things, 
questioning ―what if things were capable of expressing an ethical signification, an 
alterity that goes beyond the structures of meaning within which things have been 
enframed . . .?‖ (Benso xxx-xxxi).  This question implies the assumption that the ethics 
of humans is the response to the ethics of things: ―humans are compelled by things to 
respond to the demands placed upon them and shape their behavior in accordance to the 
inner mirroring of things‖ (Benso 142).50  Therefore, concerns of posthuman ethical 
discourses about the relationship between the human and nonhuman should not be 
understood as an ethical fallacy ignoring the human-human relationship, but as a new 
ethical perspective reexamining human ethics in another angle.   
Besides, Weinstone‘s claim that the cyborg cannot be an ethical model for the 
posthuman culture seems to run counter to the nature of posthumanism that discusses the 
coalescence of the human with technoscience.  Although Weinstone expects the advent 
of a new ethical perspective that can challenge existing hierarchical and violent social 
and political relationships grounded on the traditional ethical perspective, her view does 
not go beyond traditional ethics: in fact, her view of posthumanism still counts on the 
hierarchical relationship between human and nonhuman, between self and other, which 
has established the conditions for hierarchical and violent social and political 
                                                   
50
 Benso‘s claim on the ethics of things radically appropriates recent technoscience studies, which argue 
that ethics can be possible based on the assumption that objects are not neutral and value-free: ―Beginning 
from the premise that objects are not necessarily neutral, passive things changes our assumptions about 
what information we consider germane to ethics‖ (Smith 183). In this view, technology is ―quasi-other, or 
technology ‗as‘ other to which I relate‖ (Ihde 107, italics in original). To know ethical discourses of 
technoscience studies about the relationship between subject and object, self and other, see Don Ihde‘s 
Technology and the Lifeworld: From on the Reality to Earth and Latour’s Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the 
Reality of Science Studies.   
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relationships.  Defying the traditional ethical perspective for the relationship between 
human and nonhuman, current posthuman views on what it means to be human tend to 
privilege the deviant or monsters over the conventional versions of the human: for 
noticeable examples, Andy Clark claims that we are ―natural- born cyborgs‖ (3) and 
John Law asserts that ―we are all monsters‖ (18, italics in original).  Such definitions 
celebrate the hybridity of the human, denying the universal man and the autonomous 
human subject of traditional humanism centering around the white male and universal 
rationality.  For traditional humanism—or liberal humanism of the modern— the hybrid 
of human and nonhuman, organic and nonorganic, is a monster that threatens to 
transgress the boundaries that define the human or the human subject.
51
  But for 
posthumanism, the hybrid or cyborg, ―as an embodiment of difference, a breaker of 
category, and a resistant Other known only through process and movement,‖ is a hopeful 
monster that can revalue the marginalized and repressed and provide a new ethical 
perspective (Cohen, ―Preface‖ x).  Therefore, to understand how to live as the 
posthuman, ―we need monsters and we need to recognize and celebrate our own 
monstrosities‖ (Halberstam 27).  In this posthuman view, hybrids or monsters come to 
                                                   
51
 The term ―the modern‖ in this chapter follows Bruno Latour‘s definition of the modern. In We Have 
Never Been Modern, Latour defines the modern as a historical movement established by the 
―Constitution,‖ which conceptualized the world based on the Great Divide—the two dimensions of human 
and nonhuman, or society and nature. The modern Constitution rejected to conceive hybrids between the 
separated dimensions. For the Constitution, ―hybrids present the horror that must be avoided at all costs by 
a ceaseless, even maniacal purification‖ (112).  However, it is also the modern Constitution, Latour points 
out, that has produced hybrids: by eradicating the median dimension conjoining the separated, the modern 
Constitution took no notice that ―hybrids continue[d] to multiply as an effect of the separate treatment‖ 
underneath (13). Latour claims that since ―the proliferation of hybrids has saturated the constructional 
framework of the moderns,‖ we need a new constitution to explain current hybrids (51). The new 
constitution that Latour expects is a nonmodern one that can conceptualize hybrids without totally denying 
the modern Constitution and can show that ―[n]ow hybrids, monsters are just about everything; they 
compose not only our own collective but also the others‖ (47).   
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be understood as the norm rather than the deviation.  Accordingly, ethical questions 
arising from this change of normality will be about how to live as and/or with monsters.  
Grounded on the complexity paradigm, this chapter attempts to explore what kind of 
ethics can be articulated and how the new ethics comes to play in our technoscience 
culture by centralizing monsters and monstrosity. 
As Birgit Neumann puts it, ―[h]umans have the responsibility not just to act as 
[we] wish, but to orient [our] behavior towards a general code of norm‖ ( 132).  In this 
regard, discourse about the orientation of human behavior—that is, ethics— is to be tied 
to dominant epistemology, which establishes the norm.  Traditional ethics, which is 
universalist and subject-centered, is founded on the norm of the modern, valuing 
―hierarchy, stable systems of reference, and monocultural homogeneity‖ (Zapf 172).  
Yet, as ethicists observe, the traditional code of ethics is now challenged by new ethical 
values, such as ―dehierarchization, process, cross-cultural openness and dialogicity‖ 
(Zapf 172).  By dissolving the rigid closed-ness of self and associating others to the 
openness and dialogicity of self, such values let ethics be ―the arena in which the claims 
for otherness . . . are articulated and negotiated‖ (Harpham 394).  Regarding such a 
deconstructive shift of ethics, postmodernism claims ―the demise of ‗ethics‘‖ without 
expectation of emergence of a new ethics (Madison and Fairbairn, ―Introduction‖ 2-3).  
The claim seems to be natural for postmodernism, which denies grand narratives and 
absolute knowledge and values.  In the same vein, Zygmunt Bauman defines postmodern 
ethics as ―morality without ethical code‖ (31).  For him, while individual, contingent 
morality is possible, universal ethics controlling ethical intuition is unattainable.  He 
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maintains that human reality is so messy and ambiguous that it is impossible to claim 
that a single principle interpenetrates all local situations (32-33): ―it is the personal 
morality that makes ethical negotiation and consensus possible, not the other way round‖ 
(34).  Such a postmodern attitude toward ethics echoes Bruno Latour‘s conviction that 
postmodernism is ―not a fresh solution of the modern‖ but ―a symptom‖ in the sense that 
postmodernism does not go beyond the epistemological frame of modernism in defining 
ethics (46).   
As Bauman also points out, although postmodernism rejects epistemology and 
ethics of modernism, postmodernity ultimately shares with modernity in that both see the 
world as messy and ambiguous.  On the other hand, while modernism assumes that the 
messy and ambiguous state of the human world can ―be replaced by the orderly and 
systematic rule of reason,‖ postmodernism, regarding that belief as ―illusion,‖ claims 
that the messiness and ambiguity are ―not only not-yet-explained, but . . . inexplicable‖ 
(Bauman 33).  For postmodernism, therefore, empirical works—or narrowly, science 
and technology— attempting to explain the human world with linear and reducible 
understanding of universal rationality are just ―illusory and deceptively scientistic‖ 
(Latour 46).  In this view, science and technology are each understood as ―a closed 
system, which tolerates no alien bodies inside and zealously devours and assimilates 
everything that comes within its grazing ground‖ (Bauman 195, italics in original).  
Therefore, science and technology, or technoscience, are considered objects that we 
should keep under close surveillance to avoid the destruction of the human.  Within this 
understanding, possible ethical questions are reduced to whether technoscience is 
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virtuous or dangerous for the human.  Such a skeptical attitude of postmodernism toward 
technoscience results in emptying the world, bringing about less empirical and more 
hyperreal understanding of human experiences (Latour 131).
52
  In this perspective, 
conventional ethics is not applicable.   
Then, what if science and technology give up the universal rationality based on 
linearity and reducibility, and what if science and technology equipped with revised 
rationalism of nonlinearity and irreducibility are able to account for the dynamic pattern 
underlying the seemingly messy and ambiguous world?  The complexity paradigm 
observes our technoscience culture with those presumptions.  Claiming the existence of 
self-organizing dynamics under chaotic surfaces, the complexity paradigm argues that 
we should ―[move] on to empirical studies of networks that give meaning to the 
[modern] work of purification that [postmodernism] denounces‖ to understand the 
evolving patterns of the dynamics (Latour 46).
53
  This concern with dynamics is derived 
from endeavors to understand the posthuman environment newly created by 
technoscience and to offer a behavioral direction for this new age without following 
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 Latour‘s critique on postmodernism applies to Baudrillarian postmodernism that is represented with 
―hyperreality‖ in which everything is floating signs and simulacra. Therefore, hyperreality is an empty 
world. 
53
 Complexity theorists, including Byrne and Hayles, criticize the postmodern perspective of the empty 
world—or, absolute relativism— as another type of ―grand narrative,‖ and argue for the complexity 
paradigm, an eclectic view between the modern and the postmodern, restoring the median zone that the 
modern excluded and the empirical dimension that the postmodern disclaims. See David Byrne‘s 
Complexity Theory and the Social Science: An Introduction and Hayles‘s Chaos and Order: Complex 
Dynamics in Literature and Science.  Although he does not use the term ―complexity‖ in his book, Latour 
also shows a similar view on postmodernism‘s absolute relativism to complexity theorists.  He maintains 
that to explain the messy and ambiguous world, we need a ―relativist relativism,‖ which is a combined 
view between universalism and constructionism (113).    
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falsities of conventional ethics and abandoning the future as postmodernism does.
54
  For 
the complexity paradigm, science and technology are both theoretical and empirical 
methods to account for the dynamics, functioning as open systems to interconnect the 
human with others—systems that accommodate physical and metaphysical environments 
for the birth of technological monsters and for the ethical meaning of their ontology.  
Therefore, insofar as we, as Hayles claims, are posthumans, who are virtually 
interconnected with technoscience, our ethical concern should no longer be deciding 
whether technoscience is virtuous or dangerous.  Rather, we now should ―share [its] 
vices and virtues without seeing either heaven or hell in [it]‖ (Latour 127).  Latour 
expects that this posthuman perspective can help us explore a new ethical code ―without 
appealing to the white man‘s burden, or the fatality of capitalism, or destiny of Europe, 
or the history of Being, or universal rationality‖ (127).  In this way, receding from 
epistemological, political, philosophical traditions of the West, the new ethical code will 
respect difference and multiplicity and also can creatively exploit complexity emerging 
from them. 
This chapter suggests ―complexity‖ as a new ethical direction for the posthuman.  
Resulting from interconnective dynamism of difference and multiplicity, complexity as 
the ethical direction focuses on the relationship between self/subject and other/object 
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 On fears about the new environment created by recent developments in technoscience, complexity 
theorist Chris Langton comments that ―if we really are headed into [a technoscientific disaster], then at 
least we ought to be doing it with our eyes open‖ (Waldrop 283).  Through this comment, he wants to 
reassert that complexity theory studying the process and effects of emerging complexity is preparing for 
complex, unpredictable behaviors in our current and future technoscience culture.  While postmodernism 
insists on disruption with the past and offers no expectation of the future, the complexity paradigm tries to 
weave networks interconnecting the past, present, and future.  Langton particularly emphasizes the 
futuristic value of the complexity paradigm.   
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rather than their essential properties.  In this sense, as Rickert and Blakesley claim, the 
ethical intuitive code underlying complexity is ―to be connected‖ (818): ―[t]o be 
connected‖ is to produce complexity, which the complexity paradigm suggests as what 
we, as posthumans, should live with and for.  This complexity ethics presumes that the 
self lives with and is responsible for the other.  For this dynamic ethics, the self is ethical 
not because it has certain moral predicates and value properties, but because ―it exists 
ethically—and to exist ethically is to respond to the prior discourse and action of other 
selves‖ (Schrag 102, italics in original).  Therefore, we should not disconnect ourselves 
from the prior discourse and other selves, but weave networks with them to understand 
our current ethical position.  
Due to its dynamic nature, complexity ethics is better presented through narrative 
forms than theoretical rhetoric: the structural and contextual flexibility of narrative forms 
can effectively represent and explore the dynamics of complex relationalities between 
humans and between humans and their environment.  This view, however, does not 
reiterate the existing understanding of the relationship between ethics and literature: in a 
traditional understanding of their relationship, literature, as a representation of life, is 
expected to present a pedagogical way of behavior, exemplifying ethical theories.  
Unlike the traditional understanding of literature as ―unbroken, linear, moralistic story-
telling which would subsume the other under one‘s own category,‖ an ethics of 
literature, in the complexity paradigm, is ―an awareness of irreducible difference, 
complexity, and alterity‖ (Zapf 173).  Among literary genres, scientific fiction gives 
shape to complexity ethics, creatively appropriating differences, complexity, and alterity.  
 114 
By foregrounding the figure of the cyborg, which can depict problematic self and 
unexpected other due to its ontological characteristic transgressing the boundary 
between self and other, scientific fiction structures and responds to the ethical question 
of the posthuman: how to live as/with the cyborg, or the technological monster.  That 
question is for the mechanized human‘s encounter with the humanized cyborg—or, for 
the unstable self‘s encounter with the asymmetrical other.  Similarly, in noting the 
physically and metaphysically inseparable relationship between the human and 
technoscience, Ollivier Dyens questions, ―[h]ow will we live in a world of human-
machine conscience? A world where our soul abides in machines?‖ (95).  Through these 
questions, Dyens tries to show ―serious ethical dilemmas‖ of the posthuman, which 
should be solved (95).  In contrast, scientific fiction appreciates the dilemma as an 
opportunity for the posthuman to re-evaluate the cultural assumptions about how we 
perceive difference and alterity.  In other words, scientific fiction does not strive to solve 
the dilemma but focuses on how to respond to it creatively.  The cyborg is placed in the 
center of such ethical concerns of scientific fiction.      
The cyborg, ―whose multiple parts are neither totally merged nor totally 
separated from the human observer,‖ illustrates the non-orderly, non-stable, non-
identical relationship between the human and nonhuman, self and other (Braidotti, 
Metamorphoses 240).  The cyborg refuses to ―adopt the mask of either ‗self‘ or ‗other‘ 
offered by previously dominant, modern Western narratives of identity‖ (Haraway, 
―Promises‖ 299).  Haraway calls such an unstable status of the cyborg ―inappropriate/d‖ 
otherness and she expects that image of the cyborg will promote a new ethical 
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discourse.
55
  Without presuming any universal principle or absolute value for an ideal, 
autonomous, and sovereign subject, the cyborg helps ethics become ―a process of 
formulation and self-questioning that continually rearticulates boundaries, norms, selves, 
and ‗others‘‖ (Garber, Hanssen, and Walkowitz viii).  Indeed, the cyborg is the 
irreducible ethical terrain where self meets other—but self and other are in asymmetrical 
positions and their encounter is conducted nonlinearly, producing complexity.  
Complexity ethics understood through the ethical position of the cyborg does not attempt 
to offer a prescriptive and proscriptive solution, but rather it focuses on the creativity of 
complexity produced by the irreducible and nonlinear interaction between self/human 
and other/nonhuman or between systems.  This understanding of ethics implies that the 
role of ethics is no longer to provide a prescriptive proposition about how to live, but 
rather to be a narrative means that can properly describe contingent relationships 
between unstable norms, selves, and others.  As a descriptive ethics, complexity ethics is 
flexible and responsive to new existential modes and new relationships emerging in the 
complex networks of the technoscience culture.   
The first cyborg in literature is the unnamed Creature in Mary Shelley‘s 
Frankenstein, which is known as the first science fiction novel.  Young and 
inexperienced scientist Victor Frankenstein, who is eager to discover and display the 
secret of Nature, patches parts from dead bodies together to create ―a new species [that] 
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 Haraway borrows the term ―inappropriate/d other‖ from Trinh Minh-ha. In ―She, Inappropriate/d 
Other,‖ Minh-ha defines the inappropriate/d other as one ―who moves about with always at least two/four 
gestures: that of affirming ‗I am like you‘ while pointing insistently to the difference; and that of 
reminding ‗I am different‘ while unsettling every definition of otherness arrived at‖ (9).  In short, the 
inappropriate/d other is a monstrous being who is both Same and Other. Haraway asserts that ―[t]o be 
inappropriate/d is to be neither modern nor postmodern, but to insist on the amodern‖ (―Promises‖ 299) 
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would bless [him] as its creator and source‖ (Shelley, Frankenstein 48).  However, once 
he finishes it, Victor becomes terrified of his artificial child, calling it a monster.  Sarah 
Canfield Fuller argues that what makes Victor terrified is not just the creature‘s hideous 
appearance, but the ―fragmentarity‖ of the being: ―[t]he parts he had intended to patch 
together into a whole being remain separate, only emphasizing the impossibility of 
maintaining wholeness; where he had hoped to create a human being, a thinking subject 
from his own hands, Victor finds instead fracture and fragmentation‖ (92).  However, 
her argument can be countered in that Victor feels horror at the very moment that he 
observes the collected parts work together as a whole without losing the individuality of 
parts: Victor selected the most beautiful parts according to his definition of beauty, but 
the beauties of the parts appear unnatural and frightening to him once they become a 
whole.  If he fears the fragmentarity of the creature, he must have felt it earlier and thus 
does not have to be embarrassed at the conscious status of the Creature.  In this sense, 
Victor‘s fear of the Creature is from the fact that the fragmentary parts can turn out to be 
a whole, or the fact that a self is a network of others.  Victor —and his contemporaries—
do not fully understand the fact and cannot ethically accept it.   
The fact that fragmentary parts can become a whole is related to two monstrous 
assumptions: one is that a being is a collective of different parts, not a unified entity; the 
other is that there is an unknown dynamics to interconnect the parts into a whole that 
cannot be reduced to the parts.  These two assumptions are contradictory to the dominant 
cultural and scientific understandings of the relation of parts to the whole of the 
nineteenth century.  As Chris Baldick puts it, by depicting Victor‘s sudden realization of 
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his fear of the Creature, ―Shelley is isolating and dramatizing a problem which was in 
her time central to philosophical and by extension to aesthetic and political discussion; 
namely the question of the relation of parts to wholes‖ (34).  Shelley‘s monster is not 
understood in the dominant philosophical view of the nineteenth century, the Idealist 
philosophy of the Romantics, which assumes that ―the beauty of the whole can arise only 
from a pure vital principle within, to which all subordinate parts and limbs will then 
conform‖ (Baldick 35).  In the nineteenth-century scientific understanding of the relation 
of the parts to wholes, the Creature is categorized as a deviation.  According to the 
Newtonian worldview seeing a being as a stable system ruled by abstract laws, ―parts are 
independent of each other and thus are externally related. The whole, therefore, is the 
sum of its parts,‖ and it can be reduced to the parts (Taylor, Moment 80).  But the 
Creature is more than the sum of the dead parts and thus cannot be reduced to the parts 
that comprise it.  In this sense, the Creature is not an intrinsically stable system that can 
be explained mechanically.  Because the Creature is epistemologically inexplicable for 
Victor and thus Victor does not know how to respond to the new species, he disconnects 
himself from the Creature, abandoning his responsibility for it.  Indeed, Victor is not 
epistemologically and ethically prepared for the new species.  Such unpreparedness 
makes the Creature a monster: in this aspect, it can be said that Victor‘s monster is not 
an ethically inappropriate being itself, but a being ethically prescribed as inappropriate—
the ―inappropriate/d‖ other in Haraway‘s term.  However, by embracing the complexity 
paradigm as a critical view that can provide epistemological and ethical accounts for the 
 118 
monster, recent scientific fiction novels re-produce the monster as a hopeful ethical 
partner of posthumans.   
Exteriorizing the complexity paradigm, scientific fiction is grounded in the new 
epistemological phenomenon that Victor discovered through the artificial monster, yet 
he could not accept: a collective whole is more than the sum of parts.  The whole 
operates by self-organizing dynamics of interconnections between different parts and 
between the parts and the whole.  Scientific fiction finds creativity rather than horror in 
the new epistemological phenomenon, and thus the horrible monster for Victor and his 
contemporaries becomes a hopeful monster to redefine the relationship and boundary 
between the human and the other and to produce more complexity for the posthuman.  
Such favorable perception of the monster is often demonstrated as romantic relationships 
between humans and technological monsters especially in female writers‘ works, such as 
Amy Thomson‘s Virtual Girl, Tanith Lee‘s The Silver Metal Lover, and Marge Piercy‘s 
He, She and It.  Emphasizing the possibility of human‘s communicability with the 
technological monster, the scientific fiction novels attempt to suggest positive and 
constructive relationships between the human and the monster: the intimate relationships 
between human characters and technological monsters (cyborgs) in the novels result in 
the expansion of human understanding of their own selves and others, and the expanded 
understanding of self/human and other/nonhuman makes less hierarchical and less 
violent relationships between the self/human and the other/nonhuman possible.  Indeed, 
presenting the new ethical perspective for the monster, the novels show that there has 
been a paradigm shift, which makes it possible to perceive the monster as humans‘ 
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evolutinary partner, since Frankenstein.  Particularly, Piercy‘s He, She and It both 
recontextualizes and intertextualizes with Shelley‘s Frankenstein to show how Victor‘s 
horrible monster can be re-produced into the hopeful monster by affirming the 
interconnections between differences and appreciating complexity resulting from the 
interconnecting.   
He, She and It offers a descriptive model of non-anthropocentric ethics for the 
posthuman by foregrounding humans‘ complex relationships with artificial monsters.  
Piercy gives the artificial monster a responsible mother and a family, which Victor‘s 
monster did not have, and through this unfamiliar type of interconnection between 
human and nonhuman, she envisages constructive effects of the revised ethical 
relationship between the self/human and the other.  In doing so, she expands the desire 
of Victor‘s monster, or that of all monsters, to have relationships with others into the 
ethical intuition of the complexity paradigm—to be connected, and explores the 
creativity of complexity that the ethical intuition of the monsters produces.  In this way, 
through her scientific fiction, Piercy proposes complexity as the new ethical direction.  
Appreciating the creativity of complexity emerging from interconnections between 
differences through He, She and It, this chapter investigates how the interconnective and 
interactive relationship between the human subject and the technological other that 
complexity ethics envisions can engender a less hierarchical and a less violent vision for 
the posthuman.   
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1. Genealogy of Artificial Monsters: Yod’s Interconnection with Prior Monstrous 
Others 
Depicting a near-future world (the twenty-first century) after some global 
disasters, such as great famines, ecological destruction, and world wars, He, She and It 
centers around the conflict between Y-S, a type of country based on a multinational 
corporation (multi), and Tikva, a Jewish free state that sells software and other 
sophisticated computer products to the multis.  To protect Tikva from Y-S‘s physical 
and cyberspace attacks, a male scientist Avram illegally manufactures an 
anthropomorphic cyborg named ―Yod,‖ and a female scientist Malkah socializes the 
cyborg.  To complete Yod‘s socializing program, Avram and Malkah hire Malkah‘s 
granddaughter Shira, who is recently divorced and deprived of the custody of her son Ari 
in Y-S.  The novel traces how Yod, through intimate relationships with Shira and 
Malkah, transforms from a technological ―monster‖ into a nonhuman ―person.‖  Some 
critics, including Heather Hicks, tend to read the novel as the story of Yod‘s 
humanization, focusing on ―whether Yod can truly become human‖ (92).  However, 
although it superficially foregrounds Yod‘s humanization, the novel ultimately places 
more weight on its human characters‘ changes in perceiving Yod than on Yod‘s change.  
In fact, Yod‘s humanization can progress as human characters, particularly Malkah and 
Shira, allow their interconnections with him.  The human characters‘ understanding of 
Yod‘s ontology and the commonness between Yod‘s and human ontology makes 
Malkah and Shira realize the possibility of interactivity and interconnectivity between 
the human and the technological monster, and the realization helps them accept Yod as a 
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person—albeit, not a human person: what matters in the novel is not how to distinguish 
Yod from humans, but how to incorporate him into the society as a social member.  In 
this way, Yod‘s transformation from monster to person signifies the changes of human 
epistemology and ethics in relation to the artificial monster rather than the change of 
Yod‘s monstrous ontology.   
By establishing an antagonistic relationship between the female characters, 
Malkah and Shira, and the male characters, Avram and his son Gadi, Piercy shows the 
epistemological and ethical difference between the complexity paradigm and the existing 
paradigm: while the female characters perceive the human‘s interconnectivity with the 
technological monster and seek a way to communicate with it, the male characters tend 
to adhere to the old understanding of the relationship between humans and artificial 
beings, the master-slave relationship.  For the male characters or the exiting paradigm, 
the technological monster Yod is a necessary but dangerous tool requiring careful 
control.  But through awkward relationships between male characters and Yod, Piercy 
claims that the old perspective could not account for new ethical situations that 
posthumans would face sooner or later.  Accordingly, demonstrating the female 
characters‘ intimate relationships with Yod and positive effects of their relationships, she 
suggests a new ethical vision based on feminine values and views for posthumans.  The 
feminine views and values are not simply those of women, but all views and values that 
have been repressed and excluded in the normality of male-centered ideology.  
Appreciating the dynamics of interconnectivity and interactivity inherent in the feminine 
values, Piercy traces genealogy of artificial monsters to reconfigure the ideological and 
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ethical meaning of artificial monsters for the human.  Through the genealogy, she 
exposes ideological aspects in traditional understanding of monster and envisions a new 
ethical vision about the (post)human‘s relationship with the technological other.  
In the novel, the story of Yod, a cyborg created to defend a Jewish free state in 
the twenty-first century, is paralleled with the story of Joseph, an intellectual and 
powerful golem created by Rabbi Judah Loew (the Maharal) to protect a Jewish 
community of Prague in the sixteenth century.  Implying that the golem story is 
necessary for him to grow up, Malkah tells Yod the story of Joseph as a bedtime story 
(17).  Yod also conceives of his relatedness to the golem, stating that ―[Joseph‘s] story is 
meaningful to me‖ (174).  In recent technoscience studies, it is often said that the golem 
legend has influenced human imagination of artificial beings and real science and 
technology.  Science fiction critics, including Elaine L. Graham and Ruth Bienstock 
Anolik, claim that the first science fiction novel, Shelley‘s Frankenstein, was also 
inspired by the golem story.  In this sense, it can be said that the golem is a prototype of 
artificial beings, including Victor‘s Creature.  Additionally, the name of the first 
supercomputer was ―Golem,‖ and cyberneticist Wiener also traces the origin of artificial 
intelligence back to the golem (Graham 86).  The term ―golem‖ is also used to signify 
the ethical problem of science and technology—how to control science and 
technology.
56
  In this way, the golem becomes a meaningful metaphor for our 
technoscience culture.  In Malkah‘s opinion, the golem legend is a necessary story for 
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 See Harry M. Collins and Trevor Pinch‘s Golem series. They use the word ―golem‖ in discussing 
problems of control over recent science and technology: ―Science is a golem. . . . Without control a golem 
may destroy its masters with its flailing vigour‖ (1). 
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Yod to hear in order to understand cultural dynamics of human society as well as the old 
human desire for artificial beings.  However, Piercy does not simply use the legend for 
Yod‘s education, but by intertextualizing the golem legend and her cyborg story, she 
intends to explore Yod‘s genealogical meaning in ethical discourses of the relationship 
between the human and the other.   
Besides the golem legend, He, She and It is also intertextualized with Shelley‘s 
Frankenstein and Haraway‘s ―Cyborg Manifesto‖: Yod is indicated as ―the son of 
Frankenstein‖ in the sense that he is technologically created by a male scientist (148-50), 
and Yod‘s identity is defined as a cyborg, following Haraway‘s definition of cyborg in 
her manifesto (70).
57
  Excepting the fact that they are all artificial beings, Joseph, 
Victor‘s Creature, and Yod do not exactly match up with each other in terms of birth: the 
golem is made from dust and magic, Victor‘s Creature is a collective of organic bodies, 
and Yod is a machine.
58
  Yod himself also denies the linear relationship with the golem 
and Victor‘s Creature.  Rejecting the golem‘s passivity, Yod claims that he is different 
from the golem and other machines including his brother robot Gimel: ―[Gimel is] a true 
golem. He has a soul of clay and never asks awkward questions. He never challenges 
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 Haraway‘s concept of cyborg, as ―a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well 
as a creature of fiction,‖ provides a theoretical model that affirms the dynamics of connectivity and 
multiplicity as feminine values (Simians 149). In her provocative feminist manifesto, Haraway claims that 
the concept of cyborg, embodying the values of connectivity and multiplicity, can help resist to the 
dominant male-centered ideology, which has repressed and excluded the feminine as difference, and 
envision a ―post-gender‖ world, which respects difference and multiplicity. By connecting Shelley‘s 
Frankenstein and recent feminist science fiction novels throughout the image of cyborg, Haraway suggests 
such emphasis of multiplicity, connectivity, and difference as a tradition of feminist science fiction. 
Valuing difference and the complexity produced by interconnections between differences through the 
cyborg figure of Yod, He, She and It also follows the tradition.  
58
 Strictly speaking, Yod, who does not have a natural organic component, is a human-shaped robot, or 
android, rather than cyborg. However, in the novel, human characters see him as a cyborg to the extent 
that he has the organic surface—albeit biologically manufactured.  
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you [Avram]. He obeys thoughtlessly and perfectly‖ (290).  Malkah also remarks that 
her story is that of ―the Golem: not [Yod]‖ (17).  Yet, Yod does not want to approve 
Victor‘s Creature, who has more independent power than the golem, as his linear 
ancestor, either.  As Gadi, Avram‘s son, calls Yod ―the Son of Frankenstein,‖ he 
strongly rejects that idea, saying ―I hope I die in the Base‖ (150).59  For Yod cannot bear 
that his existence is stigmatized as ―a monster‖ or ―[s]omething unnatural‖ like the 
Creature in Frankenstein (150).  On the other hand, Yod‘s ontological status as cyborg is 
disavowed by another machine.  The House, a computer managing the housework and 
safety of Malkah, continually calls Yod ―a machine‖ and distinguishes him from other 
human-based cyborgs.
60
  In this way, Malkah and Avram‘s Yod is neither a totally 
different being from previous artificial monsters nor a totally new one.  Yod is a product 
of complexity emerging from the non-linear relationality between the artificial monsters.  
By placing Yod in the genealogy of artificial monsters through the intertextualization of 
monster texts, Piercy also explores changes of cultural and social dynamics that has 
created artificial monsters.   
Foucault defines genealogy as a study to examine ―how we constitute ourselves 
as human subjects‖ through the excavation of alterity (Hoy 15).  For him, genealogy is 
about power and knowledge to establish the relationship between the self and the other.  
Teratology is also concerned with such underlying social structures.  Observing how 
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 The Base is the electronic space where Yod manages information of Tikva.  By mentioning ―the Base,‖ 
he stresses the ontological difference between Frankenstein‘s monster and himself: unlike the monster 
made of dead body parts, he is made of information. 
60
 Human beings in the novel are cyborgs, too: they are equipped with information technology and 
biological enhancement.  Especially, Nili, introduced as a female partner of Shira‘s mother Riva, looks 
like a machine.  At their first encounter, Nili and Yod avow each other‘s humanness and machine-ness at 
the same time (195-97).   
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discourses scientifically and socially organize the perception of embodied difference, 
teratology helps the human ―come to know ourselves as never-human, as always 
between humanness and monstrosity‖ (Halberstam 37).  By putting their focus on the 
other or otherness, both genealogy and teratology question the traditional ethical 
positions of the human and the other and reexamine normative and exemplary humanity, 
which constitutes ethics.  Subsuming such critical functions of genealogy and teratology, 
the genealogy of artificial monsters that the novel presents serves as a method to 
examine the emergence of a new ethics, resulting from the change of normality or of 
power and knowledge constituting the normality.    
Although Malkah mentions that ―[her] story has a human center,‖ she, in effect, 
revises the golem legend in a less human-centered view and explores how male-centered 
knowledge and power have made monsters (18).  Malkah slightly differentiates her story 
from the general version of the golem legend, emphasizing that her story depends on her 
―family‘s memory‖ (18).  While the golem is generally known as a non-intelligent being 
that could not speak, had no spirit, and thus was treated as a ―tool‖ by the rabbi, Joseph 
in Malkah‘s story can speak, learn, and even has emotion.  The Maharal regards such 
capabilities of the golem as threatening enough for him to decide to unmake the golem.  
In Malkah‘s story, the Maharal embodies male knowledge and power, and Joseph is the 
illegal and strange product of the knowledge and power.  Chava, the Maharal‘s 
granddaughter working as a midwife, notices Joseph‘s strangeness, and feels a sense of 
solidarity toward him: ―‗I [Joseph] am not a man.‘/ ‗No, Joseph, and that‘s part of why I 
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[Chava] like you. You‘re strange too. So am I‘‖ (290).61  Here, Chava points out the 
dichotomy of the man and the other.  Both women and monsters are the other of the 
man, and thus they are excluded from knowledge and power.  This is why Chava 
designates her desire for knowledge as her strangeness.  She is involved in both female 
and male areas: ―I like to try my hand now and then at cooking and making nice. But my 
real life is going back and forth between women‘s business of birthing and what men 
have made their business, the life of the mind, my studies‖ (290).  Chava thinks that 
since she possesses and desires male knowledge, she is not available for men: she rejects 
all proposals of marriage.  Indeed, Chava transgresses the border between the male and 
the female as Joseph does the border between the human and the nonhuman: in this 
sense, she is also a monster.  Joseph and Chava‘s strangeness or monstrosity is measured 
by male normality.  Therefore, it can be said that the ―human-center‖ that Malkah refers 
to in her story signifies ―male-centered.‖  
Frankenstein is another human-centered or male-centered story.  However, the 
novel does not serve to reinforce the acceptance of male-centeredness but rather to 
critique it.  Presenting two faces of knowledge, the male/the rational and the female/the 
irrational, the novel shows how the male/the rational represented through science 
excludes and represses the other.  In the very beginning of the text, Walton, who writes 
the story of Victor and his Creature to his sister Mrs Saville, shows the gendered 
understanding of knowledge: ―I [Walton] delighted in investigating the facts relative to 
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 The solidarity between women and the golem are made by male rationality. According to Jacobs S. 
Minkin, the term ―golem‖ means ―unformed // substance‖ in Talmudic literature, and it also indicates ―an 
unmarried woman‖ in the belief that woman‘s ―nature is not fully rounded until she is married‖ (qtd. in 
Anolik 141).  As Anolik argues, the golem legend also contains the power relation between the male and 
the female, such as the male anxiety over the female power, the ability to create a life (141).   
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the actual world; she [Mrs Saville] busied herself in following the aerial creations of the 
poets. The world was to me a secret, which I desired to discover; to her it was a vacancy, 
which she sought to people with imaginations of her own‖ (30).  He links knowledge 
and the rational to men and emotion and the irrational to women.  In fact, the whole 
novel deals with such a dichotomous and gendered understanding of knowledge: in the 
novel, while male characters, Victor, Walton, and Clerval, possess and seek knowledge 
or science, female characters, Justine and Elizabeth, are victimized by the male 
knowledge.
62
  As Lorraine Code puts it, the traditional ideals of rationality, which have 
constructed scientific knowledge, have excluded ―the attributes and experiences 
commonly associated with femaleness and underclass status: emotion, connection, 
practicality, sensitivity and idiosyncrasy‖ (21).  Accordingly, rationalism is, on the 
whole, assumed to be ―opposed to female, non-rational traits‖ (Lloyd 78).  Frankenstein 
highlights such a gendered and dichotomous property of rationalism and scientific 
knowledge, and the Creature functions as a criticism of them just as Joseph in Malkah‘s 
story does.  In addition, Frankenstein also points out a more foundational problem of 
knowledge/science beyond the gender and dichotomy issues—that is reductionism of 
traditional rationalism.  By revealing how reductionism handles difference, the novel 
deepens the ethical discourse regarding the artificial monster. 
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 Justine, a maid working for Victor‘s family, is wrongly executed for the murder of Victor‘s youngest 
brother William, who is killed by the Creature, and Elizabeth, Victor‘s cousin and fiancée, is murdered by 
the Creature on her honeymoon night. In the sense that the Creature is a product of Victor‘s quest for 
knowledge, they are actually victimized by Victor‘s knowledge. Besides, the two female characters, who 
devotedly take care of Victor‘s family, show their strong sense of responsibility for their relationship with 
others in contrast to Victor, who escapes from his obligation for his family and isolates himself to achieve 
knowledge. In this way, Shelley presents an ethical critique of the male-centered-ness of her contemporary 
science or knowledge through Victor.  
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Knowledge based on dichotomy reduces complexity to the simple and totalizes 
difference to the same.  Figures of complexity that reductive knowledge could not 
explain have been considered monstrous.  Rosi Braidotti claims monsters as ―figures of 
complexity‖ that ―[defy] rationalistic reductions‖ (―Sign‖ 135).  Shelley introduces such 
a teratological insight into the relationship between complexity and reductive rationalism 
through Victor‘s Creature.  In creating the Creature, Victor shows traditional scientific 
reduction of the nonhuman world to mere objects without subjectivity.  Victor does not 
consider psychological, social, and cultural aspects for a being, but focuses on biological 
function, which is, he believes, ―the principle of life‖ (Shelley, Frankenstein 46).  His 
understanding of being presents so-called ―biological reductionism,‖ which reduces 
culture to nature (Taylor, Moment 225).  Reductionism, whether from culture to nature 
or nature to culture, is based on the dichotomous understanding of knowledge: nature 
and culture, the rational and the irrational.  In the purification process of dichotomy and 
reductionism, differences are excluded and otherness is repressed.  Victor‘s Creature 
recognizes this violent nature of knowledge.  Educating himself through reading books 
and observing humans, the Creature comes to discern his difference from the human and 
recognizes that the difference makes him a monster.  As such, ―[i]ncrease of knowledge 
only discovered to [him] more clearly what a wretched outcast [he] was‖ (104), and 
made him wish that ―[he] had for ever remained in [his] native wood‖ (97).  The 
Creature here marginalizes himself—more exactly, he learns that he should be 
marginalized.  Since the Creature identifies himself in the view of the sovereign male 
rational subject, which is assumed to be representative of all humanity, he cannot but 
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consider himself a monster; in the modern paradigm, no human being, even his creator, 
can save him from the marginalization and repression.  The marginalization of the 
Creature shows how human society normalized by dichotomous and reductive 
knowledge refuses to recognize difference and otherness and brutally mistreats those 
who appear disparate and less than fully human.   
On the contrary, by suggesting an alternative viewpoint to the traditional 
understanding of knowledge and rationalism, He, She and It presents one of the most 
creative and least destructive monsters in the history of artificial monsters.  Yod‘s 
creators, especially Malkah, sufficiently understand the problems of traditional 
rationalism that previous artificial beings had to experience.  In order not to repeat 
Victor‘s mistake in making his Creature a monster, Malkah and Avram provide Yod 
with what Victor did not consider necessary for his Creature: that is, the other face of 
knowledge, the female and the irrational.  Repeating the same mistake as Victor, Avram 
made nine cyborgs before Yod, but he could not control their violence and thus 
destroyed them.  But, after nine failures, Avram recognizes that he needs Malkah or her 
knowledge to decrease his creature‘s violence.  Malkah explains how Yod is created: 
Avram made him male—entirely so. Avram thought that was the ideal: 
pure reason, pure logic, pure violence. The world has barely survived the 
males we have running around. I gave him a gentler side, starting with 
emphasizing his love for knowledge and extending it to emotional and 
personal knowledge, a need for connection.  (142) 
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As Malkah states, Avram has the traditional understanding of knowledge that positions 
the male, reason, and logic in the same side and prioritizes them, recognizing that the 
positioning accompanies violence.  However, Malkah sees that such male-centered 
rationalism could not survive and thus needs revision.  As a revision, she emphasizes the 
significance of the interconnection between traditional male-centered rationalism and 
what it has excluded, which is regarded as the irrational, such as the female, emotion, 
and connection.  In sum, Yod is not a product of dichotomous and reductive rationalism 
like his predecessors, but of a new rationalism suggested by the complexity paradigm.
63
   
 Complexity theory claims that since the dichotomous aspects are ―coadaptive and 
thus cannot be unplugged from one another,‖ any reductive and hierarchical relationship 
between them is not possible (Taylor, Moment 226).  In constructing knowledge, unlike 
modern science depending on the reductive process of separation and purification, the 
revised model of science, or complexity theory, focuses on the complexity that the non-
hierarchical, coadaptive relationality produces.  Created by this revised understanding of 
science, Yod embodies the complexity of such relationality, modifying the violence of 
Victor‘s Creature and the passivity of the golem Joseph.   
Avram should not have let me loose if he wanted a simple man-made 
cyborg, for you are also woman-made. My knowledge is in you. But 
nobody, my dear, gave you your infinite hunger to understand. That you 
gave yourself. Never, Yod, never believe anybody who tells you, not 
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 Countering postmodern criticism on science and scientific knowledge, complexity theorists argue that 
the problem is not science and scientific knowledge themselves, but reductionism embedded in them. 
Complexity theory suggests a revised version of rationalism, whose cognitive structure is based on 
complexity, not reductionism.  
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Avram, not even me, what you are and are not capable of. Find out for 
yourself. (114) 
In this statement, Malkah means that through the creative dynamics of 
interconnectivities between Avram‘s knowledge and Malkah‘s knowledge, Yod can self-
organize into a more complex being, which can escape from the slave-master 
relationship between creator and creature.  In other words, the interconnective dynamics 
gives Yod agency to self-organize and thus the human cannot claim a hierarchical 
relationship to him.  Therefore, Yod can have more complex relationships with the 
human than his predecessors.  Indeed, it is the way to conceive complexity that 
ultimately distinguishes Yod from his predecessors: while Victor negates the complexity 
related to the construction of his Creature and the Maharal abstracts it through religious 
mystification, Malkah and Avram positivistically and methodologically appropriate the 
concept of complexity in creating Yod.  Such differences in the way of conceiving 
complexity are traceable to the difference of the dominant paradigm that the creators 
follow.   
Yod is still a ―difference‖ in his world like his predecessors, but He, She and It 
tries to show the difference is no longer a threatening aspect in confusing the cognitive 
authority of the human and menacing morality—thus, Yod is not one that should be 
excluded and repressed, but a good source of complexity for the human.  In fact, for the 
complexity paradigm, the interconnectivity between differences or different systems is 
more important than difference itself in that the interconnectivity promotes complexity, 
which produces another difference: in this way, the complexity of systems makes the 
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systems so dynamic as to keep evolving.  Taylor outlines the linkage between difference, 
interconnection, and complexity as the following: ―The greater the connectivity, the 
more differences, and the more the differences, the more the information and the greater 
its complexity: Differences that are not indifferent, we have discovered, are constituted 
and sustained by interconnections, which presuppose reciprocal relations‖ (Moment 
140).  Considering this understanding in terms of human evolution, the technological 
monster Yod, as a difference, is a necessary condition for the human to keep the 
inequilibrium necessary for evolution.  In this position, through Yod, the novel explores 
the repressed fact that the human is interdependent with the other, without ignoring the 
empathy and responsibility that should be shown toward it.  As an ethical model for the 
posthuman, Yod helps us ―think of the anomalous, the monstrously different not as sign 
of pejoration but as the unfolding of virtual possibilities that point to positive alternatives 
for us all‖ (Braidotti, ―Teratologies‖ 172).  In this way, by examining the genealogy of 
the artificial monsters in the view of the complexity paradigm, He, She and It delineates 
how ―[t]he ethical has to do with ethos in its originative sense of a cultural dwelling‖ 
(Schrag 101, italics in original): universal ethics is impossible, and to understand ethics 
in a certain age, the understanding of paradigm of that age is necessary.  
 
2.  Ethics of Relationality: The Human’s Encounter with the Asymmetrical Other 
 As shown through the genealogy of artificial monsters, the novel assumes that 
the self is not a peculiar entity that possesses certain moral properties or can be defined 
by value attributes, but rather it is formed through the constant relationships with others: 
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the self is interdependent and related.  The ethical subject, as an interdependent and 
relational entity, corresponds to neither ―the classical metaphysical theory of the self as a 
soul-substance‖ nor ―modern formal and empirical theories of the self as moral agent‖ 
(Schrag 101).  Such traditional discourses of the ethical subject systematically devalue 
―notions of interdependence, relatedness, and positive involvement‖ in others (Robinson 
25).  Feminist ethicists, including Sara Ruddick, Nel Noddings, and Virginia Held, 
suppose that the devaluation of such notions is derived from patriarchal rationality.
64
  
Hence, giving critiques of reason and accounts of alternative ideals of rationality, they 
suggest a new ethics called ―ethics of care,‖ which emphasizes the interdependence and 
relationality of the self with the other.  The ethics of care understands the self in ―caring 
relations‖: the self as ―one-caring and cared-for‖ (Held 19, italics in original).  In this 
ethical understanding, the individual subject is ―defined in a set of relation,‖ and that is 
―[our] basic reality‖ (Noddings 51).  As such, the ethics of care reflects the complexity 
paradigm emphasizing interconnectivity between subjects or systems, and can help 
articulate the relationship between the human and the artificial in a new perspective by 
foregrounding the interdependent relations between them.   
The ethics of care, seeing that subjectivity is construed in other subjectivities, 
shares with Levinasian ethics.  Emmanuel Levinas situates ethics in an encounter with 
the Other that cannot be reduced to a symmetrical relationship: ―If the same would 
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 Criticizing dichotomous reasoning processes of traditional rationalism, such as the male and the female, 
and the rational and the irrational, Sara Ruddick suggests ―maternal thinking‖ to revise male biases 
embedded in traditional ethics.  The ―maternal thinking‖ emphasizes ―practice-based reasoning,‖ which 
unites thinking and action, in articulating ethics (xi). Ruddick asserts that the maternal thinking is able to 
recover the excluded in ethical discourses since they are associated with the female or the irrational. Her 
view provides the ethics of care with an epistemological basis.  
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establish its identity by simple opposition to the other, it would already be a part of a 
totality encompassing the same and the other‖ (Totality 38).65  Levinas argues that ―[t]he 
relation between the same and the other . . . is primordially enacted as conversation‖: the 
same initially faces the other (39).  In Levinas‘s philosophy, the term ―face‖ means ―the 
exposed surface of reality through which the other looks back at the self‖; facing the 
other ―collapses the closure of the unified self‖ (Pinsky 37).66  In this face-to-face 
relationship, ―[s]ubjectivity is not for itself; it is . . . initially for another. . . . the 
proximity of the Other is presented as the fact that the Other is not simply close in space, 
or close like a parent, but he approaches me essentially insofar as I feel myself—insofar 
as I am—responsible for him‖ (Levinas, Ethics 96).  Adopting this ethical relationship 
between the self and the other in a more empirical and feminist view, the ethics of care 
―stresses the construction of the self in social relationship rather than through instinctual 
drives‖ (Gardiner 130).67  In this view, the ethical subject feels more responsible to 
human network rather than to morality, or an abstract code of conduct about how one 
should act.
68
  Therefore, this ethics tends to ―seek empathy, responsibility and 
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 The same here means a being ―gathered up in its ipseity as an ‗I,‘ as particular existent unique and 
autochthonous‖ (Totality 39).  Levinas‘s ethics, overall, is a critique of Western philosophy, which has 
been preoccupied with Being, the totality, at the expense of what is otherwise than Being, which lies 
outside the totality of Being as transcendent, exterior, alterior, the Other.   
66
 In the interview with Levinas, Philippe Nemo summarizes ―[t]he Other is face‖ (Levinas, Ethics  87). 
For this understanding, Levinas mentions that ―[t]he face is signification, and signification without 
context. . . .  the Other . . . is not a character within a context‖ (Ethics 86). Therefore, the meaning of the 
other is in its relation with the self rather than the other itself in his philosophy. This view of the other is 
understood as the emphasis of self‘s necessary relationality to the other rather than as the instrumentality 
of the other.  
67
 The ethics of care has been theorized through the examples of actual caring and thus it tends to be 
material and empirical.  
68
 Despite its connection between ethics and otherness, Levinas‘s philosophy was not supported by 
feminists, such as Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray: both critics criticize that his account for the 
feminine is still based on masculine logic. See Beauvoir‘s The Second Sex and Irigaray‘s ―Fecundity of 
Caress‖ and ―Questions to Emmanuel Levinas.‖ However, overall, Levinas‘s philosophy is valuable for 
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interdependence rather than the male aggression and destructive attitude towards nature 
and women, considered as passive others‖ (Federici 139).   
The ethics of care is not a feminine ethics, but a feminist one that is open to both 
women and men, or the human and the nonhuman, returning the repressed and excluded 
by the patriarchal epistemology and ethics, such as women and the irrational, to ethical 
discourses.  Rejecting communities constructed by patriarchal traditions, Held maintains 
that the ethics of care ―should be practiced in postpatriarchal society, of which we do not 
yet have traditions or wide experience‖ (19).  Held and other ethicists of care expect 
―relationality‖or ―(inter)connectivity‖ to be a new ethical code beyond male rationalism 
and patriarchal morality.  Posthuman discourses also acknowledge the possibility of 
realization of the ―post-patriarchal‖ or ―post-gender‖ through interconnections between 
subjects or systems.  Haraway‘s cyborgian dream for ―a post-gender world‖ can be an 
example of this view (Simians 150).  Considering its ontological nature of hybridity, 
what is needed for the cyborg to live is the ethics of care, or the ethics of relationality.  
Haraway explains that the cyborg, as a post-gender creature, which patriarchal traditions 
cannot identify, is ―wary of holism, but needy for connection‖ (Haraway, Simians 151): 
the connection intercrossing all boundaries.  Portraying a posthuman world that is replete 
with technological monsters or cyborgs, He, She and It experiments with the ethics of 
relationality.  In Levinasian terms, the novel illustrates a moment of facing, when the 
other/the artificial monster ―collapses the closure of the unified self‖/the human (Pinsky 
37).  However, the novel does not limit the function of the other into the collapse of the 
                                                                                                                                                      
feminist ethics and epistemology in that it helps feminists think ‗otherwise‘ to the traditional Western 
philosophy and normativity.  
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unified self as in Levinasian ethics, but it tries to suggest a more empirical view about 
how the relationship between the self/the human and the other/the artifact can create 
complexity for the posthuman culture.  Their relationships or (inter)connections have 
caring responsibility toward each other.   
In order to develop the ethical view of relationality, He, She and It stresses 
artificial monsters‘ sense of connection.  Joseph deems that ―happiness‖ comes from 
connections: ―I belong here. Here is where I live. People like me. I have friends, and this 
is my home‖ (114).  As Joseph‘s relationships with humans develop, however, the 
Maharal comes to be worried about the possibility that the supposed relationship 
between him and the golem as the creator and the creature, or the controller and the 
controlled, can be reversed.  Hence, the Maharal unmakes him, expecting ―if knowledge 
and fearful need are joined, it can be roused to life‖ (398 and 401).  But, before proper 
knowledge and the moment of fearful need arrive, another Joseph is created by a 
scientist in Frankenstein, and the Maharal‘s worry is realized once the Creature yells at 
his creator: ―You [Victor] are my creator, but I [the Creature] am your master;—obey!‖ 
(131).  In this way, by depicting the relationship between the creator and the creature as 
the violently authoritative son-father relationship, Frankenstein reveals how patriarchal 
human society fears the artificial monsters‘ desire for connection, not just devaluates it 
as otherness.  However, bringing the sense of connection between the human and the 
artificial to the surface, He, She and It envisages a positive possibility of a post-
patriarchal, or a posthuman world, where the relationship between the human/the self 
and the other is more than a contest for ―control.‖  In constituting the positive vision, the 
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novel dismisses instrumental rationalization, which seeks control and domination.  
Instead, it appropriates Harawayan utopian rationality, which emphasizes the 
interconnection between the rational and the irrational, the scientific and the social.  
In the traditional view about the relationship between humans and technology, 
technology has been associated with human beings in terms of usefulness and 
productivity.  Particularly, programmability and functionality have become key terms for 
useful and productive machines in recent technoscience (Braidotti, Metamorphoses 215-
16).  In He, She and It, Gimmel and the House, which are programmable and functional, 
are useful and productive machines.  However, those types of machines cannot correct 
and reprogram themselves and thus never develop into more complex beings.  On the 
other hand, Yod is given another upgraded ability by Malkah: that is, the ability of self-
organization based on self-correctability and reprogrammability.  This ability is an 
achievement of Harawayan utopian rationality valuing complexity produced by 
interconnections between heterogeneous elements.  Based on such utopian rationalism, 
Malkah‘s primary concern in programming Yod is to set ―a need for bonding‖: 
Malkah had given Yod the equivalent of an emotional side: needs 
programmed in for intimacy, connection. A given need to create 
relationships of friendship and sexual intimacy. A need for bonding, the 
ability to bond strongly and consistently. . . . When he encountered 
something new, his programming said: Explore, taste, try, then evaluate. . 
. . Curiosity was a given for him. . . . He was programmed for 
introspection, to be self-correcting in subtle and far-reaching ways. Could 
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he not in time overcome his violent tendencies? They had been 
programmed in, but he was also given the ability to reprogram himself. 
(351)   
Yod‘s drive for connection or relation with humans is scientifically designed unlike that 
of his predecessors, Joseph and the Creature, for which the drive mystically and 
automatically emerged.  However, this explanation does not merely intend to emphasize 
Yod‘s mechanical nature as machine.  Rather, it serves to scientifically account for the 
hidden dynamics that made Yod‘s non-linear ancestors alive—the dynamics of self-
organization.  The intellectual and emotional development of Joseph and the Creature 
can be understood in terms of self-organizational dynamics: they adaptively self-
organize through interrelations with humans and their social surroundings.  The ability 
of self-organization makes the artificial monsters more than simple mechanical things.  
In this sense, it can be said that He, She and It sees the dynamics of adaptive self-
organization immanent in artificial monsters as a suggestive concept to offer a code of 
non-anthropocentric ethics for the posthuman. 
Cilliers defines this ability to self-organize as ―a property of complexity systems 
which enables them to develop or change internal structure spontaneously and 
adaptively in order to cope with, or manipulate, their environment‖ (90, italics in 
original).  Joseph, Victor‘s Creature, and Yod are complex systems, which evolve by 
adaptively involving their systems in other systems and their environment.  Especially, 
Yod, as a complex system, internally self-organizes through the interconnection between 
the rational and the emotional, historically self-organizes through non-linear 
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relationships with prior artificial monsters, and ethically self-organizes through 
relationships with humans.  The effect of such self-organizing processes turns out to be 
the destruction of symmetrical positions of the human and the other, which abolishes 
their hierarchical relationship.  He, She and It presents the artificial monsters as the 
asymmetrical other, which is part human, part nonhuman, part self, part other.  The 
self/the human is in a non-appropriative relation to the other: the asymmetrical other 
does not serve for the self as the One who is autonomous and powerful, dominating the 
other.  Rather, the self/the human and the other are in a coadaptive relationship to each 
other.  Indeed, this view accords with Haraway‘s cyborgian ethics, which sees the 
traditional concept of the One as ―an illusion‖ (Simians 177).  Grounded in this ethical 
view, the novel practices ―cyborg politics,‖ which opens the prospect of technological 
symbiosis between humans and machine as a progressive alternative to a masculine 
fantasy of ―natural‖ mastery and domination over the other (Haraway, Simians 176).   
He, She and It examines the ethical potential of the technological symbiosis in 
the level of dynamics constituting beings or systems.  In this sense, Malkah‘s comment 
on self-organization as the common dynamics between Yod and humans is a critical 
point of the novel: ―you [the Council of Tikva] must understand it [Yod] is a sort that, 
like our own, is self-correcting, growing, dependent on feedback as we are‖ (376).  
Malkah‘s statement does not simply signify that Yod is a well-humanized cyborg, but 
rather it shows her insight into the complexity paradigm; in terms of the complexity 
paradigm, humans are also complex systems, evolving through adaptive interconnections 
with others.  This understanding effaces the traditional perception of otherness as 
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something inaccessibly different from the human/the self.  In the same vein—albeit a 
little more radical, Shira defines all human beings as cyborgs: ―Yod, we‘re all unnatural 
now. . . . We‘re all cyborgs, Yod. You‘re just a purer form of what we‘re all tending 
toward‖ (150).  The thought that both humanized machine and cyborgized humans are 
―unnatural‖ is based on the normativity of the patriarchal and reductive rationalism in 
which the boundary between humans/self and nonhuman/other is a foundational element 
of perception.  However, Shira does not respect such a traditional understanding.  Once 
Yod is in self-pity about the strangeness of his non-biological body, Shira assures him 
that his strangeness is not unnatural: 
―I‘m not a mammal. You have a biological bond that I lack, a kinship 
with dogs and cats and horses. . . . You‘re all cousins. I‘m not in the 
family. . . . It makes me feel my strangeness. You belong to the earth, and 
I don‘t.‖ 
  ―Nonsense. You‘re as much a part of earth as I am. We are all made of 
the same molecules, the same set of compounds, the same elements.‖ 
(185)   
Here, Shira suggests that humans and nonhumans are networked to each other within a 
whole called the earth.  Her statement implies that differences between humans and 
nonhumans come from differences resulting from the interconnective dynamics rather 
than from a certain pre-given nature.  Therefore, not only is the hierarchical relationship 
between the natural/the human and the unnatural/the other obsolete, but such 
demarcations per se are meaningless.  For this understanding, the figure of the cyborg 
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signifies complex, self-organizing, coadaptive systems, rather than something unnatural 
or artificial.  Regardless of the method of their birth—whether mother‘s womb or 
laboratory—, therefore, machine-based cyborgs and human-based cyborgs need each 
other to make their systems more complex and to keep their environments in 
inequilibrium, leaving the systems evolving.
69
 
 
3. Posthuman Partnership: Non-anthropocentric Sense of Interconnection 
 He, She and It dramatizes Yod‘s relationship with humans to foreground such an 
interconnective relationship between different systems, or between human (cyborgs) and 
machine (cyborgs).  Mentioning that ―technology is not just the expression of the desire 
for mastery, but also an object of desire, curiosity and affective involvement,‖ Braidotti 
points out two side-effects of technophilic anthropomorphism in science fiction novels 
and films: ―the eroticization of the technological other as a sexual surrogate and the 
Oedipalization of the human-machine interaction‖ (Metamorphoses 215).70  Yod‘s erotic 
relationships with female human characters, Malkah and Shira, and his son-father 
relationship with his male creator Avram seemingly illustrate the two aspects of 
technophilic anthropomorphism as Braidotti speculates.  However, ultimately, the novel 
tries to deconstruct such traditional views on the relationality between human and 
technology.  In particular, the heavy romance between Yod and Shira echoes what the 
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 In the world of the novel, most babies are born in test tubes rather than mother‘s womb. This aspect also 
makes the sense of the word ―natural‖ very sophisticated in the novel.  
70
 In science fiction, eroticized technology and the Oedipal-relationship between the human creator and the 
creature are common topics. See Braidotti‘s Metamorphoses and the last chapter of Scott Bukatman‘s 
Terminal Identity: The Virtual subject in Postmodern Science Fiction (―Terminal Resistance/Cyborg 
Acceptance‖) to see how recent science fiction novels and films project and reject human desires for 
technology. 
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novel wants to present in supporting interactive relationality between the human and 
technology for our posthuman culture: a less violent and less hierarchical ethical model 
of the relationship between the human and the artificial.  Their romance is not the 
representation of human erotic desire for technology, but it is an experiment of the new 
ethical model in the posthuman culture, answering Shira‘s wonder, ―[w]hat would it 
mean to make a commitment to a machine?‖ (238).  Being afraid that he does not look 
human enough to Shira, Yod asks her about ―how much [he] disappoint[s] [her]‖ (238).  
For that question, Shira retorts, ―there‘s no culture of cyborgs for you to fit into. The 
only society is human. You have to pass. And we want someplace to meet‖ (238).  
Shira‘s statement reveals that their commitment is not reduced to Yod‘s humanization or 
Shira‘s machinization.  Rather, she suggests a more constructive view about their 
commitment, which is to build a culture for cyborgs.  In fact, the culture for cyborg is 
not just for Yod, but all types of cyborgs, including machine-based and human-based 
cyborgs.  In other words, the ―someplace to meet‖ that they should find together is where 
both human and machines/technology can live harmoniously—that is, a non-
anthropocentric culture.  
He, She and It assumes that the non-anthropocentric is non-patriarchal and non-
totalitarian, and resists patriarchal and totalitarian power.  The multi Y-S is depicted as a 
representative of patriarchal and totalitarian power, and Shira expresses her experiences 
of the patriarchal and totalitarian power in Y-S as ―a nightmare‖ and ―insane‖ (239).  In 
Y-S, Shira suffers from disconnections—divorce and the loss of custody of her son, and 
such disconnections are related to patriarchal and totalitarian power.  Due to the 
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patriarchal law of Y-S, Shira could not give her family name (Shipman) to her son Ari, 
and due to the totalitarian social system of Y-S, she had to be deprived of the custody of 
Ari: ―They have patriarchal laws here. The boy is regarded as property of the father‘s 
gene line-and, Gadi, you know I married him. Plus he has a higher tech rating than I do. . 
. . in Y-S most people get married. There‘s pressure to‖ (10).  In sum, the novel 
illustrates that the patriarchal and totalitarian power results in separation and reduction, 
giving horrible and insane experiences for the repressed.  In contrast, in Tikva, Shira 
recovers the sense of connection by being reunited with Malkah and making a new 
connection with Yod.  Especially, Shira‘s encounter with Yod makes her experience a 
more satisfying, complex, and novel relationship than her relationships with other human 
beings.  
Although Shira, at first, rationally hesitated to connect with Yod,
71
 she comes to 
be emotionally and sexually committed to Yod partly because she longs for connection 
and partly because she is attracted to Yod‘s newness as a being of not-male and not-
female.
72
  After Yod saves Malkah from Y-S‘s attack in cyberspace, Shira loosens her 
traditional bias about the relationship with machine.  Then, as Malkah and Yod claims, 
Shira begins to regard Yod as ―a person.‖  In He, She and It, ―person‖ does not 
necessarily mean ―human,‖ but it signifies all types of beings who ―think and feel and 
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 When Shira first recognized that Malkah called Yod ―he,‖ claiming that Yod is ―[n]ot a human person, 
but a person,‖ she rejects Malkah‘s claim, saying that it is a child-like idea (76). But later Shira herself 
comes to claim that ―Yod is a person‖ to other humans (210). 
72
 Though Yod has a male body, the novel stresses the female-ness in him: ―I . . . need to touch you. I need 
to be touched.‖ / ―You‘re like a woman‖ (182); ―It‘s usually thought to be women who want sex for the 
intimacy, among humans‖ (184); ―You want telepathy. It‘s a prominent human fantasy, usually a fantasy 
of women‖ (184). In sum, he cannot be categorized as a complete man or woman. Besides, Yod also 
cannot be identified according to other traditional binary distinctions, such as human and nonhuman, 
natural and artificial.   
 144 
have existence‖ (375).  The novel uses the concept of ―person‖ as a nodal concept that 
can network the human and the technological other.  In this concept, the distinction 
between the human and the nonhuman is aimless, and thus Shira can admit to her 
longing for connection with Yod.  She accepts the idea that Yod is a person in the Base, 
the cyberspace where old binary distinctions are unavailable, and that is the moment 
when their love begins. 
[―]This isn‘t crazy but good. I [Yod] want to know all of you [Shira], I 
want to enter every part of you, as I enter the Base and explore it. I want 
us to join as we join now but in the world. Shira, don‘t fear me, don‘t 
shrink from me. Let me come to you now, right now.[‖] . . . She felt 
closer to fright than to desire. Her heart was pounding, but in her mind 
was the idea that it was time to treat him as a person, fully, because he 
was nothing less; she knew, too, that she was choosing to try sex with 
him because when she was with him, she did not think of Gadi. He 
seemed able to fill all available mental space. (167-68) 
Shira might be frightened by the new experience with Yod, or technology in general that 
Yod represents, but she knows that ―it was time‖ to accept the change: her recognition of 
the need to interconnect with Yod/technology signifies the posthuman‘s ethical choice.  
She sometimes finds herself to have ethical hesitancy about her relationship with Yod.  
Nevertheless, focusing on their bond and caring for each other more than Yod‘s not-
human-ness, she expects that the new relationship can fill her ―mental space,‖ which was 
wounded by her first love with Gadi and her ex-husband Josh.   
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 The love between Shira and Yod is a dramatic device through which the novel 
intends to offer a new perspective for the (post)human relationship with technology.  He, 
She and It shows how the (post)human relationship with technology can be positively 
suggested in a non-anthropocentric perspective.  Due to this tendency embedded in the 
novel, an anthropocentric view might have trouble reading the novel appropriately.  For 
example, denying the authenticity of their love, William S. Haney II claims that Shira‘s 
love affair with Yod shows the shift of ―the source of her response to the world‖ ―from 
the deeper, more receptive levels of subtle feeling and intuition toward the more 
instrumental levels of sensory gratification‖ (163).  He argues that Shira‘s desire for Yod 
is her eroticism toward the technological other, and, in this view, Yod is just ―a 
convenient tool for [Shira‘s] own gratification‖ (163); he also compares Shira‘s intimacy 
with Yod to human fancy for cybersex (163-64).  According to him, without spiritual 
interconnection, Shira seeks just physical satisfaction with Yod to compensate for 
traumas from her unsuccessful relationships with human men, Gadi and Josh.  However, 
Haney‘s claim is a misreading of the novel.  By depending on the anthropocentric view 
that denies communal nodes between human and nonhuman, he mistakes Shira‘s 
emotional acceptance of Yod.  Shira obviously expresses her emotional and mental 
attachment and satisfaction about her relationship with Yod: ―Truthfully, I don‘t think I 
ever felt as close to him [Josh] as I do to you [Yod]‖ (333).  This statement is proved 
through the differences of her responses to the death of Josh and Yod.  Whereas Shira 
was just shocked and angry at Yod, not sad about the loss of her husband, when Yod 
killed him, she seems in despair as Yod leaves for the deadly mission: ―The sense of loss 
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drained her until she could barely walk, one step, another halting step, into the remainder 
of her life‖ (411).  As such, Shira‘s bond with Yod is as much mental and emotional as a 
love between human lovers, or even more.  Claiming that ―if two people are deeply in 
love with each other, in some way they may actually become part of that person,‖ Haney 
romanticizes the love between humans while he downplays the intimate relationship 
between Shira and Yod (162).
73
  However, the novel stresses that the solidity of the 
interconnection between Yod and Shira is not less meaningful by summarizing their love 
as follows: ―Yod was a part of her now, her real mate‖ (383); ―You [Shira] have been 
my [Yod‘s] life‖ (411).  These statements reflect not only the close relationship between 
Shira and Yod but the inseparable relationship between the human and technology in our 
posthuman age: the romance between Shira and Yod is an apparatus to introduce a 
posthuman ethical view to account for the inseparable relationship between the human 
and the other.   
 Haney concludes his argument, stating that ―Piercy‘s novel shows that 
interactions between humans and machines will never fully replicate those between 
humans themselves‖ (162).  As seen in this statement, he reads He, She and It from a 
completely anthropocentric point of view.  The focus of the novel, however, is not to 
show if human-machine relationship can replicate human-human relationships.  Rather, 
through the intimate relationship between Shira and Yod, the novel simulates an 
interactive and non-hierarchical model of the human-machine relationship with a less 
anthropocentric view, expecting that the model can contribute to the revision of human-
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  Haney borrows V.S. Ramachandra and Sandra Blakeslee‘s idea about love.  They write, ―Perhaps your 
souls—and not merely your bodies—have become intertwined‖ in their book, Phantoms in the Brain (61). 
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human relationships as well as the posthuman‘s preparation for the future relationship 
with technology.  The novel expects that less anthropocentric ethics may propose an 
alternative to the traditional family construction centering around paternal authority by 
reviving and interconnecting with what traditional anthropocentric ethics has excluded 
and repressed, such as the woman and monster, in the process of establishing a universal 
humanism and an ideal, autonomous, and sovereign subject.  Since Shira and Yod 
brought back Ari to Tikva, they have come to form an alternative type of family.  
Despite a little hesitancy, Shira introduces Yod to Ari as his ―stepfather‖ without 
revealing that Yod is a machine because she wants them to have a creative relationship 
free from traditional prejudices toward machine or technology: 
This is your stepfather. Let Ari gradually observe the nature of Yod as 
time passed. Let him grow up thinking men were rational, benign, gentle, 
infinitely patient and vastly intelligent and strong. Why should he need to 
know that Yod was also a weapon? Yod would never use violence against 
Ari, of that she was sure. (365) 
Shira believes that Yod could be a good role model for Ari or for ―a future‖ of the 
posthuman (365).  Yod, a product of a new paradigm—the complexity paradigm— does 
not follow epistemological and cultural biases of patriarchal traditions, and Ari learns 
Yod‘s way of understanding the world.  For example, Yod tells old stories to Ari as a 
human father does for his son.  But he himself does not understand the values of objects 
and sex roles that the stories reflect, and thus Ari also misses ―the adult point of stories‖ 
(377).  Yod is not ―a figure of authority‖ who transmits patriarchal traditions to his son 
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like the father of a traditional family, but he is just ―a superior‖ for Ari (377).  Positively 
viewing such a non-traditional father-son relationship between Yod and Ari, Shira 
anticipates that ―Ari would be even more a child of the age of information‖ (323).  
Indeed, Ari is the figure of the future posthuman that the novel expects by proposing the 
complexity ethics—the posthuman that can build a less hierarchical and less violent 
techoculture through active and complex interactions with the (technological) other.  
 To offer Shira and Yod‘s love affair as an ethical model of posthuman 
relationality, the novel highlights the ―happiness‖ that the new relationship brings about.  
Shira feels happy with her new family: ―She was happy. Every day was a gift. Every day 
was complete in itself, like a good and satisfying meal‖ (379).  Yod also proclaims that 
he begins to understand ―happiness‖ thanks to his family: ―I was beginning to 
understand a little what humans mean by happiness. . . . I had never been happy until we 
came back here with Ari and you told him I was his stepfather. Then I knew you truly 
accept me into your life‖ (364).  Through Yod‘s request for citizenship, the novel shows 
that personal happiness or personal relationship is also networked with social systems.  
Yod applies for citizenship to the Council of Tikva since he realizes that to keep his 
happiness, his interactive relationships with humans need to be officialized: Yod said, ―I 
wish citizenship . . . because I want to live with Shira and help raise her son. I want to be 
registered as a partnership. I can‘t do that if you don‘t think I‘m a real person‖ (406).  
Along with becoming a family member, Yod‘s request for citizenship means breaking up 
the traditional master-slave relationship between the human and the artificial and, 
instead, asking ―partnership.‖  The partnership is what the novel suggests as a new type 
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of the relationship between the human and the other.  The partnership formed by the 
interactive dynamics in relationships presumes caring and responsibility for each other.  
For Yod, to be a lover, husband, and father and to have citizenship is to achieve ―a 
partnership‖ that allows him to care for his family and community—that is what the 
complexity paradigm suggests as ethical.  For the complexity ethics, one‘s right and 
responsibility emerges from the dynamics of his/her interconnections with others.  The 
ethics, therefore, cannot be explained by certain prescriptive codes to the extent that the 
dynamics is contingent and unpredictable.  Yod‘s suicide and killing of Avram to 
destroy his research materials in the end of the novel are results of such contingent and 
unpredictable dynamics of the complexity ethics.  In other words, his destructions are to 
protect the dynamics of interconnectivity from patriarchal and totalitarian power. 
Before the Council makes a decision about whether Yod is ―a citizen of Tikva or 
Avram‘s tool,‖ Yod is forced to serve as a military instrument (365).  Y-S notices the 
existence of Yod as ―a one-man army‖ and wants to take him to make an army of 
cyborgs.  In the negotiation meeting with Tikva, Y-S asks if Yod is ―the property of the 
town‖ (392).  For that question, while Malkah claims that Yod is a citizen of Tikva as a 
person, Avram admits Yod as a possessed tool and he agrees to transfer his ownership of 
Yod to Y-S.  Yet, maintaining that ―I made him, and I can unmake him,‖ Avram orders 
Yod to self-destruct in Y-S, murdering Y-S‘s high rankers (408).  To justify his order, he 
tells Yod that ―if you were my flesh-and-blood son I could do nothing else‖ and reveals 
his plan to manufacture another conscious robot after Yod‘s death (410).  However, Yod 
does not agree with his plan.  Especially, Yod does not want Avram to make another 
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conscious weapon because he knows the new cyborg will suffer from the cyborgian 
ethical dilemma as he does: ―I don‘t want to be a conscious weapon. A weapon that‘s 
conscious is a contradiction, because it develops attachments, ethics, desires. It doesn‘t 
want to be a tool of destruction. I judge myself for killing, yet my programming takes 
over in danger‖ (410).74  As this quotation shows, Yod‘s dilemma emerges from the 
collision between his violent nature given by patriarchal rationalism and the self-
organized tendency of intimate and nonviolent relationship with humans.  In the end, 
overcoming the dilemma of choosing his own way to live or die, Yod reprograms 
Avram‘s order and decides to confront patriarchal power: not only, as Avram ordered, 
does he kill high ranking people in Y-S through his self-destruction, but he kills Avram 
and destroys his laboratory to prevent anybody from making another conscious weapon.  
Through his death message, he declares that he ―[has] done one good thing with [his] 
death‖ (416).  His death, accompanied the killing of Y-S‘s high ranking officials and 
Avram, is a self-sacrificing resistance against the patriarchal, anthropocentric, and 
totalitarian power to possess him or the other.  In terms of ethics, Yod‘s resistance 
illustrates the basic assumption of the ethics of otherness: ―I‖ cannot possess the other, 
but interconnect with it.   
 Levinasian ethics, or ethics of otherness, shares the common idea that ―the 
possibility of possession of the other‖ is ―delusion‖ (Andrew Gibson 25).  Malkah 
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 This ethical dilemma Yod struggles with shows that he is beyond machine ethics, which Isaac Asimov 
established.  Asimov offered the ―Three Laws of Robotics‖: ―1: A robot may not injure a human being, or, 
through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. 2. A robot must obey the orders given it by 
human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 3. A robot must protect its own 
existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law‖ (qtd. In Haney 70). 
Piercy attempts to offer a less anthropocentric ethics for machine and humans through her novel since 
current technoscience culture cannot be controlled in the view of robotics any more.   
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creates Yod through the genealogy of artificial monsters, deconstructing the mechanisms 
by which ―I‖ have sought possession.  Hence, Yod rejects any power for possession and 
seeks liberation from patriarchal, anthropocentric, totalitarian rationalism, which has 
provided epistemological and ethical ground for such power.  The deaths of Joseph and 
the Creature are the re-confirmation of their being possessed by their creator.  On the 
contrary, Yod, as a nonlinear descendent of the artificial monsters that has been excluded 
and repressed as the other, revenges the repressed on the dominant power that has 
attempted to possess the other.  Yod‘s resistance signals the return of the repressed ―with 
a vengeance,‖ which Braidotti expects technological monsters to do (Metamorphoses 
174).  Yod mentions that ―I hoped for a long time Avram would let me go willingly‖ 
(366).  His mentioning seems to exhibit the repressed other‘s long-term wish: the 
liberation from the dominant power of male, sovereign, universal self/subject.  In this 
sense, his liberation is not just his own but that of all the repressed.  Consequently, it 
anticipates the emergence of a new structure of power, constituted by interconnective 
dynamics.   
Malkah considers Yod ―a mistake,‖ saying that ―The creation of a conscious 
being as any kind of tool—supposed to exist only to fill our needs—is a disaster‖ (412); 
―What Avram and I did was deeply wrong. Robots are fine and useful, machine 
intelligence carrying out specific tasks, but an artificial person created as a tool is a 
painful contradiction‖ (418).  Malkah‘s comments are not to show her didactic regret 
about artificial intelligences that the Maharal and Victor presented about their creature.  
But, rather, her regret is about the immature paradigm that brings about the ―painful 
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contradiction.‖  Accordingly, when Karmia, a geneticist in Nili‘s Amazonian 
community, asks Malkah if she regrets taking part in making Yod, she retorts: ―How can 
I regret someone I truly loved? I feel guilty. I understand the crime we committed 
against him by the very act of programming him for our purposes. But I cannot regret 
knowing him‖ (421).  Through experiences with Yod, Malkah can reflect how violent 
modern rationalism has been toward the other, and can realize the need of new ethics for 
the posthuman world.  Her love for Yod explores the possibility that her new 
rationalism, or the complexity paradigm, can embrace the other within human 
epistemological and ethical networks by interconnecting the other as the partner.   
In the very end of the novel, Shira misses Yod so much that she tries to re-make 
him, using the survived research materials from Avram‘s laboratory.  However, since 
she understands that his death means his liberation from Avram, she cannot ignore 
Yod‘s will that another conscious weapon should not be made, and thus she gives up the 
effort.  By so doing, she shows that she conceives him as her real partner whose will 
should be respected rather than a simple erotic object.  In fact, throughout the novel, 
Shira keeps self-questioning about how appropriate it is for her to accept Yod as a 
person and her partner.  Yet, in the face of his death, she realizes how much she has 
appreciated the nonhierarchical and nonviolent relationship with him and that she has 
evolved with the relationship: ―She found in herself a swelling power, an intensifying 
concentrated energy for work. . . . Her time with Yod had taught her she was not 
defenseless. She too could scheme; could fight; could kill. With Yod she had been able 
to ask for what she wanted. She had come to value that directness‖ (423).  Yod becomes 
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energy as Shira throws Avram‘s research material regarding the creation of Yod into the 
fusion chamber of Tikva.  Yod, indeed, is energy for Shira to find her potential and also 
for Tikva to survive.  Right after describing how Shira abandons the research materials 
about Yod, the novel is finished with a short sentence: ―She had set him free‖ (429).  
Yod‘s death leaves ―energy‖ that helps all the repressed others be liberated from 
patriarchal, totalitarian, anthropocentric power.  The energy is derived from the 
interconnective dynamics of complexity that Yod symbolizes and strives to protect, and 
the energy will further the complexity.  In this sense, Yod is a vision of the complexity 
ethics for the posthuman future.   
Regarding Frankenstein, Halberstam states, ―for the monster, paradise is always 
lost in Frankenstein,‖ and ―for the reader, humanity—humane treatment of others, 
justice, etc.—is always beyond our reach‖ (37).  However, by portraying how the 
technological monster Yod, a nonlinear descendent of the Creature, achieves 
partnership—albeit not officially approved—in a human community, He, She and It 
suggests a possibility for the monster to reconcile with the human and for the human to 
reach a new humanity that can interact with monsters.  Reconfiguring the idea of the 
ethics of otherness, which presumes the asymmetry and inseparable relationality 
between the human/self and the nonhuman/other, in terms of the revised rationalism of 
the complexity paradigm that abandons reductionism of modern rationalism and seeks 
complexity, the novel progressively formulates interconnective dynamics between the 
human and the other as the ethical code for the posthuman.  For the ethics of complexity, 
difference is not what should be separated and repressed, but it is valued as a resource to 
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increase complexity.  Paying attention to the interconnective dynamics of the 
posthuman, He, She and It visions a positive future for the posthuman, where different 
systems can establish nonhierarchical, nonviolent relationships, forming a complex 
network.  The vision for the less hierarchical and less violent relationship between the 
human and the other is the ethics that posthumanists expect for our technoscience culture 
(Weistone 6).  In this sense, Piercy advances her novel as ―a primary vehicle for ethics‖ 
as Martha Nussbaum expects from literature (Andrew Gibson 8): the novel practices a 
descriptive ethics of the complexity paradigm through technophilic imagination.  
Appropriating the change of normative humanity by the complexity paradigm, the novel 
provides intellectual ―energy‖ to constitute the discourse of the complexity ethics for the 
posthuman living with/as technological monsters—that is what Yod does for his human 
partners.   
Piercy also attempts to embody the energy for the complexity through the 
narrative form of her novel, bringing the complex network between ethics and narrativity 
into play.  He, She and It has two narrators: Malkah narrates the story of Joseph, and an 
anonymous narrator, who shows an almost omniscient viewpoint especially for Shira, 
conveys the story of Yod.  The two narrators and two stories are mixed, and thus the 
narrative of the whole novel seems nonlinear: neither story is either subordinated to or 
completely independent from the other.  This nonlinear proceeding of the narrative is 
used not only to produce the genealogy of artificial monsters, but also to suggest a new 
narrative form valuing the complexity that nonlinear dynamics engenders.  In this aspect, 
it can be said that Piercy also illustrates the ethical code of the complexity paradigm 
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through the narrative form.  Andrew Gibson suggests that ―[e]thics and rationality now 
belong in the space where narratives interact‖ (6).  He assumes that both ethics and 
rationality are grounded in relationality or communicativity, which is ―a question of 
narrative‖: ―the contingencies of communication are selves, and the defining condition 
of the self is understood as the projection of a narrative into the world‖ (6, italics in 
original).  This claim reflects the understanding of ethics as the epistemological code 
constituting norms rather than as the moral code.  Such an epistemological 
understanding of ethics is concerned with configuring systems of value, not expressing 
significant values.  Therefore, in the context of ethics of relationality, ―the narration of a 
story appears as a particular kind of ethical concern,‖ and ―distinctions between modes 
of narration are also the crucial ethical distinction‖ (Andrew Gibson 26).  In the same 
vein, Neumann affirms that ―what makes literature valuable in terms of its ethical 
dimension is not exclusively its content, but its aesthetic means of presenting that 
content‖ (131).  She sees that the relationship between rationality, ethics, and narrative 
depends upon their communal view: ―the impossibility of closure and totalization‖ 
(132).  Through the analysis of Shelley Jackson‘s Patchwork Girl; Or, a Modern 
Monster, the next chapter investigates how scientific fiction practices the communal 
view as an aesthetic method, developing a new narrative form: hypertext.  Jackson‘s 
hypertext novel Patchwork Girl, appropriating the creativity of nonlinear interconnective 
dynamics in both its context and form, could be an example to show how literature 
methodologically appreciates subjectivity and ethics of the complexity paradigm. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE COMPLEXITY OF ELECTRONIC LITERATURE: HYPERTEXTUALITY 
AND POSTHUMAN AESTHETICS 
 
It is no longer a surprising phenomenon that works of art employ science and 
technology as both their aesthetic method and source of inspiration.  In posthumanist 
views, which regard science and technology as significant social systems holding and 
producing metaphoric meanings of our age, art‘s methodological and thematic 
employment of science and technology is a natural move.  Particularly, literature and 
literary studies have paid attention to information science and technology to interrogate 
networked and programmable media as the material basis for artistic creation.  Literary 
writing currently depends on computer technologies, such as word processors and 
writing software for composition, and the number of electronic texts, which are 
electronically published and read, is gradually increasing.  In this sense, Hayles‘s 
assertion that ―all contemporary literature is digital‖ does not seem overstated 
(Electronic 159).  The digitalization of literary writing, publication, and reading 
produces the genre of ―electronic literature‖: by definition, electronic literature is a body 
of digital-born texts, literary texts created and read on a computer.  Posthuman critics, 
such as Hayles, George P. Landow, and Jay David Bolter, regard electronic literature as 
a posthuman phenomenon caused by intermediating dynamics between humans and 
technoscience; between human language and machine code; between human cognition 
and machine execution.  Indeed, writing, reading, and interpretation of electronic 
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literature are necessarily associated with posthuman theories about subjectivity, ethics, 
and aesthetics, which emphasize the affinity and communicability between human and 
technoscience.  
Posthumanism places the human and the technological in the same circuit, where 
their intermediating dynamics organizes its system.  In this view, to change the media of 
literature is not simply to change the forms of writing and reading but to ―transform the 
metaphoric network structuring the relation of word to world‖ (Hayles, Writing 23).  In 
this consideration, Hayles expects electronic literature to ―[challenge] us to rethink what 
literature, and the literary, can do and be‖ (Electronic 42).  Indeed, the existing 
understanding of literature based on print texts may be limited in handling the changed 
context and environment of the posthuman age.  To understand changes in the 
ideological and aesthetic representation of literature in the technoscience culture of the 
posthuman age, this chapter examines hypertext fiction and its theories.  Hypertext, as a 
subgenre of electronic literature, indicates digital texts, which consist of nonlinear 
hyperlinks.  Only when the reader connects the links, a hypertext can be formed.  But 
due to the nonlinearity of hyperlinks, the order of links changes in each reading, 
producing a multiplicity of meaning.  Such nonlinearity and performativity of hypertext 
are the underlying concepts defining the World Wide Web, a cultural space of the 
posthuman.  In this sense, ideological and aesthetic discussions about hypertext are 
meaningful in understanding the cultural context of the posthuman.   
This chapter ultimately examines how hypertext appreciates the complexity 
paradigm and also aesthetically contributes to the paradigm.  In the first section, I 
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introduce two attitudes toward the computerization of literature to understand how 
technoscience mediates the emergence of hypertext.  Reviewing hypertext critics‘ claims 
that hypertext actualizes poststructuralist and deconstructionist theories, I argue that 
hypertext is more than such actualization.  Like previous cultural and literary theories, 
hypertext is interested in the liberation of the repressed and the excluded by the old 
paradigm.  Yet hypertext gets further than the liberation, paying attention to how the 
liberated values can be re-incorporated in the networks of culture: in other words, 
hypertext does not simply function as the criticism of the old paradigm, but it envisions a 
new paradigm—the complexity paradigm.  The second and third sections will further 
this claim to explore the critical and aesthetic potentials of hypertext by analyzing 
Shelley Jackson‘s hypertext Patchwork Girl, which rewrites Mary Shelley‘s 
Frankenstein.  Reviving the female monster destroyed by her creator in Frankenstein, 
Jackson presents new relationships between creator and creature, between human and 
nonhuman, between writer and text, and between reader and text through the intimate 
relationship between the female monster and the writer Shelley.  In doing so, Jackson 
experiments with dynamic relationships between literary elements—writer, text, reader, 
and medium.  Foregrounding the linking system of hypertext writing and reading, 
Jackson connects the hypertext narrative with the image of monster: she utilizes the 
structural characteristics of hypertext in constructing the content of her novel, forming 
the text as a whole operating by the interconnective and interactive dynamics between 
structural and semantic elements, between human and nonhuman elements.  The second 
section of the chapter will investigate the aesthetics that can be envisioned from the 
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dynamism of hypertext and claim it as the aesthetics of the complexity paradigm.  Based 
on that aesthetics, the last section will examine how the authorship over the hypertext is 
distributed into the networks formed by the interconnections among the literary 
elements, showing how aesthetic ideas of digital medium embeds ideological 
implications.  This examination will reinforce the view of the complexity paradigm that 
aesthetics is not an independent area but a communicative system, which is 
interconnected and interacts with other systems.  
 
1. Electronic Literature: Aesthetic Potentials of Technoscience 
As science researches into the affinity and communicability between the process 
of human cognition and that of computer programs and technological applications of the 
research flourish, literature often affirmatively illustrates the posthuman assumption that 
the machine can be a creative subject rather than an object mechanically imitating 
human cognitive activities.
75
  This posthuman assumption deepens ―[t]he tension 
between the high-level meanings of human discourse and the cascading processes linked 
with executable code in machines‖ (Hayles, Electronic 32).  Responding to this tension, 
there are two perspectives in electronic literature: one is the computer writing‘s 
replacement of human literature, which reflects a traditional anxiety about 
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 Neuroscience and cognitive science have developed the idea that the cognitive activities of the human 
brain can be encoded and decoded in the form of cybernetic information, and also vice versa. Appreciating 
such scientifically proposed connections between human and machine, literature explores the links 
between mind, literary work, and material media: more specifically speaking, such appreciation of 
literature gives birth to new literary genres: cognitive fiction novels, which thematically use the scientific 
understanding of the relationship between human and technoscience, and hypertext novels, which 
compositionally exploit it. This chapter will focus on the genre of hypertext. To learn more about 
cognitive fiction, see Joseph Tabbi‘s Cognitive Fictions, which discusses scientific novels, such as 
Thomas Pynchon‘s and Richard Powers‘s novels, in conjunction with selective references to contemporary 
cognitive theories.  
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science/technology‘s mastery over human beings, and the other is the positive utilization 
of computer writing to create a new narrative form, which can defy traditional power 
structures.  Although the two perspectives bear different attitudes toward 
science/technology, both of them suppose that it is unavoidable that technoscience or the 
posthuman condition transforms literature, literary studies, and, further, aesthetic ideas.  
In a posthuman perspective, it is not a surprising idea that the evolution of 
computer technology will make it possible for a machine to write fiction (Swirski 81).  
In 1982 when computer writing programs and the idea of electronic literature were not 
yet fully fledged,
76
 Stanislaw Lem, a Polish science fiction writer and philosopher, 
published an introduction to the imagined history of electronic literature, ―A History of 
Bitic Literature.‖77  Lem defines ―bitic literature‖ as ―any work of nonhuman origin—
one whose real author is not a human being‖ (41, italics in original): bitic literature is the 
literature of the machine.
78
  He, nonetheless, does not completely exclude human 
involvement in bitic literature, claiming that bitic literature is a ―result of the coexistence 
of machines and human beings‖ (48, italics in original).  He states that while computers 
or artificial intelligences are direct authors of bitic literary texts, human beings are 
―indirect authors,‖ who perform ―the functions which generated the real author‘s acts of 
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 The attention to electronic literature emerged in the 1990s when hypertext fictions created through the 
writing software ―Storyspace‖ were published.  
77
 ―A History of Bitic Literature‖ is contained in Lem‘s science fiction, Imaginary Magnitude, which is a 
collection of inventive introductions to nonexistent books of the twenty-first century: Necrobes, Eruntics, 
A History of Bitic Literature, Extelopedia in 44 Magnetomes, and ―Golem XIV.‖ The book is Lem‘s 
philosophical and witty speculation about the interrelations between science/technology, human evolution, 
and writing. Throughout the book, Lem tries to find a place for literature in the technoscientific direction 
of evolution. His view ultimately shows a postmodern sense of the crisis of literature through anxiety 
about rapidly developing technology.  
78
 ―bitic‖ comes from ―bit,‖ a basic, non-semantic unit of information. Computer programs are basically 
built with complicated combinations of this unit. 
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creation‖— i.e. humans provide the computing machine with programs, or operating 
environments (41).  Such a secondary place of human beings in literature, he visions, 
will cause human‘s setback in evolutionary competition with the machine.79  In this way, 
even though Lem recognizes the communicability between human and machine by 
which human and machine can produce and share literature together, he does not go 
beyond the traditional paradigm that has established the master-slave relationship 
between human and science/technology.  Lem‘s idea of bitic literature expresses anxiety 
over the possibility that the creative activity of artificial intelligence can lead evolution 
in a non-anthropocentric direction. 
Whereas the human anxiety over the creativity of the machine or artificial 
intelligence is a common theme of science fiction novels, thematizing machine literature 
or literary works by machine as a way to express the anxiety is not common.
80
  Such 
rarity in thematizing machine literature is ultimately related to the paradigmatic 
understanding of the difference between literature and science/technology as well as the 
human‘s privilege over the nonhuman.  The traditional perspective, positioning literature 
and science/technology in oppositional extremes, maintains that the difference between 
literature and science/technology is derived from their different attitude toward 
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 The last chapter of Lem‘s Imaginary Magnitude, ―Golem XIV,‖ is lectures of a super intelligent 
computer, GOLEM XIV, which critiques human evolution and meditates the secrets of the universe. The 
audience of the lectures is human beings. Human beings are intelligently subordinate to machine. In this 
way, Lem regards current technology and science as a threat to literature and human evolution.  
80
 The definition of literature here is limited in creative and fictional writings, not including other 
nonfictional types of writing. Probably because creative and fictional writing has been considered an 
explicit human intelligence activity, it is hard to find the figure of creative machine that writes fiction even 
in cyberfiction novels, which thematize the disappearing border between human and machine. Yet, as a 
rare example, in William Gibson‘s Neuromancer, the artificial intelligence, ―Neuromancer,‖ is assumed as 
a creative machine, which can write poetry. The AI‘s creative ability is recognized as a threatening 
evidence for the possibility that machine intelligence can take over human privileges.  
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complexity: while literature seeks complexity in creating and interpreting meaning of the 
world, science/technology reduces complexity into simpler elements to understand the 
world.  In the same vein, Lem deems that literature is what helps humans maintain 
complexity as energy for evolution, and machine—or expansively, science/technology— 
is what decreases the complexity.  He states that ―whereas for us the real thing is the 
world, for the machines the first and foremost actuality is language‖ (53).  He assumes 
here that machine‘s intellectual activity cannot be beyond the mechanical combination of 
linguistic codes, and consequently ―Bitic creativity impedes human creation as much as 
it simplifies it‖ (62).  As Lem shows, the paradigmatic understanding about the 
difference between literature and science/technology excludes science/technology from 
discourses of aesthetics in that aesthetics is constituted on the understanding of the 
abstract beauty of the complexity.  However closely they describe the relationship 
between human and science/technology, science fiction novels tended to be under that 
old paradigmatic perspective, placing the human and machine as competitors in 
evolution.  Lem‘s idea about electronic literature also reinforces the old paradigmatic 
perspective.     
On the contrary, the concept of hypertext, as a genre of electronic literature, 
appreciates the computerization of literature in the posthuman position that affirms the 
co-evolution of human and technoscience as partners, considering the computer not an 
object to threaten the authority of literature and the human but a hopeful medium to 
expand the reach of literature and the human.  The term ―hypertext‖ was coined by 
Theodor H. Nelson in the 1960s, when personal computers and the concept of 
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cyberspace were not even invented.  Nonetheless, by introducing the concept of 
hypertext, Nelson draws upon the literary recognition of the creative potential of the 
computer as a provider of a new narrative form.  Nelson defines hypertext as ―non-
sequential writing‖ mediated by a computing machine, presenting an interactive 
relationship between the medium and the reader: hypertext ―branches and allows choices 
to the reader, best read at an interactive screen.  As popularly conceived, this is a series 
of text chunks connected by links which offer the reader different pathways‖ (0/2, italics 
in original).
81
  Interestingly, Nelson notes that the nonlinear writing and reading 
procedure of hypertext is similar to the cognitive process of the mind (2/7-2/8): he sees 
that the computer can exteriorize human cognitive works, and digital writing of 
hypertext is not much different from human writing.  Although Nelson‘s concept of 
―literature‖ in his book does not necessarily indicate creative writing, this idea suggests 
the computer as a medium to join technical practice with artistic creation, exploring 
intermediating dynamics between human and computer, artist and programmer, literature 
and technoscience.
82
  Evolving with the intermediating dynamics, hypertext shows that 
electronic literature neither completely confines the technological nor is confined by it.  
Indeed, unlike Lem‘s bitic literature, Nelson‘s concept celebrates hypertext as the 
expansion of literature rather than seeing it as a crisis of the posthuman age.   
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 In Literary Machines, Nelson numbers the pages for each chapter. ―0/2‖ means the second page of 
Chapter Zero. 
82
 Nelson states that his discussion of writing is not necessarily about ―belles lettres or leather-bound 
books,‖ but he also does not exclude the possibility that his ideas of non-sequential writing is applicable 
for literary writing (2/9). Since literary hypertext critics apply his concept of non-sequential writing based 
on machine to literary studies of hypertext, this chapter regards Nelson‘s idea in the area of literature.   
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Nelson‘s concept of hypertext writing, which emphasizes nonlinear links, had 
developed into a narrative style of fiction by the 1990s with the growth of hypertext 
software programs and the cyber-networks of the World Wide Web.
83
  Dependent on the 
hypertext development software programs, a group of writers created hypertext novels, 
establishing hypertext fiction as a genre of electronic literature.
84
  Employing Nelson‘s 
proposal of intermediating dynamics between human and technology, hypertext novels 
foreground the interconnectivity and interactivity between writer, text, medium, and 
reader as the distinguishing feature of electronic literature.  In emphasizing the 
interconnective and interactive dynamics, hypertext fiction attests Nelson‘s claim that 
―literature is a system of interconnected writing‖ (2/9, italics in original).  In fact, Nelson 
mentions that the claim is not his own definition of literature but ―a discovered fact,‖ 
meaning that the writing type of hypertext, which operates by linking text chunks, has 
been repressed in the traditional writing culture (2/7).  In this view, he presumes that the 
existing culture of writing—i.e. culture of print texts— standardizes stable and unified 
writing and the electronic medium changes the culture.  Nelson‘s insight into the critical 
potential of hypertext has relations with poststructuralists and deconstructionists‘ 
concerns with nonlinearity: particularly, Jacques Derrida‘s discourses about linear and 
nonlinear writing and Roland Barthes‘s discourses about nonlinear reading, which cause 
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 ―Intermedia‖ and ―Storyspace‖ are two software programs designed for literary hypertext. The original 
program is ―Intermedia‖ developed at Brown University, but due to its limits in applying to new computer 
systems, it is no longer used. Instead, revising the limits of Intermedia, George P. Landow, J. David Bolter, 
Michael Joyce, and John B. Smith developed Storyspace. For the technical accounts for the two hypertext 
software programs, see Landow‘s ―The Death of Intermedia and the Migration to Storyspace.‖ 
84
 The software ―Storyspace‖ is provided by Eastgate System, which has published notable hypertext 
fictions, including Michael Joyce‘s Afternoon, a Story, Shelley Jackson‘s Patchwork Girl, Stuart 
Moulthrop‘s Victory Garden, and Judy Malloy‘s Its Name Was Penelope, Forward Anywhere.  
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death notices regarding literature, such as the end of book, the end of novel, the end of 
author, and further the end of existing form of literature.  Suggesting hypertext as an 
alternative narrative form, hypertext critics claim that hypertext practices previous 
literary theories.   
In Of Gramatology, Derrida claims that linear writing has suppressed nonlinear 
writing and the privilege of linear writing reflects the linearity of the old paradigm that 
has governed Western epistemology and culture.  But by asserting that ―what is thought 
today cannot be written according to the line and the book‖ and claiming that it is time to 
write and read differently, Derrida implicitly suggests a paradigm shift to value 
nonlinearity (86-87).  Derrida upholds the need for ―a different organization of space‖ to 
write the changed paradigm: the new organization of space is expected to allow ―pluri-
dimensionality‖ and ―a delinearized temporality,‖ which will bring about ―the end of the 
book‖ (86-87).  Derrida expects the advent of a new medium to replace linear writing 
and also the culture of print books based on linearity.  Agreeing with Derrida‘s 
assumption that such reorganization would mean of the end of book, hypertext critics 
view the computer as a medium that is able to (re)organize presentation of knowledge in 
a new way—in the nonlinear way.  They see that the computer causes the shift from 
print culture to digital culture, and the shift helps to write ―what is thought today,‖ 
which, Derrida claims, print books could not.  With respect to literary genre, hypertext 
critics contend that such changes by the computer will incite the end of the traditional 
novel and present the end of the paradigm that has supported the genre.   
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In the same vein, Robert Coover observes the relationship between medium, 
literary genre, and paradigm in discussing the critical value of hypertext.  He criticizes 
―the line‘s power‖ through which the novel, he argues, has achieved its alleged power: 
―Much of the novel‘s alleged power is embedded in the line, that compulsory author-
directed movement from the beginning of a sentence to its period, from the top of the 
page to the bottom, from the first page to the last‖ (par. 3).  Coover sees the power of 
line, or the power that the novel embeds, as the ideological power of the Bourgeois.
85
  
He implies that linearity is not a universal value but a historical one and that the linear, 
direct writing of novels is not how they naturally evolve.  He asserts that the traditional 
novel is ―the virulent carrier of the patriarchal, colonial, canonical, proprietary, 
hierarchical and authoritarian values of a past . . . [that] is no longer with us‖ along with 
the paradigm shift caused by information technology (par. 2).  In this way, Coover‘s 
argument about the nonlinear narrative of hypertext is confined to the criticism of the 
existing paradigm and its literary form, and does not further explore critical values of 
hypertext to articulate a new paradigm.  In fact, to claim that hypertext is not just the 
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 Coover‘s claims about the end of the novel and the end of linear textuality are indebted to Barthes‘s 
view of the death of author. In claiming the death of author, Barthes maintains that author‘s language and 
style in literary writing are conventional rather than creative and what makes a text creative is an author‘s 
way of manipulating the conventional language and style. For Barthes, therefore, the authority of the 
writer, as a creator of meaning based on profound understanding of language, is a myth. Barthes offers this 
idea in his book Writing Zero Degree, challenging the traditional concept of literature, which he contends 
is grounded in ―bourgeois consciousness‖ (5). The zero degree of writing indicates ―neutral modes of 
writing‖ (5). In his book, Barthes insists that literature is not zero degree writing. For him, literature is not 
a self-referential linguistic product but a historical and political construction. He argues that it is a 
bourgeois myth that literature is coded by natural, neutral, transparent writing. As Susan Sontag 
summarizes Barthes, ―[a]s modern literature is the history of alienated ‗writing‘ or personal utterance, 
literature aims inexorably at its own self-transcendence—at the abolition of literature‖ (xvii). Announcing 
the end of the paradigm bringing on the traditional understanding of literature, deconstructionist and 
postmodern critics have suggested the end of author, the end of the novel, and further the end of literature. 
Yet such ―ends‖ do not signify the real end of those, but the traditional definitions of them; what brings on 
such ends is the reevaluation of nonlinearity.   
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transformation of print texts into the digital form and to establish the legitimacy of 
hypertext in literary and cultural studies, hypertext critics, including Coover, Bolter, and 
Landow, tend to focus on how hypertext practicalizes poststructuralist theories, 
overlooking the newness of hypertext for literary and cultural studies.  Indeed, the 
nonlinear narrative of hypertext may not be a totally new way of reading and writing in 
that the nonlinear narrative is also possible in print texts as modern and postmodern 
writers experiment through their works, and it may not be fair to say that hypertext is 
superior to print texts in that the evaluation of hypertext is also an ideology-based 
genre.
86
  Hypertext, nonetheless, still has ―newness‖ related to the posthuman culture: it 
is that the textual space of hypertext, which is granted by the new medium, offers the 
possibility for the complex, dynamic network between literary elements—writer, reader, 
text, and medium, the network that engenders a new type of textuality for the 
posthuman.   
The computer became a model of the complexity paradigm and a medium to 
narrate the posthuman condition in that paradigm.  Appreciating such roles of the 
computer, hypertext offers a new concept of narrative, which can depict and explore 
dynamic networks of nonlinear links defining the posthuman condition and the 
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 Espen J. Aarseth insists that though hypertext is as much ideological as technological, hypertext critics 
tend to overlook ideological aspects of hypertext by focusing on the newness of its medium too much (79). 
Indeed, ideology of hypertext has not sufficiently been discussed by critics. This chapter, however, 
assumes that hypertext embeds ideology of the complexity paradigm, which emphasizes the productivity 
and creativity of interconnectivity and nonlinearity, and also that the emergence of the complexity 
paradigm and hypertext is related to globalization, which pursues growth through connections among 
markets and cultures. But the dissertation does not further the discussion of ideology of globalization, or 
ideology of the complexity paradigm and hypertext. To understand the current discussions of globalization, 
see Jaqdish N. Bhaqwati‘s In Defense of Globalization, Manfred B. Steger‘s Globalization: A Very Short 
Introduction and ―Ideologies of Globalization,‖ and Michael Freeden‘s ―Editorial: Ideological Boundaries 
and Ideological Systems.‖ 
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complexity paradigm.  Traditionally, narrative has been entangled with the concept of 
story, a chronological arrangement of events.  However, in the view valuing 
nonlinearity, ―[n]arrative no longer designates the shape of a story, but the organizing 
framework through which a body of information is presented and made accessible‖ 
(Parker 54).  The role of narrative is not just on a semantic level to transmit knowledge 
and experience but on a structural level to transform information into meaning.  
Likewise, for hypertext, the meaning of the text is not just the accumulation of 
information, but rather it is formed in the process of connecting and disconnecting a 
variety of information.  Therefore, hypertext, as a text with a nonlinear narrative form, 
can no longer be understood in the traditional understanding of ―a written text as an 
unchanging artifact, a monument to its author and its age‖ (Bolter 2-3).  Rather, 
hypertext shows that a text is a complex, self-organizing system, which is open to 
constant interconnections and interactions with inner and outer textual elements.  In this 
sense, the qualities of a literary text are neither included in the text nor predictable from 
the text, but they are emergent according to how the narrative assembles information 
from/of literary elements.  This view ultimately changes the understanding of a literary 
artifact: the literary text is not a stable, monumental, and authoritative artifact, but it is a 
complex organism that is always reconstituted by nonlinear dynamics between literary 
elements.   
Barthes develops the idea of the nonlinear dynamics between literary elements 
into the concept of ―textuality.‖  Distinguishing the term ―text‖ from ―work,‖ Barthes 
argues that a literary text is not a unified and independent artifact controlled by the 
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privileged author, but a multivocal organism dependent on the interactive relationship 
with its readers.  Barthes claims that an ideal text is the ―writerly text‖ that produces 
multiple meanings according to readers‘ rational and ethical intuitions.  More 
specifically, by focusing on how textuality is constituted by the complex dynamics of the 
interconnective relationships around reading activities, Barthes asserts that ―the Text is 
experienced only in an activity, in a production,‖ therefore, it should be plural (Rustle 
58, italics in original).  Yet Barthes stresses that this claim means not only that ―it has 
several meanings but that it fulfills the plurality of meaning‖ (Rustle 59).  In other 
words, the focus of plurality is not ―on an interpretation but on an explosion, on 
dissemination,‖ whose impacts are enacted through networks of writer, text, and reader 
(Rustle 59).  In this way and as reinforced in his claim that the text is not ―a computable 
object‖ but a complex organism, Barthes‘s notion of textuality is saturated with the 
complexity paradigm (Rustle 57).   
Hypertext critics, particularly Bolter and Landow, note that Barthes‘s idea of 
textuality can be actualized only in the network of the computer‘s memory (Bolter 161 
and Landow 11-12).  The electronic space mediated by a computer, indeed, makes the 
explosion and dissemination of the text, which, Barthes claims, is the way of producing 
the plurality of text, visibly possible, serving as a textual space where topics and their 
connections can be effectively displayed and where text and reader can be interactively 
associated.  Applying Barthes‘s ideas to hypertext theory, Landow redefines hypertext as 
a ―text composed of blocks of words (or images) linked electronically by multiple paths, 
chains, or trails in an open-ended, perpetually unfinished textuality described by the 
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terms link, node, network, web, and path‖ (3, italics in original).  This definition shows 
how hypertext relies on the nonlinear interconnectivity that Barthes suggests as the 
feature of ideal textuality.  In this way, Landow and Bolter portray hypertext as ―theory-
in-practice and a vision-fulfilled‖ (Ciccoricco 26).  However, even though hypertext has 
a lot in common with Barthes‘s theory, there is an inevitable difference between 
Barthes‘s textuality based on printed literary texts and the textuality of hypertext—or 
hypertextuality— based on digital texts: the difference of medium.  Hypertextuality 
established in cyberspace can form a more dynamic network between literary elements 
than Barthes‘s ideal textuality based on print texts. 
While Barthes does not consider the medium of literary text an essential textual 
element, for hypertext the medium functions as a necessary element in considering its 
textuality: the computer does not simply provide a textual space that makes multiplicity 
of text, but it actively participates in the writing and reading process.  Barthes‘s 
textuality depends on the reader‘s ability to conceive the language of text, and the 
interconnective and interactive relationship between text and reader is understood in the 
linguistic sense.  On the other hand, hypertextuality does not totally rest on the reader‘s 
linguistic ability, but also his/her interconnectivity with the medium: to read a hypertext 
fiction, the reader should physically select the next episode by clicking the path.  In this 
respect, it can be said that the reader of hypertext becomes a user rather than interpreter 
and reading hypertext becomes interaction rather than interpretation (Qvortrup 80).  The 
role of the reader in hypertextuality functions not only on a semantic level but on a 
material level.  In hypertext reading, the reader, like the medium, is a component of 
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textuality rather the controller of textuality who has the privilege of interpretation.
87
  In 
this respect, there seem no hierarchical relationship between the reader and the medium.  
The aesthetic momentum for hypertextuality is the creative dynamics of interconnection 
between human and nonhuman, between semantics and textual structure.  
Hypertextuality based on the dynamics ―brings together language, body, and world as 
networking‖ (Rickert 903).  Hypertexuality is a complex textual phenomenon self-
organizing through material-semiotic transformations of various elements/systems, 
systems that incorporate more than just the author and the reader.  In this way, 
emphasizing the creative dynamics of networking, hypertextuality aesthetically presents 
the complexity paradigm of the posthuman.   
Hypertextuality is evidence of how the digitalization of literature can make 
literature and aesthetic ideas richer in the posthuman condition.  Fully appreciating 
hypertextuality, Jackson‘s Patchwork Girl aestheticizes the changed condition of the 
human.  The changed condition of the human that the hypertext focuses on is the human 
understanding of the interrelations with nonhuman and the interconnective relationships 
between differences.  Patchwork Girl is intertextualized with Shelley‘s Frankenstein, L. 
Frank Baum‘s The Patchwork Girl of Oz, and some theory texts.  Interestingly, while its 
narrative form is ―highly original‖ in regards to its intertextuality and information 
technology, its plot is ―intensely parasitic‖ on Shelley‘s Frankenstein (Hayles, Mother 
143).  In addition to their interwoven plots, their ontological and ethical concerns about 
monstrosity also show the connection between the two texts.  Frankenstein calls into 
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 The role of the reader in hypertext will be further discussed in the third section.  
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question the traditional concept of monster and the human‘s relationship with the 
monster, which are established by the power of linearity and unity.  But punishing the 
monster and its creator, the novel does not challenge enough the existing imperative that 
represses difference, instability, nonlinearity, and multiplicity.  In contrast, by 
appreciating the creative power of hypertextuality, Patchwork Girl releases and expands 
the repressed critique on linearity and unity in Frankenstein and celebrates the aesthetic 
potential of monster, which emphasizes the nonlinear interconnectivity and interactivity 
between components.  Certainly, in intertextualizing the two texts, Jackson clarifies that 
the difference between Shelley‘s novel and her hypertext novel is derived from their 
different understandings of the relationship between parts and between parts and a 
whole—that is also associated with the difference between the old paradigm and the 
complexity paradigm.   
In Frankenstein, Victor collects body parts from graves, but he is not interested 
in the origins of the individual parts.  He believes that the parts are only lifeless, 
mechanical appendages and the connections of parts produce a mechanical whole.  What 
Victor expects in his collection of human parts is a human-figure machine.  The monster 
as a whole, however, turns out to be more than the sum of the parts.  The result is 
beyond his reason and his sense of beauty.  Hence, the emergence of a conscious entity 
from the collected body is conceived of as monstrous in Frankenstein.  In contrast, 
Patchwork Girl values the individual parts and emphasizes their interconnectivity as the 
dynamics sustaining the female monster as a whole.  By describing the origins of the 
individual parts, the hypertext stresses the individual parts as organic systems as well.  
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The parts of the female monster‘s body originate from different kinds of bodies, 
including women, a man, and a cow.  The female monster as the whole not only 
recognizes the entities of individual parts within her, but introduces their stories 
respectively, even sharing their memories and personalities: the monster, as the whole, is 
constituted by the creative dynamics of the interconnection and interaction between the 
parts and between herself, or the whole, and the parts.  Such creative power of 
interconnection and interaction between the parts and between the parts and the whole is 
also conducted on a compositional level.  Patchwork Girl is composed of text chunks, or 
lexias—more exactly, the text as the whole is formed by the interconnections and 
interactions between the lexias as the parts.
88
  In sum, the female monster and the 
hypertext work like organisms, which self-organize and sustain themselves through the 
dynamics of the relationship between parts and between the parts and the whole.  
Through the view of the female monster, Jackson hints at how the hypertext understands 
the creation of complexity and the emergence of the complexity paradigm.   
In Patchwork Girl, the female monster, a speaker of the hypertext, introduces 
herself as a chaotic entity producing disorder: ―I came out topsy-turvy, heels over head, 
and the whole world wobbled with me. Life once did flow toward death, parents 
engendered offspring, time moved from the beginning to the end. I am a disturbance in 
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 The term ―lexia‖ is borrowed from Barthes. However, the notion of lexias in hypertext is quite different 
from his usage. While lexias in hypertext mean ―blocks of text‖ (Landow, Hypertext 4), Barthes defines 
the term ―lexias‖ as ―a series of brief, contiguous fragments‖ from a word to a paragraph or more (S/Z 13). 
He explains that the fragments, regardless of their sizes, are a least measure of producing meaning and 
multiple lexias within a text to create multiple meanings. For Barthes, in this sense, lexias are a means to 
deconstruct the unity of meaning. On the other hand, the function of lexias in hypertext is beyond such a 
deconstructive task: it is to increase the structural complexity of the text, which is related to the production 
of complex meaning.  
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the flow‖ (born).89  The monster does not impose any negative implication on her 
chaotic or disorderly being.  Rather, she affirms the monstrosity and nonlinearity of her 
existence as significant elements that can help ―the once lost‖ return (remade).  Through 
this view, Jackson suggests that reviewing the monstrosity and nonlinearity of Shelley‘s 
character can be a means of reviving values repressed by the dominant ideology seeking 
the orderly and linear: exploring and revaluing the repressed becomes the function of the 
monster.  The female monster asserts that her brother monster does not successfully 
perform the function of monster, pointing out the limit of epistemology as the cause of 
the failure: 
My brother monster was like a botched resurrection, under a god for 
whom the unity of the body had lost its cohesive force, its moral 
necessity. This god groped toward a new unity in the exhaustion of the 
old, unable to invent anew, only to recycle the old. Looking for some new 
ideas, he tried to open up another space, one between life and death, 
pushing that pair to the margins, but ends up instead with this aching 
mixture. Not a resurrection, but a made thing . . . . (botched bro)
 
 
This passage shows that what to expect through monstrosity is the ―resurrection‖ of the 
repressed.  Since the male monster, however, still remains within the epistemological 
frame of the old paradigm, he does not successfully resurrect the repressed.  What he 
needs is a new paradigm respecting difference and appreciating multiplicity.  According 
to the female monster, although she and Victor‘s monster are ―jumbled and jinxed‖ 
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 I put the title of lexias in the parenthesis for the reference of Patchwork Girl.   
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alike, the difference between them is the fact that the female monster has ―the stomach‖ 
for the jumble while the male monster does not (botched bro).  The ―stomach‖ is the 
epistemological intuition that affirms nonlinear relationality.  Such intuition is the 
foundation of the complexity paradigm in that it values interconnective dynamics and 
the complexity created by the dynamics.  Through the female monster, Jackson declares 
that her hypertext is grounded in the complexity paradigm, which construes the chaotic 
entity, or the monster, as a creative power that increases complexity.  Patchwork Girl 
sees complexity as the essential condition of aesthetics to the extent that the complexity 
is a necessary condition for the multiplicity.  Focusing on the interconnective dynamics 
between heterogeneous elements, which are observed both in the context and the 
narrative structure of Patchwork Girl, the next section investigates how the hypertext 
offers the aesthetics of the complexity paradigm.  
 
2. The Hypertextual Aesthetics of Networking Heterogeneous Parts 
According to Theodor W. Adorno, the two defining characteristics of modern 
aesthetics are the recognition of the impossibility of art‘s self-evident reference or 
autonomy and the still-existing illusion of that autonomy (1).  Adorno claims that art is a 
social system, which has interconnective and interactive relationships with other 
systems.
90
  Such a denial of art‘s autonomy and the understanding of art as a social 
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 The idea of art as a social system is furthered by system theorists, including Niklas Luhmann. For 
further understanding of this aesthetic view, see Adorno‘s Aesthetic Theory and Luhmann‘s Art as a Social 
System. Particularly, Luhmann argues that art, including literature, is in the boundary between human 
consciousness based on perception and social systems. Art, pertaining to the knowledge of the senses, 
remains internal to the social. Aesthetics of the complexity paradigm, which this section will explore, is in 
the expansive path of Adorno‘s and Luhmann‘s perspective of art.  
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system reflect an aesthetic view that ―beauty and the sublime are not transcendentally 
preexisting facts, which art must reconstruct‖ but ―they are the potential outcome of 
artistic experiments‖ (Qvortrup 90).  In other words, aesthetics, or an artistic idea, is 
determined by ―what in a certain era is considered beautiful, artistically desirable‖ 
(Qvortrup 76).  To understand the aesthetics of an age, in this sense, is to understand 
―how an artist shapes his or her material in order to give form to the artistic idea; how 
the process of poetical composition can be described‖ (Qvortrup 76).  Embodying 
posthuman aesthetic ideas through its material form as well as its content, hypertext, in 
particular, can be a proper model to configure the aesthetics of our posthuman age.   
 In the posthuman perspective, Jurij Lotman deems that art, including literature, 
has a ―structural kinship to life‖ and it is ―capable of transforming noise into 
information‖ (qtd. in Paulson‘s ―Literature‖ 43).  By claiming the structural affinity 
between a living thing and art in terms of information, this perspective assumes the 
communicability between the physical and the metaphysical, between human and 
nonhuman.  Following Lotman‘s posthuman view about art, William Paulson conceives 
of literature as a ―transmission channel‖ that selects and excludes noise to produce 
information (Noise ix): for him, literature is a self-organizing system of noise, which 
provides what will be noise for some readers and information for others (Noise x).  
Aestheticizing the process of self-organization of noise so as to make information, 
hypertext reflects and practices such a cybernetic understanding of poetical composition.   
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Hypertext is an aesthetic machine, which constantly merges different sources and 
―translates‖ them into a whole.91  The machine here is not mechanical but organic.  More 
exactly, it is a machinic phylum constituted by the flow of material and nonmaterial, 
human and nonhuman, information at the bifurcation between chaos and order in 
Deleuze and Guattari‘s term.  As a machinic phylum, hypertext translates writer, text, 
medium, and reader into a contingent whole.  In an attempt to claim a new aesthetic 
paradigm in the view of technoscience, Guattari asserts that ―technoscience‘s machinic 
phylums are in essence creative, and . . . this creativity tends to connect with the 
creativity of the artistic process‖ (Guattari 107).  Stressing the aesthetic creativity of 
interconnective dynamics, he presents a ―processual aesthetic paradigm,‖ which values 
the complexity produced in the material-semiotic flow of the artistic process.  Hypertext, 
which constantly produces multiple, contingent meanings through translations of various 
literary elements, embodies this processual aesthetics.   
The processual aesthetic paradigm, as Guattari states, suggests that ―art does not 
have a monopoly on creation, but it takes its capacity to invent mutant coordinates to 
extremes‖ (106).  Works of art based on that capacity function as complex systems that 
constantly self-organize through interconnections and interactions with other 
(sub)systems.  By claiming that works of art as machinic phylums have ―a double 
process—autopoietic-creative and ethical-ontological,‖ Guattari associates his idea of 
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 In actor network theory, the term ―translation‖ signifies the process of creating of an actor network. 
Actor networks, in which material and semiotic networks work together as a whole, sustain themselves 
through the process of translation of other sources. I use here the term ―translate‖ in this sense. To learn 
more about actor network theory and its term ―translation,‖ see Bruno Latour‘s Science in Action: How to 
Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society and Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-
Network-Theory, and John Law and John Hassard‘s edited book, Actor Network Theory and After. 
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processual aesthetics with the complexity paradigm, which crosses posthuman ontology, 
subjectivity, and ethics, and in which works of art are not just products of aesthetic 
activity but aesthetic products of the paradigm (108).  Jackson‘s Patchwork Girl reflects 
and also dramatizes the concept of the processual aesthetic paradigm through the female 
monster‘s body and her relationships with others: the hypertext concentrates on how the 
female monster as the whole is formed by the parts from others and how she makes 
relationships with other people, including her creator Shelley.  More specifically, the 
hypertext performs autopoetic-creative and ethical-ontological processes by 
foregrounding the relationships between parts and between parts and a whole.  
Understanding of such relationships is necessary to articulate the aesthetics that the 
hypertext presents. 
The aesthetic idea that regards a work of art as an organism conjures up 
Immanuel Kant‘s concept of ―systematic unity,‖ which self-generates and self-sustains 
through its intrinsic dynamics.  Kant supposes that a living organism and a work of art 
are two instances of systematic unity, paying attention to the integral relations of parts, 
which he believes produce creative activity.  He claims that ―[t]he parts of things 
combine of themselves into the unity of whole by being reciprocally cause and effect of 
their form‖ (qtd. in Taylor‘s Moment 85).  Kant‘s concept of the unity of whole, or the 
systematic unity, signifies a totalizing system, in which ―differences remain indifferent 
to each other‖ and thus ―nothing more than ‗a semblance of unity‘‖ is expected (Taylor, 
Moment 81).  Due to such properties of the whole as totality, the concept of whole has 
been denied (by deconstructionism) and the deconstruction of the concept has even been 
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celebrated (by postmodernism).  Patchwork Girl is also skeptical of the traditional 
concept of whole: ―[c]lassical wholeness and taxonomic self-knowledge is harder and 
harder to believe in‖ (whole?).  Instead, via the female monster and its narrative form, 
the hypertext offers a new concept of whole: that is, the concept of ―network‖ valuing 
interconnetivity and interactivity between differences and resetting the relationship 
between parts and a whole nonlinearly.  In so doing, the hypertext is able to illustrate 
how non-totalizing structures, which nonetheless act as a whole, emerge.  The concept of 
non-totalizing whole is an aesthetic foundation of Patchwork Girl on which Jackson 
shapes her material into an artistic form and processes the composition of her hypertext.   
Non-totalizing systems are necessarily unstable and unpredictable due to the 
dynamics of the nonlinear interconnectivity and interactivity between elements of the 
systems. Such characteristics of the non-totalizing systems create complexity.  
According to John Muckelbauer and Tim Donovan, there are two types of complexity 
produced by the non-totalizing dynamics: ―a tranversality that occurs by means of 
intensity‖ and ―a transformation that occurs by means of integration‖ (867).  The former 
is a postmodern understanding of the underlying dynamics that engenders complex 
phenomena of our age, and the latter is complexity theory‘s understanding of the 
dynamics sustaining complex systems.  Deleuze and Guattari offer complexity by 
traversal intensity, which creates becoming.  The intensive becoming, as a complex 
system, does not stay within a frame, repeating de-territorialization and re-
territorialization.  As David Ciccoricco claims, however, such cartographical aesthetics 
cannot ―adequately articulate the dynamic topology of network space‖ (51).  Yet 
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hypertext, as another type of non-totalizing system, is based on the ―logic of 
transformation by integration‖ (Muckelbauer and Donovan 864).  The dynamics of that 
logic produces ―networking‖ rather than mapping.  In networking, ―parts enter into 
networked relations subject to indeterminate changes resulting from composition and 
interaction within the system‖: ―it does not leave the frame of the whole‖ — the whole 
that is sustained by nonlinear interconnections with its parts and with the environment 
(Muckebauer and Donovan 868).  In this concept of networking, what matters is the 
order of arranging the elements that constitute a system rather than the number of the 
elements: the meaning of the system depends on the order of the elements and thus the 
multiplicity of meanings makes the system complex.
92
  Likewise, although hypertext 
consists of the confined number of lexias, it produces multiple meanings according to 
the results of the reader‘s contingent selections of the subsequent lexia in linking lexias.  
In other words, the meaning of hypertext depends on how the elements are networked 
together—that is how hypertext produces complexity.   
Networks are spaces of communication.  In the concept of network, the existence 
of nodes connecting elements or parts is significant since they make the whole structure 
a communicable system.  The nodes distribute information into the whole system, and 
―[t]he web of nodes forms a distributed network,‖ whose ―[o]perations are not ordered 
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 Human beings are also an example of this characteristic of the network, or the non-totalizing system, in 
that we are a type of complexity produced by the limited number of genes. John Sebastian Bach‘s 
Goldberg Variations shows the aesthetic appreciation of this understanding of the non-totalizing system. 
Inspired by this aesthetic perspective, Richard Powers wrote his The Gold Bug Variations, which 
aesthesized the complexity created by the interconnective dynamics between the limited number of codes: 
this novel weaves together narratives from the 1950s and the 1980s to explore the common dynamics 
among computer codes, the genetic codes, the musical codes in Bach‘s Goldberg Variations, and 
cryptography in Edgar Allen Poe‘s ―The Gold Bug.‖   
 181 
sequentially but run in parallel‖: in this sense, networks are nonhierarchical and 
decentered systems (Taylor, Moment 155, italics in original).  Patchwork Girl reflects 
that understanding of network through the existential status of the female monster: 
Oh, I [the female monster] want to be whole, don‘t doubt it. Jennifer‘s leg 
lying next to Bronwyn‘s foot on the flagstones of Frankenstein‘s 
workshop can‘t kick anyone‘s butt. But then Jennifer couldn‘t do it alone, 
either, not in all those petticoats. No, it‘s me, this one: Jennifer-Bronwyn-
Elizabeth-Roderick-Kate-Alise-Germain-Aphrodite and all the others, 
who can take on any comers. (double agent) 
By enumerating the names of people that the parts belonged to, the female monster 
stresses that the individuality of the parts is not reduced to the whole.  Nevertheless, the 
parts are not completely independent from other parts and the whole, either.  The 
hyphens between the names illustrate nodes interconnecting the parts, and the female 
monster as the whole is the web of the nodes.  The female monster understands that she, 
as the whole, does not have privilege over the parts but rather she is sustained by the 
interconnective and interactive dynamics between the parts: the monster is a contingent 
result of complexity emerging from the interconnective dynamics.  Considering such 
ontological characteristics, the monster states that she is not so much ―the agent of 
absolute multiplicity‖ as she is ―a double agent, messing up . . . territories‖ (double 
agent).  This statement reinforces the fact that the female monster as a network functions 
holistically but not totalistically.  Jackson claims that the monster and the hypertext 
illustrate beauty in this concept of network, a non-totalizing whole, emphasizing 
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aesthetic values of complexity produced by the nonhierarchical dynamics of the 
network.   
Through the mouth of the character Shelley, Jackson proclaims that the existence 
of the female monster is beautiful: she notes that what makes the monster look beautiful 
is the complexity of her existence—more specifically, the beauty of the complexity 
created by the nonlinearity and multiplicity of the network structure.  In the hypertext, 
when Shelley finds the female monster deserted by Victor outside, she notices that ―the 
various sectors of her skin were different hues and textures, no match perfect,‖ which 
she could not see in ―the dim light of [her] laboratory‖ (she stood).93  Until then, she had 
not realized the individuality of the body parts and their differences from each other and 
from the whole.  This realization of the individuality of the parts makes Shelley perceive 
the beauty of the monster.  Jackson claims the beauty of the network that the monster 
presents: that is, the beauty of complexity.  Comparing the monster‘s beauty to a type of 
a beauty found in nature as an example, she asserts that the beauty of complexity is 
natural rather than monstrous.   
I [Shelley] thought of the tree that stands by the house. I have often 
noticed that a length of cloth however richly dyed cannot match the 
beauty or sustain the interest of Autumn foliage. I believe it is because the 
myriad differing hues, while tending toward the self-same yellow one can 
achieve with a broth of turmeric, say, or onion skins, creates a disturbance 
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 By stating that Shelley could not see the beauty of the monster in ―the dim light of [the] laboratory,‖ 
Jackson implicitly suggests that aesthetics is not transcendental. A new epistemological environment out 
of the old rationalism, one that can appreciate the beauty of complexity, can see the beauty of the monster.   
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of other colors around the root color: a penumbra, a kind of three-
dimensionality of color. 
In this same way she was beautiful. (she stood) 
Shelley here observes the complexity created by the nonlinear dynamics traversing 
between order and chaos, which prevails in nature.  She emphasizes the difference 
between the beauty of the dyed cloth and the beauty of the autumn foliage, valuing the 
latter more.  The color of the whole foliage, which is formed by the web of colors from 
multiple parts, is more complex than the dyed cloth with one tone: the foliage and its 
color are networks.  The color of the whole is created by the nonlinear dynamics 
between colors of individual leaves without reducing them to the whole.  The network of 
colors is in disequilibrium due to the dynamic tension between the ―tending toward the 
self-same‖ color and the ―disturbance of other colors around the root color.‖  The 
dynamic tension creates the complexity of the network, and Shelley appreciates the 
beauty of the complexity, pointing out that the monster has the same beauty as the 
foliage.   
In explaining the complexity of foliage in the above quotation, Jackson mentions 
the ―three-dimensionality‖ of the network of colors.  In that mention, she shows her 
understanding of networks as three-dimensional spaces where information can 
nonlinearly communicate.  By comparing the beauty of the complex network of foliage 
with that of the monster, Jackson insinuates the three-dimensionality of the monster.  
The monster‘s three-dimensionality as a characteristic of the network is more explicitly 
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expressed through dotted lines on her body.  Jackson provides a drawing of the female 
monster‘s naked body with dotted lines as shown in figure 1.       
 
Figure 1. Jackson‘s drawing of the female monster (1995) 
The dotted lines are the stitching marks that Shelley left in the process of piecing 
together the parts for the monster‘s body.  For the female monster, the lines are scars 
signifying the fragmentary origins of the parts.  Yet Shelley, as the character of the 
hypertext, mentions that the female monster does not have to be pitied for the scars 
because the ―scars not only mark a cut,‖ but ―they also commemorate joining‖ (cut).  
Characterizing the interconnective relationships between the parts and between the 
whole and the parts, the dotted lines, in fact, illustrate how the complexity of her being is 
accomplished: in other words, the lines show the traces of interconnections by which she 
is constituted.  Jackson describes the characteristics of the dotted lines: ―It [dotted line] 
indicates a difference without cleaving apart for good what it distinguishes. It is a 
permeable membrane: some substance necessary to both can pass from one side to the 
other‖ (dotted line).  By allowing interconnections and interactions between parts and 
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thus making the whole/monster three-dimensional, the dotted lines keep the 
monster/system complex and beautiful.  Such functions of the dotted lines on the 
monster‘s body portray how the network produces complexity or beauty through the 
interconnective dynamics.  Equating the creation of the monster and the composition of 
the hypertext, Jackson shows that an act of interconnection in the network lets 
differences shift and intersect while difference itself is preserved and unharmed just as 
stitching the body parts of the monster does so: that is how the network becomes 
aesthetic.   
The permeability of systems indicates both the openness and closed-ness of 
systems—complex systems.  As Thomas Rickert puts it, the ―permeability is equivalent 
to flow and the dissolution of the stability‖ (901).  By stressing the permeability of the 
female monster, the dotted lines re-confirm the female body as a dynamically-networked 
complex system.  Niklas Luhmann claims that complex systems cannot exist without 
keeping communication with and difference from an environment, and they are, in this 
sense, both open and closed systems (17): complex systems and networks self-organize 
and self-sustain themselves through the interplay of openness and closed-ness, 
connection and separation, which manage sending, receiving, and transforming 
information.  Likewise, via the dotted lines, the parts‘ material and nonmaterial, human 
and nonhuman, qualities are communicated throughout the monster as the whole, 
forming the complexity of the monster, which produces the monster‘s beauty: the 
monster and her beauty are constituted by the machinic flow.  The female monster is an 
aesthetic machine, which aesthetically processes the machinic flow of information.  In 
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this vein, the beauty of the female monster is derived not from a fixed image of her 
being, but from a flexible, ever-changing image of her being as a complex system that is 
far from equilibrium and thus unpredictable.  The hypertextual aesthetics of Patchwork 
Girl is also understood in this dynamism.  Although Patchwork Girl consists of 
fragmentary lexias, the nonlinear, machinic interconnections between lexias and between 
literary elements produce structural and semantic complexity of the hypertext.   
To read the nonlinear hypertext narrative is to perform the aesthetics that 
appreciates the beauty of the monster: the reader‘s individual reading, or the activity of 
interconnecting the parts/lexias, is an aesthetic process that increases hypertextual 
complexity.  Throughout Patchwork Girl, Jackson suggests that the beauty of the 
hypertext is not formed by the aesthetic value of meaning of the text—i.e., its semantic 
coherence—but by ―successive attending to persisting form‖ (Joyce 63).94  The 
―successive attending‖ does not simply indicate linking lexias but also interconnecting 
all literary elements—writer, text, medium, and reader: the moment of reading is a 
moment of producing textual complexity and textual beauty.  Besides, although it is the 
reader that makes the ―successive attending,‖ the reader is not always the inciter of that 
dynamics.  In Patchwork Girl, the monster/text tempts the reader to conjoin with her: 
emphasizing that ―your skin is a permeable membrane,‖ she says, ―[c]ome closer, come 
even closer: if you touch me, your flesh is mixed with mine, and if you pull away, you 
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 Joyce claims that there is aesthetic coherence in hypertext although the meaning of coherence is not 
matched with the traditional understanding of coherence. According to him, the concept of coherence is 
changed along with the paradigm shift. The paradigm privileging poly-vocality, multiplicity, and 
constellated knowledge perceives coherence as ―the successive attending to persisting forms‖ rather than a 
singular organic whole.  Joyce‘s notion of ―successive attending‖ presumes that a hypertextual whole is a 
non-totalizing system maintained by the interconnective dynamics.   
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may take some of me with you, and leave a token behind‖ (hazy whole).  The 
monster/text here describes how the reader is caught in a network of other complex, co-
adaptive literary elements.  In hypertext, the reader is read as much as the text; in the 
same vein, the writer is written as much as the text.  The hypertextual space of the 
electronic medium makes all this complex networking between literary elements 
possible.  In this sense, the aesthetics that hypertextuality offers through its nonlinear 
narrative has the ―processual‖ and ―machinic‖ characteristics that Guattari identifies as 
being characteristics of the aesthetics of the posthuman culture.  Fully appreciating and 
appropriating such posthuman aesthetics in her Patchwork Girl, Jackson provides a 
model of aesthetic application of the complexity paradigm.  By examining the 
interconnective dynamics between literary elements in Patchwork Girl further, the next 
section will interrogate how the authorship over the hypertext is constructed and how the 
hypertextual authorship explores ideological implications of the processual and machinic 
aesthetics.   
 
3. Distributed Authorship: The Complex Network between Writer, Text, Medium, 
and Reader in Hypertextuality 
Hypertext shows changes in technical and cognitive functions of writing and 
reading that digital literature has brought about, and such changes become the catalyst 
for a redistribution of power: providing a form of nonlinear narrative, hypertext 
challenges the ideological power of linearity and presents unprecedented and unforeseen 
qualities of being.  Such functions of hypertext help illuminate the anxiety some critics 
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feel about the crisis of literature in advanced technoscience culture as well as the anxiety 
over the paradigm shift causing the reconfiguration of ontology, subjectivity, and ethics.  
Shelley Jackson‘s Patchwork Girl among canonical hypertext fictions explicitly 
embodies such critical functions of hypertext, aiming at the suggestion of new ideas of 
textuality based on the complexity paradigm.  As Landow puts it, Jackson‘s hypertext 
fiction ―permits us to use hypertext as a powerful speculative tool that reveals new 
things about ourselves, while at the same time to retain the sense of strangeness, of 
novelty‖ in our age where the medium of information technology is considered the 
―natural‖ way to describe the (post)human (―Stitching,‖ par. 9).  By analyzing the 
hypertextual characteristics of Patchwork Girl, this section investigates how hypertext 
redistributes power and how that redistribution of power makes the complexity of the 
text.   
 Patchwork Girl illustrates how the emergence of the complexity paradigm is 
indebted to information technoscience, which brings about the digital culture of the 
posthuman.  Patchwork Girl‘s intertextual rewriting of Frankenstein makes the reader 
experience the medium shift from print to digital and the paradigm shift envisioned by 
that medium shift.  As Joseph Tabbi puts it, ―the printed book . . . appear[s] stable, 
natural, and self-contained only after an environment had been built (over centuries) that 
gives legal, material, social, and scientific support to [the] fixity‖ and the appearance of 
electronic media changes the culture of printed book and offers a reconfiguration of that 
cultural ideology (xi).  Through her hypertext, Jackson depicts such changes and 
reconfiguration.  She reads Frankenstein as the text questioning the power/ideology of 
 189 
the printed book, which values linearity, stability, and unity.  In Shelley‘s novel, the 
monster is an unstable, unnatural, and unfixed being, and the denial of the Creature 
means the denial of the values that the monster represents as I discussed in the previous 
chapter.  The monster and his creator Victor are not only being rejected but punished 
with death.  Their death is a way in which Shelley compromises with the dominant 
cultural ideology: in other words, although Shelley notices the creativity of instability 
and nonlinearity, she must compromise with the dominant ideology valuing stability, 
linearity, and unity for her text to survive.  Patchwork Girl in the form of hypertext 
attempts to liberate what Shelley had to repress, by utilizing a new, electronic medium—
the computer, which provides a textual space for the repressed values of instability and 
nonlinearity.  The value of the new textual space is not just that it accommodates 
unstable and nonlinear power but that it exploits interconnective and interactive 
dynamics between unstable and nonlinear elements or systems.  Change caused by the 
shift of the literary medium to the computer ―is not necessarily the form or content of 
books per se, but the whole structure of support and beliefs about what counts as 
(meaningful) signal, and what is noise‖ (Tabbi xi).  In sum, the shift of medium is 
accompanied with that of paradigm as an epistemological framework.  By rewriting 
Frankenstein in the hypertext form, Jackson is able to reveal ideology embedded in print 
culture and reconfigure power-structure around and within literary texts—particularly, 
related to authorship.  Such a revelation and reconfiguration are conducted along with 
her appreciation of creative power of instability and nonlinearity, which the complexity 
paradigm vitalizes.   
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Patchwork Girl is a metafiction, a fiction about writing fiction.  Through her 
metafictional hypertext, Jackson suggests the nonlinear narrative of hypertext as an 
alternative to the dominant linear narrative that has established the conventional 
narrative style of novel.
95
  Peter Stoicheff claims that ―a metafiction text is a complex 
system‖ (85).  Jackson‘s metafiction, which utilizes the nonlinear narrative, appropriates 
this view.  By fully exploiting the image of the monster as a complex system and 
applying it to writing activity, she tries to exhibit how the complexity of text emerges, 
offering a new vision of writing and of power structure within the text.  Jackson parallels 
the structural complexity of hypertext with the monster‘s existential complexity: the 
lexias as the parts of the hypertext are equated with the parts of the monster‘s body.  In 
discussing the long-standing association between the body and writing, she reconfirms 
this equation: ―the comparison between a literary composition and the fitting together of 
the human body from various members stemmed from ancient rhetoric. Membrum or 
‗limb‘ also signified ‗clause‘‖ (typographical).96  In ―Stitch Bitch,‖ Jackson reveals that 
the association of body and writing has come to be associated with the ideological logic 
of normativity: the monstrous body is  
                                                   
95
 She radically defines ―hypertext‖ as ―everything that for centuries has been damned by its association 
with the feminine‖: especially in literature, that is what literary convention—in particular, the convention 
of novel— has edited out as the feminine (―Stitch‖ 534). According to the traditional idea of writing, while 
a conventional novel as a dominant narrative style is built by linear, direct writing and thus is considered 
good writing, hypertext, written nonlinearly, is a bad writing.   
96
 Jackson‘s understanding of the relationship between the monstrous body and writing conjures up French 
feminists‘ theory about feminine writing—particularly, Helen Cixous‘s theory of ―écriture féminine.‖ 
Écriture féminine places experience before language and privileges nonlinear, transgressive, and cyclical 
writing that defies phallogocentric discourses. Being combined with other French feminist theorists‘ 
concerns with the body, the concept of feminine writing has developed into a subversive exercise against 
phallogocentrism. However, this chapter does not locate Patchwork Girl in such feminist theories, which 
is based on psychoanalytical and poststructuralist views, to rearticulate the creative values of nonlinear 
and unstable writing in terms of the complexity paradigm valuing the creativity of such writing as a 
practical norm.  
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amorphous, indirect, impure, diffuse, multiple, evasive. So is what we 
learned to call bad writing. Good writing is direct, effective, clean as a 
bleached bone. Bad writing is all flesh, and dirty flesh at that: clogged 
with a build-up of clutter and crud, knick-knacks and fripperies encrusted 
on every surface, a kind of gluey scum gathering in the chinks. (534)   
In sum, bad writing is disordered and nonlinear like a monster‘s body while good writing 
is unified and linear.  To the extent that the norm prefers unity and linearity to disorder 
and nonlinearity, bad writing is located on the side of the repressed and excluded by the 
norm.  This corollary shows how writing is influenced by the normativity seeking 
linearity and unity.  In this sense, Jackson‘s attempt to refashion the concept of good/bad 
writing is related to the change of the norm—or the paradigm enframing the norm.   
Patchwork Girl is grounded on the assumption that Shelley had to eliminate 
some parts of her writing to meet the demand of normative, or good, writing.  In the 
hypertext, Shelley‘s re-sewing of the body parts that Victor deserted symbolizes a 
reviving of the writing that had been edited out in the pursuit of good writing.  Jackson 
provides the evidence to prove this assumption in a lexia: 
Indeed, there were remains –unused lengths of venous plumbing, fatty 
trimmings, deleted passages, a page that blew off a table in the garden 
where a rock imperfectly anchored an untidy slew of manuscript pages 
while she wandered in a reverie, attending only dimly the disquisitions of 
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one of the philosophical friends of the household. Percy himself excised 
parts he found blemished. (basket)
97
 
The lexia of ―basket‖ reveals the fact that Shelley‘s husband Percy Shelley was deeply 
committed to her writing.  This lexia follows the lexia entitled ―the remains,‖ which 
excerpts a scene of Frankenstein where Victor deserts the parts of the female monster on 
a shore.
98
  The female monster and Shelley‘s nonlinear and disordered writing were 
rejected by Victor and Percy Shelley respectively since they were a bad body and bad 
writing for them: Shelley‘s monster, as a being of collected parts, and her text with 
untidy parts were not allowed by the existing norm of subject and writing.    
Shelley confesses that male authorities, as a force to regulate the norm, 
intervened in producing Frankenstein from the initial stage to the publication of the 
novel.
99
  Especially, Percy Shelley, who wrote the preface to the 1818 edition of 
Frankenstein without revealing his name, meddled considerably in her writing.  His 
intervention resulted in framing Mary Shelley‘s writing within the concept of normative 
writing.  According to her, Percy ―was very anxious that [Mary] should prove [herself] 
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 The lexia to which this quotation belongs has a footnote given by Jackson: ―Excised, with selective 
deletions, from p. 211 of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus, first published in 
1818 (mine is the Penguin edition, 1985).‖   
98
 In Frankenstein, Victor carries the dissembled body parts of the female monster in a basket to a shore.  
In Patchwork Girl, Shelley brings them to her house without telling her husband. The story of the female 
monster, especially the ―graveyard‖ path writing about the origins of the body parts, in the hypertext could 
be considered what Shelley might put in her original manuscript before Percy Shelley edited. By 
imagining such, Jackson sample what Shelley‘s ―bad‖ writing might be like—that is, nonlinear and 
disorderly, but interconnected to the whole. 
99
 Shelley introduces how she wrote the story in detail in the ―Introduction to the Standard Novels Edition‖ 
for the 1831 edition. According to the introduction, Lord Byron, Percy Shelley, and Mary Shelley agreed 
to make a ghost story for each other, but she recollects that she felt heavily the burden of the agreement 
with such great authors, and the pressure even made her have a horrible dream on which Frankenstein is 
based. The story about Frankenstein and his creature may reflect her anxiety about male authorities‘ 
judgment of her writing or her monstrosity.  
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worthy of [her] parentage, and enroll [herself] on the page of fame‖ (272).  To make 
Shelley‘s writing and imagination public, he had to ―excise[s] parts he found blemished‖ 
(basket).  He might believe that the excising process can help make Mary Shelley‘s 
writing/monster ―good‖: for Percy Shelley, orderly and systematic writing was aesthetic.  
However, according to her own introduction to her novel in the 1831 edition, it seems 
that Shelley herself recognized the creativity of nonlinearity and chaos or disorder and 
the creative potential of chaotic and disorderly writing: in that introduction, she remarks 
that invention is made ―out of chaos‖ (―Author‘s‖ 274).  In addition, her ideas about the 
living monster with the collected body and its creative actions in her novel also support 
the assumption that Shelley understands the creativity and aesthetic values of chaos.  
Therefore, as Jackson depicts in her hypertext, Percy Shelley‘s editing out the 
disordered, nonlinear parts of her writing for publication might have been irritating for 
Mary Shelley although she, as a young and beginner writer, could not resist it.
100
  In this 
way, Shelley‘s authorship over her novel and aesthetic perception were infringed upon 
by male authorities—Percy Shelley and the print business.  As Jackson insists, 
nevertheless, Shelley tried to ―secure [her] monster behind those locks and screens‖ by 
embedding ―her tale in a double thickness of letters and second-hand accounts‖ in 
Frankenstein (real M.).  Owing to such efforts, her monsters—the female monster and 
her writing—had a chance to be revived along with the shift of paradigm.  Appreciating 
Shelley‘s remains, Jackson explores in her hypertext the aesthetic values of the nonlinear 
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 In Patchwork Girl, Shelley becomes mad about her husband‘s engagement in her writing process. Her 
passive resistance is regarded as ―feminine complaints‖ and ignored by Percy (female trouble). Through 
this episode, Jackson depicts how the feminine writing, which is impure and nonlinear, has not even been 
paid attention to in favor of the normative writing.   
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and disorderly that male authorities edited out.  In emphasizing such repressed values, 
however, Jackson does not simply mean to return the authorship to Shelley.  Rather, 
through Patchwork Girl, she reconfigures the authorship of the ext itself by collapsing 
the sense of hierarchy embedded in the concept of authorship.  As a result, Jackson can 
make her text more chaotic or complex than Shelley intends for her novel.  By doing so, 
she attempts to develop Shelley‘s aesthetic perception into the aesthetic of the new 
paradigm. 
Frankenstein is composed of four letters written by Walton, who tells Victor and 
his Creature‘s story to his sister, and his fourth letter has three volumes; each volume 
also consists of chapters.  Through this multi-layered narrative structure, Shelley 
experiments with nonlinear narrative, rearranging the sequence of events and employing 
multiple voices.  By hindering the reader‘s linear tracking of meaning, the nonlinear 
narrative based on the complex textual structure also minimizes the sense of an author‘s 
existence within the text.  With the help of the digital medium, Jackson can materially 
practice Shelley‘s experiment with the nonlinear narrative, and further its creativity by 
adding the concept of interconnective dynamics to the nonlinear narrative.  Her 
hypertext, Patchwork Girl, is composed of five paths structured by collections of lexias: 
―graveyard,‖ ―journal,‖ ―quilt,‖ ―story,‖ and ―broken accents.‖101  Although they are 
divided under different subtitles, the five paths are structurally interconnected without 
                                                   
101
 The ―graveyard‖ told by the female monster is the collection of stories of the individual parts 
comprising her body; the ―journal,‖ Shelley‘s journal recording her stitching of the female monster and her 
relationship with the monster; the ―quilt‖ containing excerpts from Baum‘s Patchwork Girl of Oz and the 
reinscription of other parts of the text; the ―story‖ about the female monster‘s adventures and excerpts 
from the relevant passages of Frankenstein; and the ―broken accents,‖ or ―body of text,‖ containing the 
female monster‘s narration about hypertext and human bodies.   
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being fully reduced to or separated from each other.  Such an irreducible interconnection 
is attributed to the nonlinear links of lexias.  Jackson notes that the interconnective and 
interactive dynamics of hypertext depends on ―multiple writing spaces/windows/lexias 
that can be linked in as many ways as the writer wants‖ and that the complex dynamics 
of writing spaces, or lexias, helps the hypertext cover ―a lot of different kinds of 
structures‖ (qtd. in Ferreira, par. 1).  Lexias not only liberate the writer from the forced 
rule of linear writing but the reader from linear reading both in physical and semiotic 
senses.  In hypertext, the writer programs lexias and their links on multiple levels so that 
the reader can move nonlinearly among lexias, weaving a variety of textual structures: 
the complexity of hypertext emerges from nonlinear dynamics.  In this way, throughout 
Patchwork Girl, Jackson pays attention to how the diminishment of the writer‘s 
authority over the text contributes to the complexity of the text.   
In a conventional understanding of literary works, the linear relationship between 
writer, text, and reader is assumed: the writer produces the text, and the reader consumes 
the text.  In this linear relationship, the text is considered just an object of property and 
the writer becomes an author, who is ―outside and precedes‖ the text (Foucault, 
―Author‖ 125).  Foucault claims that this status of the author, fostering ―the formulation 
of the fundamental critical category of ‗the man and his work,‘‖ is related to ―the 
systems of valorization in which he was included‖ (125).  His claim implies that the 
paradigm shift will cause a new concept of author.  In fact, the traditional concept of 
author is rooted in that of a unified self, an individual who is outside the (con)text.  
However, the author disappears with the emergence of a new paradigm that denies the 
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unified self: as long as the integrated self of the author is denied, ―the rights of the author 
as a persistent self-identity‖ over the text come to be more evanescent (Heim 221).  In 
this vein, Shelley in the hypertext states how the experience of interconnection with her 
monster transformed her understanding of the relationship between the 
human/self/author and the nonhuman/other/text: ―Her scars lay like living things 
between us, inscribing themselves in my skin. I thought I too was rent and sewn, that I 
was both multiply estranged and gathered together in a dynamic union./ What divided 
her, divided me‖ (her, me).  Shelley here reveals her realization that the 
human/self/author is constituted by the same complex, interconnective dynamics as the 
monster/other/text.  Under this dynamics, the two different systems can interact without 
rehierarchization.  Considering the communicability between human/self/author and 
monster/other/text, the writer no longer automatically becomes the author of the text, 
who controls the textuality.  Rather, authorship is distributed into the larger system, 
textuality, along the nodes between the writer and the text: the writer becomes a part of 
the textuality.  In Foucault‘s review, the disappearance or death of the author comes to 
transform the author into ―the victim of his own writing‖ (126).  But Foucault was not 
certain how the transformation would be appreciated in literature.  By representing a 
possible situation in which the writer Shelley interconnects and interacts with her own 
monster/text without a sense of hierarchy, Jackson demonstrates a result of the 
transformation.   
While Frankenstein‘s Creature regards his creator as father, the female monster 
perceives Shelley as ―[l]over, friend, collaborator‖ rather than mother (thanks); Shelley 
 197 
also regards her monster as such.  By not establishing their relationship as a mother-
daughter relationship, Jackson avoids any hierarchical sense traditionally implicated in 
the relationship between the creator and the creature.  In their nonhierarchical and 
interactive relationship, Shelley‘s responsibility for her creature is to preserve their 
interactive relationship rather than to control the monster.  Their interactive relationship 
is emphasized through their inter-species and lesbian intercourse.  What Jackson intends 
to claim through such an unfamiliar relationship between creator and creature is to 
expose the repressed possibility of interconnection with difference and its creative 
power.  In the old paradigm that privileges the sameness, the interconnection with 
difference is categorized as abnormal and thus prohibited as shown in Frankenstein.  
However, in the complexity paradigm where the increase of complexity through 
interconnections with difference is sought, the abnormal relationship can be a creative 
means to increase complexity.  In Patchwork Girl, the female monster/text achieves 
autonomy through the interconnective relationship with her creator and she decides to 
leave Shelley for her own adventurous life.  The monster‘s leaving illustrates how the 
text becomes more dynamic and complex when the writer‘s authority over the text 
diminishes: indeed, through her own experience, the monster/text can produce more 
complex meaning beyond the writer‘s confined experience.  In this aspect, the 
writer/Shelley is no longer the center of the textuality.  However, the demystification of 
the writer‘s authorship does not necessarily mean the complete separation of the text 
from the writer.  Rather, the interconnection between the writer and the text forms a 
textual web, and the authorship of textuality is distributed in that web.  Patchwork Girl 
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illustrates the distribution of the authorship through Shelley and the monster‘s skin graft.  
Shelley cuts a part of her body and grafts it to the monster‘s body, wishing she ―would 
live on in [the monster], and [the monster] would know [her] as [she knows herself]‖ 
(female trouble).  The grafted skin functions as a node between the creator and the 
creature, and the node disables ―the formulation of the fundamental critical category of 
‗the man and his work‘‖ (Foucault 125).  Shelley/writer and the monster/text are 
interconnected and interact through the dotted lines of the grafted skin.  Shelley will 
experience what the text will go through not as an authoritative controller but as an 
element of textuality.  
The three-dimensional electronic space of the hypertext makes the textual web 
constituted by the interconnection between the writer/Shelley and the text/the monster 
substantially possible by allowing the interconnective dynamics between them to move 
multilinearily and thus to weave a complex network.  Signifying both connections and 
disconnections, or the interconnection of connection and disconnection, the dotted lines 
marked on the female monster‘s body embody the creative characteristic of hypertextual 
space.  Jackson explains the dynamical lines as ―an indication of the way out of two 
dimensions (fold along dotted line)‖: ―In three dimensions what is separate can be 
brought together without ripping apart what is already joined, the two sides of a page 
flow moebiusly into one another. Pages become tunnels or towers, hats or airplanes, 
cranes, frogs, balloons, or nested boxes‖ (dotted line).  Jackson uses the dotted lines to 
show the shift of narrative forms from two-dimensional print form to three-dimensional 
hypertextual form.  The dotted lines, forming moebius space, give the text volume to 
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continue nonlinear, dynamic interconnections.  As Hayles points out, the dotted lines 
refer to the flickering signals of the computer, which have the pattern of presence and 
absence (Mother).102  In the three-dimensional electronic space constituted by flickering 
signifiers, the text becomes ―permeable,‖ ―paradoxical,‖ and ―potential‖ hypertext 
generating new writing and reading experiences (dotted line); the lexia/link pattern of 
hypertext is constructed by the dynamics of the connection and disconnection of 
flickering signifiers.  In the same vein, the female monster states, ―my real skeleton is 
made of scars: a web that traverses me in three-dimensions. What holds me together is 
what marks my dispersal. I am most myself in the gaps between my parts, though if they 
sailed away in all directions in a grisly regatta there would be nothing left here in my 
place‖ (dispersed).  The female monster accounts for herself in terms of hypertextual 
dynamics of flickering signifiers.  The monster, as a hypertext, stresses that her/its 
complexity or complex textuality is not determined by a single textual constituent.  
Rather, the hypertextuality is potentially constituted by the interconnective dynamics 
between writer, text, and medium, and it is contingently specified by the reader.   
Unlike print texts that linearly arrange writing and reading ―by the left-to-right, 
top-to-bottom, front-to-back fixit of the book,‖ the writing and reading of hypertext are 
nonlinear and multisequential (Purves 39-40).  Although the writer of hypertext creates 
the textual links with lexias in the first place, it is the reader who finally orders the lexias 
by clicking the flickering signifiers.  Critics call this characteristic of hypertext reading 
―cyborg reading,‖ which means that the reader and the text co-adapt to each other 
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 See the sixth chapter, ―Flickering Connectivities in Shelley Jackson‘s Patchwork Girl,‖ of Hayles‘s 
book, My Mother Was a Computer. 
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through reading.  Cyborg reading is required for hypertext.  Hayles asserts that reading 
hypertext is ―more than a cognitive activity—or rather, it is an activity that takes place in 
the embodied cognitions of the extended mind as it enrolls the material object of the 
medium into its cognitive system‖ (―Transformation‖ 37).  Particularly, Patchwork Girl 
asks the reader to be ―a cyborg reader‖ in order to let him/her know ―his/her prosthetic 
relations with the text‖ and ―adopt a gaze which is equally modular and fragmentary‖ 
(Carazo and Jimenez 116).  By doing so, the hypertext practices the interconnective and 
interactive relationship between the reader and the text, between the cognitive activity 
and the medium.  In the first verbal lexia of the ―a graveyard‖ path, the female monster 
states, ―I am buried here. You can resurrect me, but only piecemeal. If you want to see 
the whole, you will have to sew me together yourself‖ (graveyard).  She/text waits for 
the reader to stitch the parts into a whole.  By stitching them, the reader becomes a co-
author of the text: more exactly, reading contingently engenders meaning formed by the 
interconnective relationship between writer, text, and medium.  As the female monster 
narrates, multiple potential meanings of the text wander in the electronic textual space of 
the hypertext, and a specific meaning contingently emerges according to the reader‘s 
spontaneous selections of links: ―I hop from stone to stone and an electronic river 
washes out my scent in the intervals. I am a discontinuous trace, a dotted line‖ (hop).  
The reading of hypertext is untraceable because the reader cannot mark the last lexia at 
which he/she leaves, and accordingly the reader may not repeat the same reading: since 
hypertext does not provide a certain point of beginning and ending for reading, the 
reader can start and end his/her reading anywhere and at any moment, and also the 
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direction of reading changes according to the reader‘s selection of the link for the next 
lexias.
103
  Due to such nonlinear, multisequential reading, a universal reading is 
impossible for hypertext.  The moment of reading is the contingent moment of 
complexity when the writer, text, medium, and reader work together.  In this way, 
hypertextuality does not assuredly distinguish the positions and functions of such textual 
constituents.  Rather, the nonhierarchical interconnections and interactions between the 
writer, text, medium, and reader perform the hypertextuality.   
By highlighting the performativity of hypertextuality, Patchwork Girl suggests 
the changing concept of control.  While the conventional textuality of books controlled 
by the author is fixed and univocal, the hypertextuality, which is formed by the nonlinear 
interconnections and nonhierarchical interactions between the author, text, medium, and 
reader, is variable and multivocal.
104
  For the distributed authorship of the hypertext, the 
female monster remarks, ―Mary writes, I write, we write, but who is really writing?‖ (am 
I mary?).  This question is made for the reader of the hypertext.  Jackson does not claim 
herself as the privileged author of Patchwork Girl.  Instead, she emphasizes that she is 
one of the co-authors by introducing the author of the hypertext as ―Mary/Shelley, & 
Herself.‖  In this arrangement of authors‘ names, Jackson does not clarify exactly who 
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 In both form and content, Patchwork Girl does not proceed linearly. Since there is no order of reading 
like page numbers of print books, the reader can start anywhere s/he clicks first.  Likewise, the story of 
Patchwork Girl is not a unified one, but it is a type of collage containing monster stories, criticism, and 
bibliographical information. The hypertext does not provide a conclusion, showing that the reader of 
hypertext is not intended to find a specific meaning hidden by the author but to make meaning emerge 
through complex reading processes.  
104
 Purves claims that hypertext brings about changes both in the form of control and the nature of control: 
―The writers control the text; the text controls the readers; the readers control the text and the writers; 
convention controls the writers and the reader through the text; writers and readers can invent and play 
with convention and the text. The whole is an apparent anarchy‖ (39, italics in original). Purves argues 
that such a nonhierarchical and interconnective type of control can help reconfigure the existing cultural 
and theological web by problematizing all the traditional types of authority.  
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the names refer to.  She places a slash between Mary and Shelley.  It could mean Mary 
Shelley, not as Frankenstein‘s author, who deleted the existence of the female monster, 
but as the writer of the text within Patchwork Girl, who revived the monster by re-
stitching the deleted parts: the slash may mean the différance of her authority over her 
work.
105
  The ―Mary/Shelley‖ also could signify Mary Shelley and Shelley Jackson.  
Without claiming the originality of her hypertext, Jackson actively appropriates her 
predecessor‘s work.  The slash between Mary and Shelley is a mark of nonlinear 
interconnective dynamics between Mary Shelley and Shelley Jackson, between 
Frankenstein and Patchwork Girl.  Likewise, ―Herself‖ as a coauthor of the hypertext is 
not clearly identified either.  It could be the female monster, the text, the medium, or the 
reader—or all of them.  In this way, the answer to the monster‘s question above, ―who is 
really writing,‖ might be ―we,‖ all the literary elements which participate in constructing 
hypertextuality.  Such a distributed and thus dynamic authorship over the text reinforces 
the complexity of the text.  Through the textual complexity that the distributed 
authorship produces, Patchwork Girl demonstrates how hypertext embodies ―ideological 
implications of digital medium and its positivistic aestheticization‖ (Ensslin 7).  Indeed, 
hypertext is not only an example of how literature methodologically uses technoscience, 
but it is an aesthetic gain of the posthuman and the complexity paradigm.   
Qvortrup asserts that in a complex culture, ―[t]he role of artist becomes the 
creation of potential worlds through which ‗users‘ can create their own world 
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 I use the term ―différance‖ to mean ―to differ‖ and ―to defer‖ as Jacques Derrida defines. The writer 
Mary Shelley in Patchwork Girl is not what she was actually, but one who Jackson hypertextualizes. 
Shelley‘s authority in the hypertext is differed from and deferred by her novel.  
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realizations, or make their own paths‖ (90).  In other words, the role of the artist in the 
complex culture helps the reader/user experience the complexity of their world through 
works of art so that the reader can realize the complex network of the culture.  In her 
hypertext Patchwork Girl, utilizing the nonlinear narrativity and a three-dimensional 
textual space, Jackson creates the potential world of complexity in which the reader can 
aesthetically experience how complexity emerges by the machinic process based on 
nonlinear, interconnective dynamics.  This aesthetic experience helps the reader realize 
the dynamics of the complex network culture to which s/he belongs.  David Ciccoricco 
argues that ―an effective network aesthetic maintains some form of dialogue between the 
discursive, verbal, and conceptual on the one hand, and the formal, performative, and 
material on the other‖ (71).  Taking advantage of the interconnective image of the 
monster and the conceptual depth of the nonlinear narrative of hypertext, Jackson‘s 
Patchwork Girl maintains the balance in such a dialog, reflecting the aesthetic ideas of 
the complexity paradigm.  Through her hypertext, in other words, Jackson proposes that 
aesthetics itself is a complex system in which various epistemological, social, and 
cultural systems are interconnected and interacted.  
The progress of technological developments alters the genre in a techno-
methodical way.  Indeed, thanks to technological developments, the increasing diversity 
of artistic tools and methods allows writers to experiment with and to change the notions 
of language, narrative, and text—and thereby further literature.  Hayles claims with 
caution that ―digital literature will be a significant component of the twenty-first century 
canon‖ to the extent that ―almost all contemporary literature is already digital‖ 
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(Electronic 159).  In particular, by exploring the nonlinear narrative in a hypertextual 
space, hypertext heightens the ideological and aesthetic competence of digital literature.  
As Hayles claims, the emergence of a new narrative form transforms ―the metaphoric 
network structuring the relation of word to world‖ (Writing 22-23).  By restructuring the 
relation of word to world through nonlinear writing, hypertext is able to revive values 
degraded by linear and hierarchical cognition of the world.  Values supporting 
nonlinearity and interconnectivity challenge ideological implications inherent in the 
existing paradigm.  In this respect, despite the posthuman conditions in which language 
and aesthetic is decoded and re-encoded by technology, literature proves its significance 
in our technoscience age by offering a new narrative form to articulate the emerging 
posthuman culture and a new aesthetic perspective to appreciate the complexity of the 
culture.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: SCIENTIFIC FICTION AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM 
 
Human beings are living in the information age when things change so fast and 
information is so unorganized and unpredictable that stability and simplicity become 
―idle dream[s] that no longer can be realized,‖ making the question of complexity a 
topical subject (Taylor, Moment 3).  In order to understand the information age, Taylor 
suggests, ―we must comprehend complexity, and to comprehend complexity, we must 
understand what makes this moment different from every other‖ (Moment 3).  Agreeing 
with Taylor‘s suggestion, this dissertation claims that the difference of our age from 
others is the emergence of the strong feedback loops among technoscience, literature, 
and culture: although the feedback loops are not new, they have never been strong 
enough to account for a reality until today (Hayles, Chaos 295).  The feedback loops 
advance and at the same time obscure our understanding of physical, literary, and 
cognitive structures, producing complexity.  They lead to the emergence of the 
complexity paradigm and the emergence of the genre of scientific fiction.  The 
dissertation deems that the complexity paradigm, which values interconnective and 
interactive dynamics among systems and complexity produced by the dynamics, is the 
epistemological framework of the technoscience culture, and scientific fiction is its 
cultural product.   
The dissertation proposes scientific fiction as a critical genre that continuously 
increases the complexity of the technoscience culture: it is more than the literary 
 206 
representation of the culture.  Suggesting Cadigan‘s Synners, Bear‘s Blood Music, 
Piercy‘s He, She and It, and Jackson‘s Patchwork Girl as scientific fiction novels, the 
dissertation outlines how they re-envision humanity, subjectivity, ethics, and aesthetics 
within the parameters of the complexity paradigm of the technoscience culture.  By 
using the terms and concepts of complexity theory originating from the science of 
complexity, the dissertation addresses the fact that the novels combine scientific ideas 
and literary narratives, constructing a unique view to understand the technoscience 
culture and the human within it.  Scientific fiction is an expansion of literature, of 
cultural studies, and of science studies; it is not reduced to any of them and not separate 
from them.  Scientific fiction itself is a complexly-networked system, being sustained by 
the interconnections and interactions between two cultures—science/technology and 
art/literature— and adding more complexity to the cultural network.  Although this 
dissertation examines the works of the writers usually categorized as science fiction 
writers to show the emergence of the genre, the scope of scientific fiction is not within 
the genre of science fiction.  Richard Powers, for example, is one of non-science fiction 
writers who fully appreciates the critical nature of scientific fiction as a complex system 
and its epistemological potency, contributing to the establishment of the genre.  
Particularly, Powers‘s novels and his transdisciplinary insight into literature and 
technoscience can be used in defending the genre of scientific fiction from some critics, 
including William Deresiewicz, who have the traditional understanding of the 
relationship between the two cultures.   
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Powers utilizes the feedback loops between the two cultures and the concept of 
complexity as the theme and the structure of his novels.
106
  In reading Powers‘s scientific 
fiction novels, readers are expected to understand scientific knowledge through 
representations of the arts, and scientific knowledge, in turn, helps them interpret several 
works of art.  Particularly in The Gold Bug Variations, Powers relates Bach‘s 
combinatorial mastery of the thirty-two note base in the Goldberg Variations to thirty 
variations and the permutations of replicating DNA, assuming common patterns between 
them and suggesting the interconnectivity between art and science.  Further, by 
mentioning Edgar Allen Poe‘s ―The Gold Bug,‖ which shows how the pattern of 
information, not the content of information, can produce meaning, he claims that the 
interconnective dynamics is the pattern by which to create complexity or meaning.  In 
order to claim the creativity of the complexity produced by the dynamics, Powers 
presents the concept of the ―ecology of knowledge,‖ which signifies the network of the 
diverse fields of the two cultures, such as music, genetics, computer science, literature, 
art history, library science, and history (326).  The complex knowledge system promises 
to construct new knowledge, providing flexible and adapting viewpoints for the 
changing environment of the human.  He seems to want his scientific fiction novels to 
(re)present the ―ecology of knowledge.‖  The concept of the ―ecology of knowledge‖ is 
                                                   
106
 Among his novels, The Gold Bug Variations (1991), Galatea 2.2 (1995), and The Echo Maker (2006) 
shows the characteristics of scientific fiction, foregrounding the ideas of complexity based on complexity 
theory. Powers deals with the complexity produced by the interlocking relationship between science and 
art in The Gold Bug Variations, and then in Galatea 2.2, he specifies the topic into the relationship 
between science and literature, networking cognitive science, literature, and literary studies. Through 
Galatea 2.2, Powers tries to reconfigure the status of literature in the network culture and literary criticism 
based on the feedback loops between science and literature in the complexity paradigm. The Echo Maker 
thematizes the complex relationship between the activities of the human brain and the perception of 
reality, centering the concept of complexity in accounting for disorderly events and relationships among 
characters. 
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also reflected in the narrative structure of The Gold Bug Variations, forming the text as 
an interconnected whole: he makes his novel a complex, adaptive system operating by 
nonlinear, interconnective subsystems.  In this way, The Gold Bug Variations exploits 
the creative power of complexity from the interconnective dynamics.  In sum, through 
the novel, Powers shows that the dynamics of interconnectivity itself can create 
meaning.   
In a traditional understanding of the relationship between science/technology and 
humanities/literature, scientific fiction‘s transdisciplinary view is considered threatening 
to literature.  In ―Science Fiction‖ published in 2006, Deresiewicz critiques Powers‘s 
novels as examples of ―our culture‘s skewed understanding of the nature of fiction, and 
of knowledge‖ (25).  He claims that his critique of Powers‘s novels is ―not just that we 
don‘t understand the relationship between stories and ideas, [but] it‘s that there‘s a 
particular realm of ideas to which we assign supreme value: science‖ (25).  Claiming the 
distinction between the ―intellect‖ of literature and ―scientific acumen,‖ Deresiewicz 
asserts that The Gold Bug Variations is ―a container for scientific ideas‖ (25 and 26).  On 
the other hand, he advocates Thomas Pynchon‘s and Don DeLillo‘s novels dealing with 
science and technology, arguing they ―embody their perceptions about technological 
civilization in narratives that . . . bring out their human meanings, their impact on 
individual lives‖ and they ―introduce the complexity they find in both science and the 
civilization it has helped created into the texture of the narratives themselves‖ (26); for 
him, Powers pedantically exhibits scientific knowledge in his novels without exploring 
the complexity of human life embedded in science and the civilization constructed by 
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science.  Deresiewicz places literature outside the feedback loops between 
science/technology and the civilization or culture, confining the role of literature to 
merely the consumer of knowledge.  In contrast, Powers intentionally places his novels 
within the feedback loops, expanding the role of literature as a creator of knowledge—
more exactly, a participant in creating meanings.   
Asserting that Power‘s scientific fictions are not novels, Deresiewicz holds that 
―what novels are for‖ is to explore ―what it means to be alive at a particular time and 
place, what it feels like‖ (25).  In Deresiewicz‘s view of the novel, Cadigan‘s Synners, 
Bear‘s Blood Music, Piercy‘s He, She and It, and Jackson‘s Patchwork Girl also fall 
short of  ―good‖ novels since they focus on how interconnective dynamics produce the 
complexity of the human rather than ―human meanings‖ embedded in 
science/technology and the ―impact [of science/technology] on individual lives.‖  In 
other words, for scientific fiction writers, what the novel, or literature, is for is not just to 
dig out the meaning and complexity existing in the culture through writers‘ speculation, 
but to recreate meaning or knowledge in new versions through applying the patterns of 
dynamics that constitute the world to their works.  Scientific fiction suggests that novels 
or literature can serve not just to explore problems of the complex world and provide 
solutions to them, but to envision the evolutionary pattern of the human, stressing the 
creative power of complexity.  Indeed, it establishes its position as the critical tool of the 
complexity paradigm.   
In The Gold Bug Variations, Powers supposes that ―the world is only translation, 
nothing but‖ (491).  The ―translation‖ here means a becoming process through 
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interconnections and interactions with others.  Scientific fiction perceives the world as a 
complex system formed by the interconnective and interactive dynamics between 
(sub)systems; that is also how the world appears complex.  For this understanding of the 
world, which is the way that the complexity paradigm understands the world, the world 
is no more than a text made up of a network of interdependent metaphors and tropes.  
Hence, what both science and literature can do is to make their own text from the 
context.  Yet, translating the different texts from science and literature, scientific fiction 
deepens the knowledge that supposedly results from the combination.  In other words, 
scientific fiction is a genre that continues scientific communication and also practices its 
social significance, ethical implications, and aesthetic effects.  Ultimately, through the 
proposal of scientific fiction, this dissertation confirms the emergence of the complexity 
paradigm, expecting the paradigm to make sense of our world in a way we never were 
able to before.    
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